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349 
NOT “THE FRAMERS’ DESIGN”:  
HOW THE FRAMING-ERA BAN AGAINST 
HEARSAY EVIDENCE REFUTES THE 
CRAWFORD-DAVIS “TESTIMONIAL” 
FORMULATION OF THE SCOPE OF THE 
ORIGINAL CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
Thomas Y. Davies∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
According to proponents, an originalist approach to 
constitutional interpretation injects discipline into constitutional 
decision-making.1 At least in criminal procedure, this claim is 
                                                          
 ∗ E.E. Overton Distinguished Professor of Law and Alumni 
Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of 
Law. This article is a revised version of the author’s presentation for the 
symposium, Crawford and Beyond: Revisited in Dialogue, held at Brooklyn 
Law School, September 29, 2006 (originally titled “Originalist Alchemy: 
Applying the Crawford-Davis Testimonial/Nontestimonial Distinction Despite 
the Framing-Era General Ban against Hearsay Evidence”). 
 The author thanks Professor Robert Pitler for inviting him to participate 
in the symposium and also for a series of e-mail and phone exchanges in 
which Professor Pitler’s comments and queries spurred the author’s thinking 
on this topic. Additionally, the author thanks Professor Ronald Carlson, 
Professor Clifford Fishman, Professor Otis Stephens, Mr. Anthony Franze, 
and Mr. Robert Kry for their comments on drafts for this article. Of course, 
the opinions expressed and any errors are solely the responsibility of the 
author. 
 In this article, passages from the historical sources are quoted with the 
original spellings, capitalizations, and punctuation, but in modern typeface. 
However, in some instances shorter passages quoted in the text have been 
altered to follow modern capitalization conventions. 
1 Originalists also assert that the original understanding of a 
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unrealistic. Instead, the originalist claims that have appeared in 
recent criminal procedure decisions have usually reflected the 
ideological proclivities of the justices who made them, but have 
rarely resembled the historical legal doctrines that actually 
shaped the Framers’ understanding.2 
The divergence between originalist claims and historical 
doctrine has been particularly apparent in two recent decisions 
that construed the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause3 with 
regard to the admission of hearsay evidence in criminal trials. In 
the 2004 decision Crawford v. Washington,4 and again in the 
2006 decision Davis v. Washington,5 Justice Scalia asserted in 
opinions for the Court that “the Framers’ design”6 for the scope 
of the confrontation right was that the right should regulate the 
admission as evidence in criminal trials of only “testimonial” 
out-of-court statements, but not apply at all to less formal, 
“nontestimonial” hearsay evidence. 
As a practical matter, it seems likely that the narrow scope 
accorded to the confrontation right in Crawford will allow 
prosecutors considerable room to use hearsay evidence in 
criminal cases rather than produce the person who made the out-
                                                          
constitutional provision is entitled to heightened normative status as the 
content that was actually adopted. Given that stance, it is appropriate that 
claims of original meaning should be made only if there is clear historical 
evidence supporting the claim. See Thomas Y. Davies, Revisiting the 
Fictional Originalism in Crawford’s “Cross-Examination Rule”; A Reply to 
Mr. Kry, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 557, 571-73 (2007). 
2 See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-
Order Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-
Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
239, 252-66 (2002) (identifying examples of fictional originalist claims). 
3 In relevant part, the Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. That provision explicates an 
aspect of the provision in the Constitution that provides that “[t]he Trial of all 
Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury.” U.S. CONST. 
art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
4 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
5 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006) 
6 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
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of-court statement as a trial witness, even when the person who 
made the hearsay statement is readily available to be called. 
Thus, the Crawford formulation of the limited scope of the right 
appears to mean that criminal defendants will often be deprived 
of meeting face to face the available declarant who made the 
out-of-court statement and will also be deprived of cross-
examining the declarant in the view of the jury. Is that outcome 
really consistent with the framing-era doctrine that shaped the 
Framers’ understanding of the confrontation right? 
Plainly not. Although Justice Scalia endorsed formulating the 
Confrontation Clause to permit “only those [hearsay] exceptions 
established at the time of the founding,”7 he did not follow 
through on identifying such exceptions in Crawford or Davis.8 If 
he had actually canvassed the framing-era evidence authorities, 
he would have discovered that framing-era evidence doctrine 
imposed a virtually total ban against using unsworn hearsay 
evidence to prove a criminal defendant’s guilt.9 Although 
                                                          
7 Id. at 54. 
8 The absence of historical evidence regarding the claims in Crawford 
about the scope of the confrontation right may not be immediately apparent 
because Justice Scalia did mention a few of the relevant authorities when he 
discussed the so-called “cross-examination rule” that Crawford construed as 
the substantive content of the confrontation right regarding the admission of 
testimonial hearsay in criminal trials. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42-50. 
However, Justice Scalia did not discuss the framing-era authorities when he 
discussed the limitation of the scope of the confrontation right to testimonial, 
rather than nontestimonial, hearsay. See id. at 50-53. 
9 I refer to “unsworn hearsay” for clarity, although that usage is actually 
redundant in framing-era parlance, because hearsay was defined simply as an 
unsworn out-of-court statement by someone other than the defendant. See, 
e.g., infra text accompanying notes 124, 137, 144. One difficulty in writing 
about the historical evolution of hearsay doctrine is that the doctrinal 
definition of hearsay has changed over time. 
 Today, hearsay is typically defined as “a statement, other than one made 
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted.” FED. R. EVID. 801 (c). For a 
discussion of the features of that definition, see, e.g., JONES ON EVIDENCE: 
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL §§ 24:2-24:31 (Clifford S. Fishman ed., 7th ed. 2000). 
However, the eighteenth-century legal authorities did not include the 
qualification that the statement be offered “for the truth of the matter 
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framing-era law did permit some hearsay evidence to be 
admitted regarding certain specific issues in civil lawsuit trials, 
those exceptions were not understood to apply to criminal trials. 
Instead, as of 1789, a dying declaration of a murder victim was 
the only kind of unsworn out-of-court statement that could be 
admitted in a criminal trial to prove the guilt of the defendant. 
Otherwise, the hearsay “exceptions” that now constitute a 
prominent feature of criminal evidence law had not yet been 
invented. Instead, nineteenth-century judges invented the hearsay 
exceptions that now apply to criminal trials only after the 
framing. Hence, it is clear that the Framers did not design the 
Confrontation Clause so as to accommodate the admission of 
unsworn hearsay statements. 
Indeed, the framing-era authorities indicate that admission of 
hearsay statements would have violated basic principles of 
common-law criminal evidence. In particular, the framing-era 
sources indicate that the confrontation right itself prohibited the 
use of hearsay statements as evidence of the defendant’s guilt. 
The condemnations of hearsay that appeared in prominent and 
widely used framing-era authorities typically recognized that the 
admission of a hearsay statement would deprive the defendant of 
the opportunity to cross-examine the speaker in the presence of 
the trial jury, and that opportunity to cross-examine was 
understood to be a salient aspect of the confrontation right. 
Thus, the framing-era sources actually suggest that the Framers 
would not have approved of the hearsay exceptions that were 
later invented because the Framers would have perceived such 
exceptions to violate a defendant’s confrontation right. 
Hence, Crawford’s testimonial formulation of the scope of 
the confrontation right does not reflect “the Framers’ design.” 
Rather, Crawford’s permissive allowance of unsworn hearsay is 
inconsistent with the basic premises that shaped the Framers’ 
understanding of the right. Thus, whatever might be said for or 
                                                          
asserted.” Rather, the historical authorities cited in this article simply defined 
hearsay to include any unsworn out-of-court statement. I speculate that the 
offered-for-the-truth qualification was added to the definition of hearsay when 
the “res gestae” concept was developed during the nineteenth century. See 
infra note 279. 
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against Crawford’s formulation as a matter of contemporary 
constitutional policy, the fictional character of the historical 
claims made in that opinion constitute further evidence that 
originalism is a defective approach to constitutional decision-
making. 
OVERVIEW OF THIS ARTICLE 
This article documents the fictional character of Crawford’s 
historical claim that the scope of the original Confrontation 
Clause reached only testimonial but not nontestimonial hearsay 
statements.10 Part I briefly reviews the originalist claims in 
Crawford and Davis, calling particular attention to the point that 
Justice Scalia did not base his originalist claim regarding the 
limited scope of the confrontation right on direct evidence of the 
treatment of hearsay statements in the framing-era legal 
authorities, but rather based it only on “reasonable inference[s]” 
that he drew from the general history of the right and from the 
use of the term “witnesses” in the text of the Clause. I argue, 
however, that the validity of his “reasonable inference[s]” 
actually depends upon whether framing-era law recognized 
exceptions to the ban against hearsay that would have permitted 
                                                          
10 I have previously criticized the originalist claims made in Crawford 
about the scope of the confrontation right in Thomas Y. Davies, What Did 
the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It? Fictional Originalism in 
Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOKLYN L. REV. 105, 189-206 (2005). 
 In my previous article, I argued that there was no historical basis for 
Crawford’s distinction between “testimonial” and “nontestimonial” hearsay, 
but I accepted the view, evident in some recent historical commentary, that 
hearsay exceptions were still “embryonic” at the time the Bill of Rights was 
framed. See id. at 196-200. However, further research on framing-era 
doctrine indicates that the hearsay exceptions that are now pertinent to 
criminal trials were not merely underdeveloped but virtually non-existent at 
the time of the framing. Hence, the criticisms in my prior article actually 
understated the fictional character of Crawford’s originalist claims about the 
testimonial scope of the original Confrontation Clause. The fictional character 
of the Court’s justification for restricting the scope of the right is significant 
because it increasingly appears that the restriction of the confrontation right 
to only “testimonial” but not “nontestimonial” hearsay will be the more 
important aspect of Crawford’s originalist formulation. See infra note 291. 
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the admission of unsworn, informal hearsay statements. 
Part II examines the framing-era legal authorities to explicate 
how framing-era law actually treated the admissibility of out-of-
court statements. According to those authorities, the only two 
kinds of out-of-court statements that constituted admissible 
criminal evidence involved either a sworn statement of an 
unavailable witness (in the case of a Marian witness examination 
of a deceased witness) or a functionally sworn statement of an 
unavailable witness (in the case of a dying declaration of a 
murder victim). However, those authorities did not identify any 
exceptions to the ban against using unsworn out-of-court 
statements, or even sworn statements of available witnesses, as 
evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Indeed, the framing-era 
authorities did not treat the ban against hearsay and the 
confrontation right as being analytically independent of one 
another. Rather, those authorities treated the defendant’s right to 
cross-examine—that is, the confrontation right—as one of the 
principles that required the ban against the use of hearsay 
statements to prove a defendant’s guilt. Hence, Crawford’s 
insistence on defining the scope of the confrontation right 
without regard to the law of evidence at the time of the framing 
is itself a departure from the Framers’ understanding of the 
right. 
Next, Part III closely examines the few historical cases that 
were discussed in Davis, and argues that what judges actually 
ruled in those cases is consistent with the description of 
historical evidence doctrine set out in Part II, rather than with 
the testimonial formulation of the confrontation right set out in 
Crawford. In particular, I note that the two cases that were 
identified in Davis for excluding an out-of-court statement both 
did so on the ground that the statement was not properly sworn, 
not because the statement was “testimonial” rather than 
“nontestimonial” in character. Additionally, a prominent 
framing-era source indicates that the only case identified in 
Crawford or Davis that might appear to admit a nontestimonial 
hearsay statement under an “excited utterance” or “res gestae” 
exception actually involved a very different consideration. The 
bottom line is that neither Crawford nor Davis identified a single 
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example of a framing-era case that actually admitted unsworn 
hearsay as evidence of a criminal defendant’s guilt. 
The contrast between the ban against admitting unsworn 
hearsay evidence of a defendant’s guilt during the framing era 
and the variety of exceptions that now frequently permit use of 
hearsay evidence in criminal trials poses an obvious question: 
when and why did post-framing judges invent the current 
hearsay exceptions? Part IV offers additional evidence that the 
current hearsay exceptions post-date the framing, and speculates 
as to some of the reasons why nineteenth-century judges 
departed from the original confrontation right by allowing the 
use of hearsay evidence. 
Finally, the article concludes by arguing, as I have on prior 
occasions, that originalism is a fundamentally flawed approach 
to constitutional interpretation in criminal procedure issues 
because originalists fail to grasp—or to admit—the degree to 
which legal doctrine and legal institutions have changed since 
the framing.11 
  
                                                          
11 For clarity, let me stress that I am not an originalist and do not 
criticize Justice Scalia’s formulation of the original Confrontation Clause to 
advocate an alternative originalist program for criminal procedure. Rather, I 
do not think it is either feasible or desirable to return to the original 
conception of that Clause or the other criminal procedure provisions in the 
Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 10, at 206-17; Thomas Y. 
Davies, Farther and Farther from the Original Fifth Amendment: The 
Recharacterization of the Right Against Self-Incrimination as a “Trial Right” 
in Chavez v. Martinez, 70 TENN. L. REV. 987, 1043-1045 (2003) 
[hereinafter, “Davies, Fifth Amendment”]; Davies, supra note 2 at 436-37; 
Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. 
REV. 547, 740-750 (1999) [hereinafter “Davies, Fourth Amendment”]. 
 My point is simply that a Justice should not invoke “the Framers’ 
design” as an elevated normative justification for criminal procedure rulings 
unless there is actually clear evidence of the original meaning in the authentic 
framing-era sources. Fictional originalist claims cannot provide legitimate 
justifications for constitutional rulings. 
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I.  THE ORIGINALIST CLAIMS ABOUT THE SCOPE OF THE 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE IN CRAWFORD AND DAVIS 
In modern doctrine, the relationship between the allowance 
of hearsay evidence and the confrontation right presents a 
conundrum: how can the admission of hearsay evidence in 
criminal trials be justified given that the defendant can neither 
meet the out-of-court declarant face-to-face nor cross examine 
the out-of-court declarant in the view of the jury? The Supreme 
Court previously recognized that conundrum when it stated that 
“a literal reading of the Confrontation Clause would ‘abrogate 
virtually every hearsay exception, a result long rejected as 
unintended and too extreme.’”12 
In Crawford, Justice Scalia purported to solve the 
conundrum by reference to “the Framers’ design” for a 
testimonial confrontation right. In Davis, Justice Scalia then 
repeated the same originalist formulation when he undertook to 
explain the testimonial boundary of the cross-examination right 
announced in Crawford. The most significant feature of the 
originalist claims about the testimonial scope of the 
confrontation right in these two cases is that Justice Scalia did 
not base his formulation of “the Framers’ design” on “direct 
evidence” of the common-law confrontation right as it was 
understood in 1789, but instead only drew “reasonable 
inference[s]” about the scope of the right.13 
A.  Crawford’s Testimonial Formulation of “the Framers’ 
Design” 
Writing for the Court in 2004 in Crawford, Justice Scalia 
construed the confrontation right to be fairly strict in substance, 
                                                          
12 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 848 (1990) (quoting Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980)). Note, however, that the term “long” in 
the passage quoted in the text does not precisely identify how far back in time 
the implied ban against hearsay exceptions had been rejected as being “too 
extreme.” 
13 See infra note 47. 
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but narrow in scope. With regard to the substance of the right, 
Justice Scalia asserted that the Framers intended to limit the use 
of out-of-court statements according to a “cross-examination 
rule”: that is, the Clause would bar the use of an out-of-court 
statement in a criminal trial unless (1) the declarant was 
unavailable to testify at trial and (2) the defendant had had a 
prior opportunity to cross examine the declarant.14 (I have 
previously criticized Crawford’s originalist claims regarding the 
cross-examination rule, but I do not address that aspect further 
in this article.15) 
In contrast to the relatively strict substance accorded the 
confrontation right,16 Justice Scalia announced a narrow 
conception of the scope of the right. Justice Scalia described the 
use as evidence in criminal trials of formal out-of-court 
statements such as ex parte depositions as the “principal evil” 
targeted by the Clause17 and as the “core concern” addressed in 
the Clause.18 Thus, he asserted that the regulation of this type of 
hearsay, which he labeled “testimonial” hearsay, was the 
Framers’ “primary object.”19 Moreover, he asserted that, 
because the Framers were “focused” on testimonial hearsay,20 
the Framers could not have intended for the Confrontation 
Clause to impede the admissibility of informal, “nontestimonial 
hearsay” at all. On that basis, the Court’s opinion in Crawford 
strongly suggested that the admissibility of nontestimonial 
hearsay statements does not implicate a constitutional standard 
but rather should be determined only by the (usually state) law 
                                                          
14 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004). 
15 See infra note 120. 
16 I describe Crawford’s cross-examination rule as a “relatively strict” 
standard because the requirement of an opportunity to cross-examine prior to 
trial is not actually equivalent to an opportunity to cross-examine in the 
presence of the trial jury. However, the latter was the historical 
understanding of the confrontation right. See, e.g., infra note 23, quoting the 
Supreme Court’s earlier iteration of the historical standard. 
17 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50. 
18 Id. at 51, 60. 
19 Id. at 53. 
20 Id. at 51. 
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of hearsay evidence itself.21 (Although these statements about the 
scope of the right took the form of dicta in Crawford, the Court 
subsequently adopted that formulation as law in Davis.22) 
1.  The Road to Crawford’s Testimonial Formulation 
Justice Scalia’s Crawford opinion did not invent the 
narrowed, testimonial formulation of the scope of the 
confrontation right. A number of prior Supreme Court opinions 
had asserted that the Framers had been primarily concerned with 
preventing trial by ex parte deposition.23 However, the Court 
deviated from that view in the 1980 ruling Ohio v. Roberts,24 
under which it more or less merged confrontation analysis with 
hearsay analysis.25 Subsequently, the Roberts formulation was 
                                                          
21 Id. at 68. 
22 In Crawford, Justice Scalia concluded that that case did not present a 
vehicle for authoritatively ruling on the scope of the right because the hearsay 
statement at issue was so obviously “testimonial” that it would be subject to 
the confrontation right under any construction of the scope of the 
Confrontation Clause, and thus the issue of the scope of the right was not 
properly before the Court. 541 U.S. at 53. However, because the two cases 
decided in Davis presented closer questions regarding the applicability of the 
right, the Davis opinion clearly ruled that the scope of the confrontation right 
is limited to testimonial hearsay statements. Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 
2266, 2274-76 (2006). 
23 For example, in 1895, the Supreme Court stated that: 
The primary object of [the Confrontation Clause] was to prevent 
depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes 
admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of 
a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in 
which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the 
recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of 
compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that 
they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand 
and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is 
worthy of belief. 
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895). 
24 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
25 See e.g., Daniel J. Capra, Amending the Hearsay Exception for 
Declarations Against Penal Interest in the Wake of Crawford, 105 COLUM. L. 
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widely criticized as robbing the confrontation right of any 
independent substance.26 
Perhaps to place a restrictive view of the confrontation right 
on a firmer constitutional footing, the Justice Department 
proposed a narrow, purportedly textualist construction of the 
scope of the Confrontation Clause in a 1992 amicus brief in 
White v. Illinois.27 In response, Justice Thomas endorsed 
limiting the scope of the confrontation right to what he termed 
“testimonial materials” in a concurring opinion in White, which 
Justice Scalia joined.28 Thereafter, several commentators also 
endorsed proposals to limit the scope of the right with regard to 
hearsay evidence.29 Of course, Justice Scalia’s Crawford opinion 
limited the scope of the right in a similar fashion, but the 
originalist rationale he offered for his “testimonial” formulation 
                                                          
REV. 2409, 2409-10 (2005) (noting that, prior to Crawford, the Supreme 
Court had “tended to equate the Confrontation Clause with the hearsay 
exceptions that are found in the Federal Rules of Evidence”); Richard D. 
Friedman, Confrontation, the Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L. J. 
1011, 1014-22 (1998) (discussing confrontation rulings under Roberts and its 
progeny and concluding that in those rulings “the Supreme Court has tended 
to conform the Confrontation Clause to prevailing hearsay doctrine”). 
26 See e.g., Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to 
the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 575 (1988) (concluding that 
the Roberts approach made the Confrontation Clause “a mere vestigial 
appendix of hearsay doctrine”); David E. Seidelson, The Confrontation 
Clause, the Right Against Self-Incrimination and the Supreme Court: A 
Critique and Some Modest Proposals, 20 DUQ. L. REV. 429, 433 (1982) 
(concluding that the Roberts approach made the Confrontation Clause 
“nothing more than a ‘constitutional hearsay rule’ subject to many 
exceptions”). 
27 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent 
at 17-29, White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (arguing that the term 
“witnesses” in the Confrontation Clause indicates that it should apply only to 
those persons who provide in-court testimony or the functional equivalent in 
the form of affidavits, depositions, confessions, etc). 
28 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 366 (1992) (Thomas, J., joined by 
Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
29 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 25; Akhil R. Amar,. Foreword: Sixth 
Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641 (1996), reprinted in AKHIL R. 
AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 125-131 (1997) 
[hereinafter “AMAR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE”]. 
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differed significantly from that presented in prior proposals. 
The previous proponents of a testimonial construction who 
took an originalist approach had assumed that framing-era law 
recognized hearsay exceptions and, thus, that the Framers must 
have framed the confrontation right to allow for such 
exceptions.30 For example, when Justice Thomas endorsed 
limiting the Confrontation Clause to only testimonial hearsay 
statements in White, he rested that proposal on an assumption 
that hearsay exceptions already existed during the framing era: 
“there is little if any indication in the historical record that the 
exceptions to the hearsay rule were understood to be limited by 
the simultaneously evolving common-law right of 
confrontation.”31 However, although Justice Thomas assumed 
that the framing-era confrontation right was analytically 
independent of hearsay analysis, he did not actually identify any 
hearsay exceptions that had emerged by the date of the framing. 
Similarly, when Professor Amar advocated a restriction of 
the confrontation right to testimonial hearsay statements, he also 
premised that proposal on the assumption that “surely all 
hearsay cannot be unconstitutional [because a]t common law, the 
traditional hearsay ‘rule’ was notoriously unruly, recognizing 
countless exceptions to its basic preference for live testimony.” 
However, like Justice Thomas, Amar also provided no examples 
of those “countless exceptions.”32 
Perhaps because the testimonial formulation of the 
confrontation right seemed to depend upon the purported 
existence of framing-era criminal hearsay exceptions, the 
Solicitor General’s amicus brief in Crawford undertook to 
document such exceptions. However the listing offered in that 
                                                          
30 Although Professor Friedman’s article did briefly describe the early 
history of the confrontation right to the middle of the seventeenth century, it 
did not address the relationship between the confrontation right and hearsay 
evidence at the time of the framing. See Friedman, supra note 25, at 1022-
25. 
31 502 U.S. 346, 346 (1992) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
32 AMAR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 29, at 94. 
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brief distorted historical doctrine.33 Moreover, Chief Justice 
                                                          
33 The text of the amicus brief of the United States asserted that: 
The hearsay rule [] is a feature of evidence law applicable to all 
litigants in both civil and criminal proceedings. The 
“appreciation of the impropriety of using hearsay statements” 
took increasing hold in England during the 17th century; and by 
the early 18th century, the general prohibition against admitting 
hearsay declarations “received a fairly constant enforcement.” 5 
J. Wigmore [Evidence], §1364, at 18 [Chadbourne rev. ed. 
1974]. From the outset, however the hearsay rule was subject to 
well recognized (and enduring) exceptions. 
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 12-13, 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (emphasis added). In an 
accompanying footnote, the amicus brief asserted the following specific 
exceptions: 
At least the following exceptions had taken shape by the late 18th 
century: dying declarations, regularly kept records, co-
conspirator declarations, evidence of pedigree and familily 
history, and various kinds of reputation evidence. See Patton v. 
Freeman, 1 N.J.L. 113,115 (N.J. 1791) (co-conspirator 
declarations); 5 J. Wigmore, [Evidence], § 1430, at 275 
[Chadbourne rev. ed. 1974] (dying declarations); id. § 1518, at 
426-428 (regularly kept records); id. § 1476, at 350 
(declarations against interest by deceased persons); id. § 1476, 
at 352-358 (statements of fact against penal interest); id. § 1480, 
at 363 (pedigree and family history); id. § 1580, at 544 
(reputation evidence); 3 J. Wigmore, supra, § 735, at 78-84 
(past recollection recorded). See also 3 W. Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Law of England 368 (1768). 
Id. at 13 n. 5 (repeating claims about framing-era hearsay exceptions 
previously made in Brief of the Unites States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at 24 n. 14, White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992)). 
 These passages distorted the law of hearsay in 1789 in a variety of ways. 
To begin with, the amicus brief erred in suggesting that historical hearsay 
exceptions applied equally in civil and criminal trials. To the contrary, the 
confrontation right incorporated in the Sixth Amendment pertained to 
criminal trials and it was understood at the time of the framing that the 
hearsay exceptions allowed in trials of civil lawsuits did not apply to evidence 
in criminal trials. See infra note 162 and accompanying text. Hence, civil 
hearsay exceptions had no bearing on the confrontation right. 
 Likewise, the brief’s suggestion that Blackstone endorsed hearsay 
exceptions was overstated. Blackstone actually indicated that hearsay 
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exceptions that applied in civil lawsuit trials were quite limited, but did not 
mention hearsay being admissible in criminal trials at all. The passage cited 
in the amicus brief, which appeared in Blackstone’s discussion of civil 
lawsuits, the subject of volume three of his Commentaries, actually stated: 
So no evidence of a discourse with another will be admitted, but 
the man himself must be produced; yet in some cases (as proof 
of any general customs, or matters of common tradition or 
repute) the courts admit of hearsay evidence, or an account of 
what persons deceased have declared in their lifetime: but such 
evidence will not be received of particular facts. 
3 BLACKSTONE, supra, at 368 (emphasis added). That is hardly a ringing 
endorsement of hearsay exceptions even in civil trials. 
 Additionally, the only historical hearsay exception identified in the 
Solicitor General’s amicus brief that was actually pertinent to evidence in 
criminal trials was that for dying declarations; however, even that exception 
was limited to the declaration of a “murder victim.” See infra text 
accompanying notes 147-154. The other exceptions the brief mentioned that 
might appear to be pertinent to criminal trials actually were not recognized in 
framing-era sources. For example, the citation in the amicus brief of the 1791 
New Jersey decision in Patton v. Freeman as authority for a “co-conspirator 
declarations” exception was misleading. Patton was a civil damages lawsuit 
for fraud, not a criminal case; the court prefaced its rulings by noting that the 
case was “a civil action” involving “the interests of the plaintiff in a civil 
suit.” The case simply did not address admissible criminal evidence. As I 
explain below, at the time of the framing, statements of co-conspirators could 
sometimes be admitted to prove the general existence of a conspiracy but 
could not be admitted to prove the defendant’s personal involvement in it. 
See infra note 126. 
 There is also no basis for the assertion in the Solicitor General’s brief 
that framing-era sources recognized an exception for “statements against 
penal interest.” Instead, the passage by Wigmore cited in the amicus brief as 
authority for that exception actually claimed only that a broad exception for 
“declarations of facts against interest” (presumably in civil trials) emerged 
“from 1800 to about 1830”—that is, after the framing—and noted that the 
exception was subsequently limited “to exclude the statement of a fact 
subjecting the declarant to a criminal liability, and [was] confined to 
statements of facts against either pecuniary or property interest.” 5 Wigmore, 
supra, §1476, at 350-51. Likewise, the Wigmore passage cited by the amicus 
brief as authority for this claim (“§1476, at 352-358”) actually sets out 
nineteenth-century American state cases that addressed this issue and usually 
ruled “the confession” (that is, the statement against penal interest) 
inadmissible. 
 The reference in the amicus brief to an exception for “regularly kept 
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Rehnquist effectively threw cold water on that listing when he 
quoted what a prominent framing-era evidence authority had 
actually written on the subject of hearsay. 
2.  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Historical Observation 
In a concurring opinion in Crawford, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
opposed replacing the Roberts approach with the testimonial 
formulation adopted by the majority. In setting out his 
opposition, the Chief Justice pointed out that Justice Scalia’s 
testimonial formulation actually had no roots in framing-era law. 
In particular, the Chief Justice quoted a statement in the leading 
framing-era evidence treatise to the effect that “hearsay is no 
evidence” and correctly interpreted that to mean that unsworn 
out-of-court statements, made by anyone other than the accused, 
were generally not considered substantive evidence upon which a 
criminal conviction could be based.34 Thus, the Chief Justice 
concluded that “unsworn testimonial [hearsay] statements were 
treated no differently at common law than were nontestimonial 
[hearsay] statements.”35 Rather, the historical sources indicated 
that there was a general bar against the admission of unsworn 
                                                          
records” was also exaggerated. Even in civil lawsuit trials, there was no 
broad exception for “regularly kept records” during the framing era; rather, 
there was only a narrow allowance for the admission of the “shop book” of a 
tradesman in a lawsuit over non-payment for goods. So far as I can 
determine, no framing-era authority suggested that the narrow “shop-book” 
exception was relevant to a criminal trial. See infra note 43. 
 In sum, except for the “dying declaration” exception, there was no 
substance to the historical claims the Solicitor General’s amicus brief made 
regarding supposed framing-era criminal hearsay exceptions. 
34 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 69-70, n. 2 (2004) (quoting 
GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 152 (3d ed. 1769) and also 
citing King v. Brasier, 1 Leach 199, 200, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (Twelve 
Judges, 1779). For a discussion of Gilbert’s treatise, see infra notes 135-139 
and accompanying text, The passage Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted in 
Crawford is set out infra text accompanying note 137. For a discussion of 
Brasier, see infra notes 217-239 and accompanying text. 
35 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 71. 
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hearsay statements in a criminal trial.36 
Nevertheless, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not consistently 
adhere to the implications of the framing-era doctrine that 
“[h]earsay is no evidence.” Rather, in later statements in his 
concurring opinion he suggested that there had “always” been 
hearsay exceptions, but did not identify them.37 Even so, the 
                                                          
36 The phrase “general bar” is actually Justice Scalia’s interpretation of 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s position, but I think it is an accurate summation. 
See id. at 52 n. 3. 
37 Chief Justice Rehnquist undertook to discredit the historical pedigree 
of the testimonial formulation while defending the previous formulation of the 
confrontation right in Roberts. His opinion initially conceded that neither the 
Roberts formulation nor Justice Scalia’s testimonial formulation was 
consistent with framing-era law. Id. at 69 (“The Court’s distinction between 
testimonial and nontestimonial statements, contrary to its claim, is no better 
rooted in history than our current doctrine”). 
 However, in a subsequent passage, the Chief Justice ignored the 
implication of the framing-era rule that he had quoted to the effect that 
“hearsay is no evidence” and instead asserted that “[b]etween 1700 and 1800 
the rules regarding the admissibility of out-of-court statements were still 
being developed [so] there were always exceptions to the general rule of 
exclusion [of out-of-court statements], and it is not clear . . . that the 
Framers categorically wanted to eliminate further ones.” Id. at 73 (citing 
modern historical commentaries previously cited id. at 69 n. 1, including, 
among others, JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL 
TRIAL 238-39 (2003) [hereinafter, “LANGBEIN, ADVERSARY TRIAL”]; 5 JOHN 
H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1364, 17, 19-20, 19, n. 33 (Chadbourne rev. ed. 
1974); T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 
499, 534-35 (1999); Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause 
and Hearsay Doctrine Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse 
Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 738-46; Stephan Landsman, Rise of 
the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth Century England, 
75 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 506 (1990), and John H. Langbein, Criminal Trial 
before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 291-293 (1978)). Notably, 
however, the Chief Justice did not identify any framing-era authority that 
actually identified hearsay exceptions under which unsworn out-of-court 
statements could be admitted to prove a criminal defendant’s guilt. Rather, 
the Chief Justice’s statement that modern histories show that “there were 
always exceptions” to the exclusion of hearsay statements was too broad 
insofar as it failed to distinguish between civil and criminal evidence. To the 
extent that general statements in the modern commentaries the Chief Justice 
cited might appear to indicate that there were legally recognized hearsay 
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Chief Justice’s quotation of historical doctrine undercut the 
previous originalist assumption that there must have been 
framing-era hearsay exceptions, and thus undermined the 
previous originalist testimonial formulations of the confrontation 
right. 
3.  Justice Scalia’s Historical Assertions 
Like the Chief Justice, Justice Scalia also made inconsistent 
statements in Crawford regarding framing-era hearsay 
exceptions. At one point, Justice Scalia wrote that the 
Confrontation Clause “is most naturally read as a reference to 
the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those 
exceptions established at the time of the founding.”38 Shortly 
thereafter, he followed the Chief Justice in asserting that 
“‘[t]here were always exceptions to the general rule of 
exclusion’ of hearsay evidence”39 and also asserted that 
“[s]everal [hearsay exceptions] had become well established by 
1791.”40 In that context, Justice Scalia specifically asserted that 
hearsay exceptions had existed for “business records” and for 
“statements in furtherance of a conspiracy.”41 However, Justice 
                                                          
exceptions that applied in framing-era criminal trials (other than dying 
declarations of murder victims) those statements were overbroad and 
incorrect, as the review of framing-era authorities set out in Part II of this 
article demonstrates. 
38 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54 (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 
237, 243 (1895); cf. State v. Houser 26 Mo. 431, 433-35 (1858)). 
39 Id. at 56 (quoting id. at 73 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)). 
40 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004) (citing 3 WIGMORE 
§1397, at 101 (2d ed. 1923); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 
13, n. 5, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)). 
41 After quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist’s assertion that “[t]here were 
always exceptions to the general rule of exclusion” of hearsay evidence, 
Justice Scalia wrote: 
Several [hearsay exceptions] had become well established by 
1791. See 3 Wigmore [EVIDENCE] §1397, at 101 [2d ed. 1923]; 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 13 n. 5. Most of 
the hearsay examples covered statements that by their nature 
were not testimonial—for example business records or 
statements in furtherance of a conspiracy. We do not infer that 
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Scalia offered no significant support for those historical claims. 
The general statements he cited as evidence that there had been 
relevant hearsay exceptions in 1791 were overgeneralized or 
insubstantial,42 and the specific examples he offered were 
overblown: even in civil lawsuits, framing-era sources did not 
recognize anything like the modern “business records” 
exception,43 and framing-era sources consistently stated that a 
                                                          
the Framers thought exceptions would apply even to prior 
testimony. 
541 U.S. at 56. 
42 Justice Scalia cited a passage by Dean Wigmore and the amicus brief 
of the United States as authority for his general claim that “several [hearsay 
exceptions] had become well established by 1791.” See 541 U.S. at 56 
(passage quoted supra preceding note). However, neither of those sources 
constituted valid support for that claim. 
 The passage from Wigmore that Justice Scalia cited merely made a broad 
assertion that there were “a number of well established [hearsay exceptions] 
at the time of the earliest [American state] constitutions,” but did not actually 
identify any such exception. See 3 Wigmore, supra, § 1397, at 101 [2d ed. 
1923], cited 541 U.S., at 56. Notably, Wigmore’s discussion did not 
distinguish between hearsay exceptions relevant to civil lawsuit trials and 
those relevant to criminal trials. Hence, his statement was too general to 
indicate that there had been hearsay exceptions applicable to criminal trials. 
 Additionally, the listing of purported framing-era hearsay exceptions in 
the amicus brief of the United States was insubstantial and erroneous, as 
described supra note 33. 
43 Contrary to Justice Scalia’s suggestion, even in civil lawsuits there 
was no broad framing-era hearsay exception for “business records.” Rather, 
framing-era authorities recognized only that the “shop-book” of a merchant 
could be admitted as evidence to prove delivery of goods in civil lawsuits, in 
lieu of live testimony, provided two conditions were met: (1) the action for 
payment was brought within a year of the transaction, and (2) the clerk who 
regularly entered the accounts had died, and his handwriting in the book 
could be identified. Even in that circumstance, however, framing-era 
authorities referred to shop-book evidence as “written evidence” rather than 
as “hearsay.” 
 For example, in 1767, a leading treatise on evidence in trials in civil 
lawsuits stated the following in a discussion of written evidence: 
Before we conclude with written Evidence, it is proper to take 
Notice of [the statute] 7 Jac. c. 12, which enacts, That the 
Shop-book of a Tradesman shall not be Evidence after a Year. 
However, it is not Evidence of itself within the Year, without 
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co-conspirator’s unsworn statement was not admissible to prove 
a criminal defendant’s personal guilt.44 
Notwithstanding these assertions, at other points in 
Crawford, Justice Scalia seemed to question whether there had 
been framing-era hearsay exceptions that could be relevant to 
criminal trials. For example, he expressed a note of skepticism 
                                                          
some Circumstances to make it so. As if it be proved that the 
Servant who wrote it is dead, and that it is his Hand-Writing, 
and that he was accustomed to make the entries. 
BATHURST, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT NISI 
PRIUS 265-66 (1767) (“nisi prius” refers to trial jurisdiction). 
 In 1768, Blackstone essentially repeated Bathurst’s description of the 
conditions for admitting shop-book entries into evidence in his discussion of 
evidence in civil lawsuits: 
So too, books of account, or shop-books, are not allowed of 
themselves to be given in evidence for the owner; but a servant 
who made the entry may have recourse to them to refresh his 
memory: and, if such servant (who was accostomed to make 
those entries) be dead, and his hand be proved, the book may be 
read in evidence: for as tradesmen are often under a necessity of 
giving credit without any note or writing, this is therefore, when 
accompanied with such other collateral proofs of fairness and 
regularity, the best evidence that can then be produced . . . . 
However, this dangerous species of evidence is not carried so 
far in England as abroad; [because] the statute 7 Jac. I c. 12, 
(the penners of which seem to have imagined that the books of 
themselves were evidence at common law) confines this species 
of proof to such transactions as happened within one year before 
the action brought; unless between merchant and merchant in the 
usual intercourse of trade. For accounts of so recent a date, if 
erroneous, may more easily be unravelled and adjusted. 
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 368-
69 (1st ed. 1768) (citing “Law of nisi prius. 266”). 
 A 1791 revision of a leading evidence treatise still gave essentially the 
same treatment of shop-book evidence. See 1 GEOFFREY GILBERT, LAW OF 
EVIDENCE 206-08 (Capel Lofft ed. 1791) (discussion appearing in Part II, 
“Of Written Evidence, Private”; Chapter I, Section VII “Of Secondary 
Evidence”; Title II, “Tradesmen’s Books”). Lofft added this section when he 
expanded Gilbert’s treatise in 1791; no similar discussion of shop-book 
evidence had appeared in earlier editions of Gilbert’s evidence treatise. 
44 See infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
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as to whether there had been a framing-era “excited utterance” 
exception,45 and he noted that a commentary on the 
Confrontation Clause had previously concluded that the 
exception for dying declarations “was the only recognized 
criminal hearsay exception at common law.”46 
In still another passage, Justice Scalia seemed to adopt the 
position that it did not really matter what hearsay exceptions did 
or did not exist at the time of the framing. In a footnote 
responding to the Chief Justice, Justice Scalia asserted that the 
absence of “direct evidence” regarding the Framers’ view of the 
admissibility of unsworn hearsay evidence was not a problem for 
originalist analysis because the Framers’ design for the 
application of the confrontation right to hearsay exceptions that 
had not existed at the time the Sixth Amendment was adopted 
could nevertheless be “estimated” by making “reasonable 
inference[s].”47 
                                                          
45 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58 n. 8 (2004) (suggesting 
that the historical spontaneous declaration hearsay exception was narrow “to 
the extent the hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations existed at all”). 
46 Id. at 56 n. 6 (quoting FRANCIS HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 105 
(1951) (emphasis in Crawford). I concur with Professor Heller’s conclusion 
on this point, as indicated in Part II of this article. 
47 Justice Scalia wrote: 
. . . even if, as [the Chief Justice] claims, a general bar on 
unsworn hearsay made application of the Confrontation Clause 
to unsworn testimonial statements a moot point, that would 
merely change our focus from direct evidence of original 
meaning of the Sixth Amendment to reasonable inference. [. . .] 
Any attempt to determine the application of a constitutional 
provision to a phenomenon that did not exist at the time of its 
adoption (here, allegedly admissible unsworn testimony) 
involves some degree of estimation—what The Chief Justice 
calls use of a “proxy”—but that is hardly a reason not to make 
the estimation as accurate as possible. Even if, as The Chief 
Justice mistakenly asserts, there were no direct evidence of how 
the Sixth Amendment originally applied to unsworn testimony, 
there is no doubt what its application would have been. 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 n. 3 (emphasis added). 
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4.  Justice Scalia’s “Reasonable Inferences” 
In the text of his opinion, Justice Scalia offered two 
inferences regarding the Framers’ design for the confrontation 
right, one based on the language of the Confrontation Clause, 
and one based on the general history of the right. With regard to 
the text, Justice Scalia asserted that a distinction between 
testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay statements was implied 
by the use of the term “witnesses” in the Confrontation Clause. 
Drawing selectively on the definitions in a historical dictionary, 
he asserted that the use of “witnesses” in the text of the 
Confrontation Clause implied that the Framers were concerned 
only with statements that amounted to “testify[ing],” and thus 
inferred that “witnesses” revealed the Framers were concerned 
only with regulating “testimonial” statements, but not with the 
admission of more casual, nontestimonial hearsay statements.48 
However, Justice Scalia’s textual analysis was unduly 
selective insofar as he ignored other definitions of “witness.”49 
Additionally, he ignored a pertinent feature of historical usage—
it does not appear that framing-era sources even used 
“testimonial” as an adjective, let alone as a designation for a 
category of hearsay.50 Thus, there is no reason to think that the 
                                                          
48 Id. at 51-53. Compare with White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 366 
(1992) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring); Friedman, supra note 
25, at 1025-1026; AMAR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 29, at 94. 
49 I have previously noted that Justice Scalia selectively discussed only 
one of the definitions of the verb “witness” but ignored broader definitions of 
the noun “witness” that appeared in the same dictionary. See Davies, supra 
note 10, at 193-94. For a more thorough criticism of this aspect of Crawford, 
see Randolph N. Jonakait, “Witnesses” in the Confrontation Clause: 
Crawford v. Washington, Noah Webster, and Compulsory Process, 79 
TEMPLE L. REV. 155 (2006). 
50 Examination of framing-era sources indicates that the adjective 
“testimonial” was not used to describe a category of legal evidence during 
that period. In fact, those sources make it doubtful that “testimonial” was 
even used as an adjective during that period. 
 The only definitions of “Testimonial” that appear in early dictionaries 
treat it only as a noun indicating a writing that a person could produce to 
confirm their good character or conduct. Samuel Johnson defined 
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Framers conceived of the category of “testimonial hearsay.” 
Indeed, the restrictive concept of a “testimonial” statement that 
                                                          
“TESTIMONIAL” only as a noun meaning “A writing produced by any one as 
an evidence for himself.” 2 A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(Samuel Johnson ed. 1755) (pages unnumbered). Likewise, Noah Webster 
defined “TESTIMONIAL” only as a noun meaning 
“[a] writing or certificate in favor of one’s good character or 
good conduct. Testimonials are required on many occasions. A 
person must have testimonials of his learning and good conduct, 
before he can obtain a license to preach. Testimonials are to be 
signed by persons of known respectability of character.” 
2 AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Noah Webster 
ed. 1828) (pages unnumbered). Justice Scalia quoted a definition of 
“TESTIFY” that appears on the same page of this dictionary in Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 51, but did not discuss the definition of “TESTIMONIAL” that 
appeared almost immediately below “TESTIFY.” 
 Likewise, word-searches of the digital versions of the framing-era 
treatises on evidence law do not reveal any usage of the term “testimonial.” 
Word searches of the framing-era treatises and manuals on criminal 
procedure reveal only a single usage: they use the word “testimonial” only 
when quoting the statute of 39 Eliz. c. 17, which used “testimonial” as a 
synonym for a military “pass.” See e.g., 1 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF 
THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 691 (1736) (quoting the statute as making a felony 
“[i]dle or wandering soldiers coming from sea not having a testimonial under 
the hand of a justice of the peace, setting down the time and place of his 
landing, place of his landing and birth, and limiting a time a time for his 
passage thither . . . “); 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF 
THE CROWN 116 (1719) (same); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 165 (1st ed. 1769) (describing 39 Eliz. c. 17 as 
requiring soldiers to have “a testimonial or pass from a justice of the 
peace”). In light of framing-era usage, there is no reason to think the 
Framers used or even conceived of the term “testimonial” hearsay. 
 In fact, Simon Greenleaf still did not use the term “testimonial” at all in 
the early editions of his leading nineteenth-century American evidence 
treatise. See SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1st 
ed., three volumes published 1842, 1846, 1853). In the 1857 and 1892 
editions, Greenleaf did use the term “testimonial,” but only as the name for a 
document. See 1 id. at 623 n. 1 (8th ed. 1857) (referring to a South Carolina 
statute regulating use of any “foreign testimonial, probate, certificate, &c” as 
evidence); 1 id. at 632-33 n. 17 (15th ed. 1892) (same). However, Greenleaf 
did use “testimonial” in a broader sense in his 1899 edition, as discussed 
infra note immediately following. 
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Justice Thomas introduced in White, and that Justice Scalia 
employed in Crawford, appears to have been unprecedented. 
When the term “testimonial” came into use as an adjective in 
evidence discourse, it simply referred to any statement in which 
the words of the speaker communicated information.51 
                                                          
The same narrow usage of “testimonial”as a term for a document is evident 
in LEXIS and WESTLAW searches of nineteenth-century Supreme Court case 
reports: in seventeen reports either the justices or counsel used the term 
“testimonial” as a noun referring to a record or certificate, while in one 
counsel used “testimonial” as an adjective in arguing that because a “verbal 
sale” of slaves was “null” under Louisiana law, “testimonial proof” of the 
sale instead of written evidence “shall not be admitted.” Zacharie v. 
Franklin, 37 U.S. 151, 157 (1838). In that instance, “testimonial proof” 
obviously referred simply to oral testimony as opposed to written evidence. 
51 In the 1899 edition of his evidence treatise, Simon Greenleaf began to 
use “testimonial” in two ways that had not appeared in earlier editions. First, 
he subdivided all evidence into either “testimonial” or “circumstantial” 
evidence, and thus used “testimonial” to refer to all evidence in which “the 
factum probandum” [that is, the fact to be proved] is “directly attested by 
those who speak from their own actual and personal knowledge of its 
existence” as opposed to a fact “to be inferred from other facts, satisfactorily 
proved.” See 1 GREENLEAF, supra note 50, at 24 (16th ed. 1899). This 
notion of “testimonial evidence” appears throughout this edition. For 
example, Greenleaf used “testimonial” in this broad sense of a witness’s 
statement based on personal knowledge when he wrote in a later passage that 
“the vital and determinative” reason for “rejecting hearsay assertions” was 
“the desirability of testing all testimonial assertions by the oath and by cross-
examination.” 1 id.at 184. 
 Additionally, Greenleaf also used “testimonial” in a slightly narrower 
sense when he wrote that the hearsay rule barred only “testimonial 
assertions” but not testimony about “utterances” when “the very fact in 
question is whether such things were written or spoken.” 1 id. at 185. His 
point appears to be the equivalent of the modern notion that an out-of-court 
statement is hearsay only if it is offered “to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted.” See supra note 9. However, Greenleaf clearly did not use 
“testimonial” in the restrictive sense that Crawford does because he treated 
all statements that asserted any fact as “testimonial” assertions: “when the 
assertion of A that fact x exists because A says that it does, A’s utterance is 
offered testimonially, i.e. as if A were a witness to fact x, and the Hearsay 
rule here requires that A’s assertions, to be receivable, must be made under 
oath and subject to cross examination.” 1 id. 
 In contrast to Crawford, modern Fifth Amendment self-incrimination 
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Justice Scalia also drew a second inference from the general 
history of the confrontation right. Like opinions in some earlier 
Supreme Court confrontation cases, he asserted that the general 
history revealed a “focus” on regulating the admission of out-of-
court statements of a formal, testimonial nature such as ex parte 
depositions, and inferred that this “focus” meant that the 
Framers would have been concerned only with regulating the 
admission of similar testimonial hearsay, but would not have 
been at all concerned with the admission of less formal, 
nontestimonial hearsay statements.52 
Notably, however, Justice Scalia’s historical assertions 
regarding “the Framers’ design” were based only on these 
inferences rather than on actual historical evidence. Although he 
endorsed defining the scope of the confrontation right according 
to “those [hearsay] exceptions established at the time of the 
founding,”53 he did not actually follow through and canvas the 
framing-era legal authorities to determine whether criminal 
hearsay exceptions existed during that period. Thus, the claim 
he made in Crawford about “the Framers’ design” for the scope 
of the confrontation right was not actually historical; rather, 
Justice Scalia’s originalist claim was essentially hypothetical. 
Indeed, instead of delineating what hearsay exceptions did—
or did not—exist at the time of the framing, Justice Scalia made 
several statements that implied that the original understanding of 
the confrontation right was disconnected from the Framers’ 
understanding of the treatment of hearsay in the law of 
evidence,54 and then drew his “reasonable inference[s]” to 
                                                          
doctrine also defines “testimonial” statements or actions broadly, in much the 
same way that Greenleaf did, to include any statement or act in which the 
speaker or actor communicates information possessed by the speaker or actor, 
in contradistinction to utterances or actions that reveal only physical 
attributes. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Doe v. 
United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 
(1990). 
52 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-51 (2004). Compare, e.g., 
the statement set out supra text accompanying note 20. 
53 See supra text accompanying note 38. 
54 Several statements in Crawford reveal an assumption that the content 
of the Confrontation Clause was always understood to be independent of the 
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predict how the Framers would have dealt with unsworn hearsay 
evidence regardless of whether framing-era law had permitted 
the admission of any such evidence. 
B.  “The Framers’ Design” in Davis 
Although Crawford asserted that “the Framers’ design” was 
to limit the confrontation right solely to testimonial hearsay, but 
not to nontestimonial hearsay, the Crawford opinion shed little 
light on the boundary between the two.55 The Court undertook 
to provide guidance on the boundary between testimonial and 
nontestimonial hearsay in the 2006 rulings in Davis and the 
companion case, Hammon v. Indiana.56 Justice Scalia again 
wrote for the Court.57 
                                                          
law of the evidence. For example, Justice Scalia stated that the Framers did 
not intend “to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the 
rules of evidence.” 541 U.S. at 61. He also stated that the application of the 
confrontation right to out-of-court statements introduced at trial should not 
depend upon “the law of evidence for the time being.” Id. at 50-51. 
 The assumption evident in those claims—that is, the assumption that the 
Framers of the Sixth Amendment anticipated that the law of evidence would 
be unstable—is dubious as a historical matter. Justice Scalia offered no 
historical evidence of any such expectation, and I know of none. Rather, 
because there had been no significant change in the strict doctrinal ban 
against admitting hearsay evidence during the prior century, as I discuss 
below in Part II, it does not appear that the Framers had any reason to 
anticipate any change in the ban against hearsay or the creation of hearsay 
exceptions. 
55 Crawford did identify some modern examples of hearsay statements 
that would always be “testimonial”: accomplice confessions, plea allocutions 
by accomplices, grand jury testimony, prior trial testimony, preliminary 
hearing testimony, and police interrogations. 541 U.S. at 64, 68. 
56 The companion case was Hammon v. Indiana, 126 S. Ct. 1457, No. 
05-5705 (2006), reported in Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2272 (2006). 
57 Justice Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part in Davis. In 
accord with his concurring opinion in White, Justice Thomas would have 
limited the “testimonial” hearsay to only quite formal statements such as 
depositions or affidavits. Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2281-84. Thus, he dissented 
from the ruling that the statements made during the police interview in 
Hammon were “testimonial” and subject to the confrontation right. Id. at 
2285. Because Justice Thomas’s application of the testimonial/nontestimonial 
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In the companion decision in Hammon, the Court held that 
an out-of-court statement that a victim of domestic abuse made 
during a police interview that immediately followed an episode 
of domestic violence was testimonial in character because the 
statement was taken “primarily” for use in a prosecution; thus, 
the admission of that statement through the testimony of another 
witness, when the declarant herself was available but did not 
testify at trial, violated the defendant’s right under the 
Confrontation Clause.58 
However, in Davis itself, the Court found that a hearsay 
statement identifying an attacker in a recording of a 911 call was 
not testimonial in character because it was made during an 
episode of domestic violence and thus was not made primarily 
for use in a prosecution. On that basis, the Court concluded that 
the statement identifying the attacker that was made in that call, 
by a victim who was available but nevertheless did not testify at 
Davis’s trial, was not subject to the Confrontation Clause at 
all.59 Hence, the statement was deemed admissible simply 
because it complied with Washington state law regarding 
admission of hearsay evidence. 
In the course of his opinion in Davis, Justice Scalia 
essentially repeated the hypothetical originalist claims he had 
previously made in Crawford and added an additional inference. 
Specifically, Justice Scalia asserted—in the negative—that “We 
are not aware of any early American case invoking the 
Confrontation Clause or the common-law right to confrontation 
that did not clearly involve testimony as thus defined [in 
Crawford],”60 and cited twelve state cases, all but one of which 
                                                          
hearsay distinction was more extreme than Justice Scalia’s, the historical 
criticisms that I direct to Justice Scalia’s claims all apply with as much force 
to Justice Thomas’s more restricted treatment of the confrontation right. 
Hence, I generally do not discuss Justice Thomas’s position. But see infra 
note 121. 
58 Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2272-73, 2278-79. 
59 Id. at 2270-72, 2276-78. 
60 Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2274. Along a similar vein, Justice Scalia asserted 
that: 
Most of the American cases applying the Confrontation Clause 
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were decided in the nineteenth century.61 Notably, however, 
Davis still did not identify endorsements of criminal hearsay 
exceptions in framing-era sources. 
In fact, the briefing in Davis actually revealed the absence of 
such exceptions. Because Crawford had cast the testimonial 
scope of the confrontation right as though it were a historical 
matter, one can safely assume that the lawyers who briefed those 
cases for the parties, the Solicitor General’s office, and the other 
amici, diligently searched for historical examples of the 
inadmissibility of testimonial hearsay or the admissibility of 
nontestimonial hearsay.62 However, the results were rather 
paltry and one-sided.63 
                                                          
or its state constitutional or common-law counterparts involved 
testimonial statements of the most formal sort—sworn testimony 
in prior judicial proceedings or formal depositions under oath—
which invites the argument that the scope of the Clause is 
limited to that very formal category. 
Id. at 2275-76. However, this statement followed a recitation of Supreme 
Court decisions dating from 1879 to 1970, which are plainly too distant from 
1789 to constitute valid evidence of the original understanding of the 
Confrontation Clause. 
61 Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2274-75 n. 3. 
62 See e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1979) 
(opinion for the Court by Scalia, J.) (berating counsel for failing to brief 
framing-era common-law doctrine relevant to the issue). 
63 In some respects counsel found too much insofar as they identified 
English sources that were not available in framing-era America. In particular, 
several of the parties and amici cited accounts of eighteenth-century English 
trials in the Old Bailey in London that were published in the Old Bailey 
Sessions Papers (hereinafter “OBSP”). That material is now also available 
on-line as “Proceedings of the Old Bailey.” For examples, see infra notes 71, 
237. 
 However, those trial accounts, which were published as pamphlets at the 
end of each of the eight sessions of the Old Bailey held each year, were 
written for a general readership rather than to record legal rulings per se. As 
a result, the thoroughness of the accounts varies and accounts often omitted 
legal aspects and rulings made during the trials. Hence, although individual 
cases in the Old Bailey Sessions Papers were occasionally referred to in 
English cases or in post-framing treatises, those publications did not have the 
status of legal authorities in their own right. For a description of the OBSP 
accounts, see LANGBEIN, ADVERSARY TRIAL, supra note 37, at 180-90. 
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The briefs did identify two late eighteenth-century English 
cases that excluded out-of-court statements that might now be 
labeled testimonial hearsay. The cases included the 1779 English 
ruling in King v. Brasier64 and the 1791 ruling in King v. 
Dingler.65 Even on that side of the search, the results were 
sparse insofar as both cases had previously been identified in 
Crawford.66 Moreover, the reports of those cases were published 
too late to have informed the Framers’ understanding of the 
confrontation right when the Confrontation Clause was framed 
in mid-1789.67 Brasier was initially published in London in late 
1789, shortly after the framing,68 while Dingler was not 
published until 1800.69 
                                                          
 So far as I can determine, there is no reason to think that the OBSP 
accounts were available in framing-era America. Hence, although these 
accounts provide a treasure-trove of information for historians currently 
interested in historical English legal practices, they do not seem to be 
pertinent evidence of the original meaning of American constitutional 
protections. 
64 1 Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (Twelve Judges 1779). 
65 2 Leach 561, 168 Eng. Rep. 383 (Old Bailey, 1791). 
66 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 46, 69-70 (2004). 
67 See Davies, supra note 10, at 160. 
68 Brasier was reported in the first edition of Leach’s Cases in Crown 
Law that was published in 1789. See Leach (first ed. 1789) 346. However, 
that volume could not have been published prior to May 1789 because it 
reports a case from April 1789. See Davies, supra note 10, at 160. In 
addition, there was at least a six-month delay between the publication of the 
second edition of Leach’s Cases in Crown Law in 1792, and the last case 
reported in that volume which was decided in the summer of 1791. See 
Davies, supra note 1, at 564 n. 23. Assuming that the delay in the 
publication of the second edition was fairly typical, it is likely that the first 
edition would not have been published until near the end of 1789. Id. I am 
indebted to Mr. Robert Kry for the information as to the date of the final 
case that appeared in the second edition. 
 As I explain below, the initial account of the trial ruling in Brasier was 
substantially altered and corrected in later editions, and the version cited in 
Crawford and Davis was not published until 1815. See infra note 217 and 
accompanying text. 
69 The 1791 ruling in Dingler occurred subsequent to the date of the 
final case reported in Leach’s 1792 second edition, and it was not reported in 
that edition. However, Leach’s 1792 edition did mention Dingler in a 
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Even putting this objection aside, however, the noteworthy 
aspect of the two cases was that neither described the excluded 
statements as “testimonial.” In fact, neither even described the 
excluded statements as “hearsay.” Hence, as discussed in more 
detail below, neither case provided historical support for 
Crawford’s restriction of the scope of the confrontation right to 
testimonial out-of-court statements.70 
Even more significantly, the briefs in Davis did not identify 
a single valid example of a pre-framing published case report or 
treatise that endorsed the admission of any unsworn out-of-court 
statement that could now be deemed to be “nontestimonial 
hearsay.”71 Thus, counsel did not locate any historical evidence 
                                                          
marginal note at the end of the report of King v. Woodcock, Leach (1792 ed.) 
397, 401 n. (a) (Old Bailey 1789). In Woodcock, the court first concluded 
that the examination of a deceased victim was not admissible as a Marian 
witness examination, but left it to the jury to decide whether the deceased 
was sufficiently under the apprehension of death for her statement to be 
admissible as a dying declaration. The marginal note read: “(a) Same point: 
Dingler’s Case at O[ld] B[ailey] September Session 1791; and by Mr. 
J[ustice] Gould [the presiding trial judge] was decided accordingly upon the 
authority of this case [that is, Woodcock].” Note, however, that there was 
some ambiguity in the note as to which of the two rulings in Woodcock was 
the “same point” ruled on in Dingler. 
 No report of Dingler was published until Leach’s 1800 third edition—
eleven years after the framing of the Sixth Amendment.Because I did not 
have access to a copy of Leach’s second edition when I wrote my previous 
article on Crawford, I simply assumed that Dingler probably appeared in the 
1792 second edition. See Davies, supra note 10, at 157. That turns out not to 
have been the case. I am indebted to Mr. Robert Kry for the information 
about the contents of the second edition. 
70 For a more detailed discussion of these points, see infra notes 208-239 
and accompanying text. 
71 It may initially appear that such cases were found in the Old Bailey 
Sessions Papers. The Solicitor General’s brief in Davis cited two 1755 cases 
in the Old Bailey Sessions Papers that purportedly permitted the admission 
into evidence of statements that victims of assaults made to other persons 
after the assault. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at 25 n.4, Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). 
 However, Petitioner’s Reply Brief in Hammon, at 7, pointed out that 
these two 1755 cases actually involved murder trials, and thus may very well 
have involved dying declarations. As explained below, dying declarations 
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for that half of Crawford’s testimonial/nontestimonial distinction. 
Put another way, no one identified any situation in which the 
Framers would have had any occasion to consider whether the 
Confrontation Clause would allow admission of “nontestimonial 
hearsay.” Moreover, the absence of historical cases that 
admitted unsworn hearsay is important because it undermines the 
logic of Justice Scalia’s “reasonable inference[s]” about “the 
Framers’ design” for the scope of the confrontation right. 
C.  Why the Absence of Framing-era Hearsay Exceptions Is 
Important 
As noted above, Justice Scalia based his claim that the 
confrontation right was limited to testimonial hearsay only on 
“reasonable inference[s],” not on direct evidence from framing-
era legal authorities. He did not undertake to identify evidence 
of hearsay exceptions in framing-era legal sources, but instead 
proceeded as though the existence or nonexistence of such 
exceptions did not matter. However, that treatment ignored the 
degree to which the logical validity of the “reasonable 
                                                          
were not viewed as unsworn hearsay, but were deemed to be admissible 
evidence under the theory that the awareness of imminent death was the 
functional equivalent of an oath. See infra notes 151-153 and accompanying 
text. 
 It also should be noted that the Solicitor General’s Brief was grossly 
inconsistent in citing the cases from the Old Bailey Sessions Papers because 
only a few pages earlier it had objected to Petitioner’s citation of aspects of 
the 1787 trial in King v. Radbourne that were reported only in “The 
Proceedings of the Old Bailey.” Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae 
at 22-23, Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006). However, as 
discussed supra note 54, the latter is simply the title of the on-line version of 
the Old Bailey Sessions Papers that the Solicitor General’s brief cited itself! 
Note, for example, that the internet citations given for both sources in the 
U.S. amicus brief are the same. 
 Actually, none of the Old Bailey trial accounts in these sources constitute 
valid evidence of the Framer’s understanding of the Confrontation Clause 
because there is no evidence that these informal, uncollected reports, which 
were published in London at the end of each of the eight sessions each year, 
were available to any significant degree in framing-era America. See supra 
note 63. 
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inference[s]” drawn in Crawford was contingent upon there 
having been significant criminal hearsay exceptions in framing-
era law. 
Consider the inference that Justice Scalia drew in Davis from 
the observation that the early American cases that invoked the 
Confrontation Clause or the common-law right to confrontation 
involved statements that would now be deemed testimonial 
statements.72 He suggested that this pattern in the early cases, as 
well as in later Supreme Court opinions, indicated that the scope 
of the Confrontation Clause was limited to formal testimonial 
hearsay.73 However, the significance of the sample consisting of 
twelve “early” cases that he cited is dubious for a variety of 
reasons,74 not the least of which is that most of the cases were 
hardly “early” in the sense of being proximate in time to the 
framing era.75 
Additionally, as a logical matter, no implication can be 
                                                          
72 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 & n. 3. 
73 Id. at 2274-76. See supra notes 60, 61and accompanying text. 
74 One deficiency is that reported cases, usually from state supreme 
courts, hardly provide a valid sample of the issues litigated in the trial courts. 
Another is that the determination of whether an “early” case involved the 
“common-law counterpart” of the Confrontation Clause is a matter of 
judgment. Rulings that now appear to involve hearsay were not always 
described as such, and some “early” state cases that may have involved the 
admission of informal hearsay did not record the ground of the objection to 
evidence. See e.g., Commonwealth v. M’Pike, 57 Mass. (3 Cush.) 181 
(1849). In that case, the defendant objected to the admission of a second-hand 
report of what a deceased victim had said. It would appear to have been an 
objection to hearsay, but there is no indication in the case report of the 
ground on which that objection was based. Id. at 182. Did the defendant 
complain that his confrontation right was violated, or his right to cross-
examination? There is no way to know. 
75 The “early” state cases that Justice Scalia cited in Davis were 
generally the same as those he had previously cited in Crawford. Compare 
Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2274-75 n. 3, with Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49-50. Only 
one of those twelve cases was decided prior to 1800; most are from the 
1830s, 1840s, and 1850s. Hence, they are too far removed from the framing 
to constitute plausible evidence of the Framers’ understanding. See Davies, 
supra note 10, at 179-82. Moreover, two of the cited cases did not actually 
involve confrontation issues. See Davies, supra note 1, at 626 n. 273. 
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drawn from a pattern of cases that involved only formal sorts of 
out-of-court statements unless there had been framing-era 
hearsay exceptions under which informal as well as formal out-
of-court statements could have been admitted at trials. Litigation 
and case reports tend to reflect unsettled or active issues. There 
were active issues regarding the boundaries of admissible 
formal, sworn out-of court statements, so it is not surprising to 
find cases litigating those issues.76 If there had been recognized 
hearsay exceptions that applied to informal, unsworn statements, 
one would expect that they would also have given rise to issues 
regarding the admission of informal hearsay statements. Thus, if 
there had been recognized criminal hearsay exceptions, a pattern 
in which confrontation litigation occurred only regarding formal, 
sworn out-of-court statements, but not informal hearsay 
statements, might indicate that the confrontation right was not 
understood to apply to informal, nontestimonial hearsay 
statements. 
However, how could one logically infer that the Framers 
would not have applied the Confrontation Clause to 
“nontestimonial hearsay” if framing-era law did not yet 
recognize any exceptions under which informal, unsworn 
hearsay could arguably have constituted admissible evidence in 
criminal trials in any event?77 If framing-era law permitted the 
                                                          
76 See, e.g., infra notes 211-214 and accompanying text (discussing the 
window during which sworn Marian witness examinations could be properly 
taken); infra note 285 (discussing the admissibility of a deceased witness’s 
testimony at a prior trial). 
77 The amicus brief filed by the Solicitor General’s office in Davis 
contains a claim that exposes the same difficulty: 
[A] casual remark to a neighbor, offered to prove the truth of 
the assertion, presumably would have been excludable as 
hearsay at the time of the framing of the Confrontation Clause. 
But as Crawford establishes, because that statement is not 
testimonial, its introduction does not implicate the core concerns 
of the Confrontation Clause. 
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 23, 
Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006). However, if casual hearsay 
was inadmissible anyway in 1789, what basis would there be for defining the 
“core concerns of the Confrontation Clause” to reach only testimonial 
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admission of only some forms of sworn out-of-court statements, 
but strictly excluded unsworn hearsay statements, that 
prohibition itself would completely explain the pattern that 
Justice Scalia claimed—without shedding any light on the 
Framers’ understanding of the scope of the confrontation right 
itself. 
Indeed, if framing-era evidence doctrine had made an oath a 
necessary requisite for admissible criminal trial evidence, one 
would expect that a lawyer with even a minimal understanding 
of criminal evidence would not have attempted to proffer an 
unsworn out-of-court hearsay statement as evidence in a criminal 
trial. Hence, one would not expect that much discussion of how 
the confrontation right applied to statements that could now be 
termed unsworn, nontestimonial hearsay would have occurred in 
framing-era criminal trials. Thus, an absence of recognized 
hearsay exceptions applicable to unsworn hearsay at the time of 
the framing would completely explain why the “early” (but post-
framing) confrontation cases that Justice Scalia identified 
involved only formal, sworn out-of-court statements. Indeed, if 
that were the case, his “reasonable inference” would amount 
only to a false dichotomy. 
The logic of the two “reasonable inference[s]” that Justice 
Scalia drew in Crawford is equally contingent on the existence 
of framing-era hearsay exceptions that would have allowed the 
admission of unsworn, informal hearsay. The apparent “focus” 
on formal and usually sworn out-of-court statements in the 
famous early English treason cases that gave rise to the 
confrontation right might shed light on the understanding of the 
scope of that right if informal, unsworn out-of-court statements 
had also been admissible. In that case, the application of the 
right to the one, but not the other, would illuminate the right’s 
scope. However, if informal, unsworn hearsay had always been 
inadmissible simply as a matter of evidence doctrine, that would 
not be the case.78 
                                                          
hearsay? 
78 In Crawford, Justice Scalia pointed to the admission of Cobham’s 
unsworn letter in Raleigh’s trial as though that “paradigmatic confrontation 
violation” disproved Chief Justice Rehnquist’s suggestion that the oath was a 
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Likewise, the inference Justice Scalia drew to the effect that 
the use of the term “witnesses” in the Confrontation Clause 
denoted a concern with only formal, “testimonial” statements, 
was also contingent on the nature of the statements that were 
potentially admissible under framing-era evidence doctrine. If 
informal, unsworn hearsay statements were always inadmissible 
in criminal trials, and only persons who possessed direct 
personal knowledge of relevant facts could be admitted to testify 
in trials, then persons who could offer only second-hand, 
hearsay information could not have been admitted as 
“witnesses.” Thus, the absence of hearsay exceptions would also 
suffice to explain why the Framers were content to address only 
“witnesses” in the Confrontation Clause.79 The Framers cannot 
be expected to have drafted the Confrontation Clause to take 
account of a scenario—the admission of unsworn hearsay 
statements—if they had no reason to think that scenario could 
ever occur. 
Hence, the “reasonable inference[s]” that Justice Scalia drew 
                                                          
salient requirement for admission of an out-of-court statement in framing-era 
evidence law. 541 U.S. at 52 (emphasis added). However, that use of an 
unsworn out-of-court statement was probably unusual even in the treason 
trials, and that “violation” of the confrontation right in Raleigh’s 1603 trial is 
hardly evidence of the content of the law of evidence almost two centuries 
later in 1789. (Somewhat inconsistently, Justice Scalia brushed aside a 1739 
case cited by the Chief Justice on the ground that it was decided too early to 
reflect the law at the time of the framing. See id. at 54 n. 5.) Criminal 
evidence standards obviously were raised subsequent to Raleigh’s trial to 
prevent recurrences of the abuses associated with that and similar trials. See 
infra note 111. 
79 It is hardly surprising that the Framers addressed the confrontation 
right to “witnesses,” given that witnesses are the source of the evidence 
presented at criminal trials. However, as I explain below, the “best evidence” 
principle in framing-era evidence law restricted the persons who could be 
admitted to testify at trial as witnesses to those who possessed direct personal 
knowledge of the facts, but that standard excluded persons who had only 
second-hand, hearsay information. See infra notes 114-115, 137, 262 and 
accompanying text. Thus, to the extent that modern doctrine permits hearsay 
testimony, it alters the original understanding of “witness.” Indeed, a person 
in the position of the 911 operator in Davis could not have been admitted as a 
“witness” in 1789. 
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in Crawford do not actually escape the historical issue of 
whether there were significant framing-era exceptions to the ban 
against hearsay evidence in criminal trials. Rather, one cannot 
assess the Framers’ conception of the confrontation right unless 
one searches out “direct evidence” of the treatment of out-of-
court statements in the framing-era sources that Justice Scalia 
ignored. What do those sources tell us? They tell us that there 
was good reason for Justice Scalia to abandon the earlier 
assumption that a variety hearsay exceptions were recognized at 
the time of the framing. As Justice Scalia acknowledged—albeit 
in a footnote—that assumption was demonstrably false.80 
II.  THE “DIRECT EVIDENCE” OF HEARSAY AND CONFRONTATION 
DURING THE FRAMING ERA 
Framing-era sources document two important features of 
framing-era evidence law. First, they show that the only kinds 
of out-of-court statements that could be admitted in criminal 
trials to prove a defendant’s guilt were sworn or functionally 
sworn statements made by genuinely unavailable witnesses, but 
that unsworn hearsay was not permitted to be used as evidence 
of the defendant’s guilt. Second, they also document that it was 
understood that the confrontation right was one of three 
principles that each required the ban against admitting unsworn 
hearsay in criminal trials. In other words, the framing-era 
authorities do not indicate that the Framers would have 
distinguished between the general ban against hearsay and the 
confrontation right; rather, the sources indicate that the ban 
against hearsay evidence was understood to be a salient feature 
of the confrontation right. Hence, the Framers never had any 
reason to draw any distinction between the right to confrontation 
and the ban against unsworn hearsay. Rather they understood 
that the latter was a component of the former. 
In this part, I document the historical evidence for this 
                                                          
80 See supra note 46 and accompanying text (noting that Justice Scalia 
cited a 1950 commentary that had concluded that “dying declarations” were 
the “only” form of admissible criminal hearsay at the time of the framing). 
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description of the framing-era treatment of out-of-court 
statements. I begin with a few preliminary comments regarding 
the sources of evidence of the Framers’ understanding of the 
confrontation right and the language in which the confrontation 
right was addressed in those sources. I then offer a brief 
preview of the framing-era criminal evidence regime before 
systematically working through the pertinent sources. 
A.  Recovering the Framing-Era Understanding of the 
Confrontation Right 
Where does one find evidence of the Framers’ understanding 
of the confrontation right? Unfortunately, the Framers did not 
leave us much in the way of legislative history.81 However, 
                                                          
81 Of course, there were confrontation provisions in the state declarations 
of rights that were adopted prior to the federal Bill of Rights, but they are 
unhelpful insofar as they were framed in language as general as the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause itself. See infra notes 91-93 and 
accompanying text. 
 Unfortunately, surviving statements about the confrontation right made 
during the Ratification debates of 1787-1788 are also scarce. In Crawford 
Justice Scalia did quote a 1787 Letter of a Federal Farmer as though it were 
a direct antecedent of the Confrontation Clause applicable to criminal trials, 
but the appearance that the Letter addressed the confrontation right was 
largely the product of editing rather than the letter’s original content. Justice 
Scalia portrayed the Letter in Crawford as follows: 
[A] prominent Antifederalist writing under the pseudonym 
Federal Farmer criticized the use of “written evidence” while 
objecting to the omission of a vicinage right: “Nothing can be 
more essential than the cross examining of witnesses, and 
generally before the triers of the facts in question. . . . [W]ritten 
evidence . . . [is] almost useless; it must be frequently taken ex 
parte, and but very seldom leads to the proper discovery of 
truth.” R. Lee, Letter IV by the Federal Farmer (Oct. 15, 
1787). The First Congress responded by including the 
Confrontation Clause in the proposal that became the Sixth 
Amendment. 
541 U.S. at 49 (citation omitted). 
 However, the passage quoted in Crawford actually appeared in a 
discussion of “[t]he trials by jury in civil causes.” Letter IV by the Federal 
Farmer (Oct. 12, 1787) (emphasis added), reprinted in CONTEXTS OF THE 
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because there is little doubt that the Framers intended to 
preserve the important elements of common-law jury trial in the 
Constitution and Sixth Amendment,82 it is generally safe to 
                                                          
CONSTITUTION 706, 710 (Neil H. Cogan, ed. 1999). The Federal Farmer 
stated that he did not place much weight on the need to be tried by one’s 
neighbors, and then wrote that it was important for trials in civil “causes” 
(that is, lawsuits) to be held in the vicinity for the convenience of obtaining 
oral testimony from witnesses so that it would not be necessary to resort to 
the use of depositions: 
the trial of facts in the neighborhood is of great importance in 
other respects. Nothing can be more essential than the cross-
examining witnesses, and generally before the triers of the facts 
in question. The common people can establish facts with much 
more ease with oral than written evidence; when trials of facts 
are removed to a distance from the homes of the parties and 
witnesses, oral evidence becomes intolerably expensive, and the 
parties must depend on written evidence, which to the common 
people is expensive and almost useless; it must be frequently 
taken ex parte, and but very seldom leads to the proper 
discovery of truth. 
Id. Although this passage reflects the general importance attached to oral 
testimony and cross-examination, it did so in the context of expressing 
concern about the expected use of depositions as evidence in trials in civil 
lawsuits. 
82 Invocations of the right to common law were ubiquitous during both 
the Revolutionary period, during which the state declarations of rights were 
adopted, and during the Ratification period itself when the need for a federal 
Bill of Rights was debated. See, e.g., Declaration and Resolves of the First 
Continental Congress, October 14, 1774, reprinted in CONTEXTS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, at 414 (12.1.4.6) (“Resolved, N.C.D. 5. That 
the respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England, and more 
especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers 
of the vicinage, according to the course of that law.”); Northwest Territory 
Ordinance, Art. 2 (1787), reprinted in CONTEXTS OF THE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 72, at 414-15 (12.1.4.8) (“the inhabitants of the said territory 
shall always be entitled to the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus, and of 
the trial by jury; of a proportionate representation of the people in the 
legislature, and of judicial proceedings according to the course of the 
common law”). Additionally, Richard Henry Lee, one of the most prominent 
advocates of a federal Bill of Rights called for a Bill of Rights to guarantee 
freedom of the press, religious liberty, jury trial in civil cases, and “Common 
Law securities.” See Letter to Samuel Adams (October 27, 1787), reprinted 
in 2 THE LETTERS OF RICHARD HENRY LEE 456-57 (James C. Ballagh ed. 
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assume that the Framers undertook to preserve at least the rights 
that common-law authorities identified in the criminal jury 
trial.83 
As a result, the best evidence we have of the Framers’ 
understanding of the confrontation right are the descriptions of 
the principles of evidence in criminal trials that appeared in the 
legal authorities that were widely used in America during the 
framing-era itself—that is, during the period from the start of the 
drafting of the state declarations of rights in 1776 through the 
framing of the Federal Bill in 1789.84 Because there were few 
                                                          
1914), quoted in Davies, supra note 2, at 339 n. 311). 
83 The discussion of the original understanding in this article is 
incomplete insofar as it does not deal with a large topic that I am not yet 
prepared to address: what the Framers meant when they required, in Article 
III in the original Constitution that “the trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by 
Jury.” See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl 3. It is unlikely that the Framers 
meant only that a petit jury had to be the final decision maker in a criminal 
trial. It is far more likely that they understood “trial by jury” to incorporate 
at least the basic features associated with a common-law criminal prosecution. 
As a result, it is doubtful that they thought that the provision of a 
confrontation right in the Sixth Amendment added anything to the guarantee 
of jury trial already in the Constitution. Rather, it is far more likely that they 
viewed the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment as simply making 
that feature of the jury trial right more explicit. Thus, it is likely that the 
Framers would have understood the common-law principles of criminal 
evidence discussed in this article to be part of the broader constitutional 
guarantee of trial by jury guaranteed by Article III of the Constitution as well 
as the confrontation right itself. I say that the Framers intended to preserve 
“at least” the basic common-law protections of the jury trial in the Sixth 
Amendment because it is possible that they meant to guarantee more than 
that, but implausible that they meant to guarantee less than that. Thus, Justice 
Scalia’s assertions that the original Confrontation Clause should be construed 
independently of the law of evidence (see supra note 54) fails to take into 
account the Framer’s larger understanding of “trial by jury.” 
84 Because the federal Bill of Rights was based largely on the state 
provisions adopted between 1776 and 1780, one must be very cautious about 
treating any statement that first appears in an English source published after 
1775 as evidence of original meaning. See Davies, supra note 10, at 153-55. 
Additionally, the date of the framing (1789) is the relevant cutoff date for 
materials that could have informed the original meaning; not of the date of 
ratification (1791) that is sometimes invoked in Supreme Court opinions, 
including Crawford. See id. at 158-60. 
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published case reports dealing with evidentiary rulings during 
that period85 (though there are some from the decades following 
the framing), the most significant authorities are the legal 
treatises on criminal procedure and evidence and the derivative 
works, especially justice of the peace manuals, abridgments, and 
legal dictionaries, that framing-era Americans consulted.86 
B.  Identifying the Confrontation Right in the Historical 
Sources 
The search for the common-law confrontation right in the 
framing-era sources is complicated somewhat by the fact that the 
framing-era sources seldom used “confrontation” terminology. 
                                                          
85 There were virtually no pre-framing published reports of American 
cases. See Davies, supra note 10, at 124 n. 55. Moreover, published reports 
of ordinary English criminal trials in which evidence rulings were made were 
not available until Leach’s Crown Cases appeared in late 1789, after the 
Confrontation Clause was already framed. See supra note 68. 
86 Professor Kenneth Graham has argued in several commentaries that 
the confrontation right in the Sixth Amendment was much more of a home-
grown understanding arising from the abuses associated with civil law 
procedure in the colonial vice-admiralty courts than an enactment of an 
English common-law right derived from Raleigh’s Trial. See, e.g., Kenneth 
Graham, Confrontation Stories: Raleigh on the Mayflower, 3 OHIO. ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 209 (2005) [hereinafter “Confrontation Stories”]; Kenneth Graham, 
The Right to Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses 
Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99 (1972). See also 30A CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
EVIDENCE § 6341-348. 
 For example, Graham has asserted that “English common law has never 
recognized a right of confrontation.” Confrontation Stories, supra, at 209. I 
think that is an overstatement. It may be that English sources did not 
commonly use that terminology, but the framing-era English treatises did 
recognize the components of the confrontation right, as I discuss in this 
article. Additionally, while there is no doubt that American experience with 
the vice-admiralty courts contributed to the value that the American Framers 
placed on jury trial, I do not see how that alters the fact that the principal 
sources that informed the Framers’ understanding of the law of jury trials 
were the English common-law treatises. Hence, I think those treatises, and 
the manuals derived from them, must be central to any account of the 
original Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. 
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As I explain below, the framing-era treatises refer to the main 
features of the confrontation right when they discuss the 
requirements that evidence in criminal trials be given in the 
presence of the defendant and be subject to cross-examination in 
the view of the jury.87 However, they usually do not use the 
term “confrontation” itself.88 
It appears that the terminology of a “confrontation” right 
traces to Matthew Hale’s mid-seventeenth-century endorsement 
of the “opportunity of confronting the adverse witnesses” as one 
of the virtues of common-law jury trial.89 William Blackstone 
probably gave that phrasing additional visibility in 1768 when he 
repeated Hale’s endorsement of the value of “the confronting of 
adverse witnesses” as a means of “clearing up of truth” in 
trials.90 
Although confrontation terminology does not seem to appear 
in other English treatises, it is likely that George Mason drew 
                                                          
87 See also LANGBEIN, ADVERSARY TRIAL, supra note 37, at 234 n. 241 
(2005) (commenting on being “puzzled at the failure of the English common 
law to identify and develop the confrontation policy as a matter of doctrine”). 
88 The lack of framing-era discussions that actually used the term 
“confrontation” right may partly account for the conventional view that the 
history of the right is especially obscure. See. e.g., California v. Green, 399 
U.S. 149, 173-74 (1970) (Harlan J., concurring) (stating that “[t]he 
Confrontation Clause comes to us on faded parchment. History seems to give 
us very little insight into the intended scope of the Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause”); Randoph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the 
Confrontation Clause: An Alternative History, 27 RUTGERS L. J. 77, 77 
(1995). 
89 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON LAW 
OF ENGLAND 258 (first published posthumously in 1713; written sometime 
before Hale’s death in 1676). 
90 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
373 (1st ed. 1768) (the statement quoted in the text follows a footnote to 
“Hale’s Hist. C. L. 254, 5, 6.”). 
 Blackstone’s influence on framing-era American thought was substantial. 
The initial edition of the four volumes of his Commentaries was reprinted in 
Philadelphia in 1771-1772. See ELDON REVARE JAMES, A LIST OF LEGAL 
TREATISES PRINTED IN THE BRITISH COLONIES AND THE AMERICAN STATES 
BEFORE 1801, 170-71 (1934). There were some 1,557 American subscribers. 
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 88-89 (1973). 
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upon the statements by Hale and Blackstone when he articulated 
the defendant’s right “to be confronted with the accusers and 
witnesses” as an essential criminal trial right in the 1776 
Virginia declaration of rights.91 Thereafter, variations on that 
phrasing were repeated in several other state declarations of 
rights92 (though some used the alternative formulation of a right 
to “meet” adverse witnesses “face to face”93). James Madison 
also drew upon Mason’s phrasing when he referred to a trial 
right of the accused “to be confronted with his accusers, and the 
witnesses against him” when he proposed the proto-Sixth 
Amendment in June, 1789.94 The First Congress then shortened 
Madison’s seemingly redundant references to “accusers” and 
“witnesses” to the right of the accused “to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him.”95 Although the framing-era legal 
                                                          
91 See HELEN HILL, GEORGE MASON: CONSTITUTIONALIST 136, 137-38 
(1938) (quoting Section 8 of Mason’s draft for the Virginia Declaration of 
Rights); Virginia Declaration of Rights § 8 (1776), reprinted in THE 
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 
413 (Neil H. Cogan, ed. 1997) [hereinafter “COMPLETE BILL”]. 
92 See Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights § IX (1776), reprinted in 
COMPLETE BILL, supra note 91, at 411; Delaware Declaration of Rights § 14 
(1776), reprinted in id. at 402; Maryland Declaration of Rights § VII (1776), 
reprinted in id. at 403; North Carolina Declaration of Rights § VII (1776), 
reprinted in id. at 410; Vermont Constitution Ch. I (1777), reprinted in id. at 
413. 
93 See Massachusetts Declaration of Rights § XII (1780), reprinted in 
COMPLETE BILL, supra note 91, at 404; New Hampshire Bill of Rights § XV 
(1783), reprinted in id. at 405. 
94 See COMPLETE BILL, supra note 91 at 385. Madison had been a 
member of the committee of the Virginia legislature that drafted the 1776 
Virginia Declaration of Rights. See HILL, supra note 91, at 135. Thus, it is 
not surprising that he drew upon the Virginia phrasing. 
95 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (framed, 1789; ratified, 1791). Professor 
Graham has suggested that the elimination of “accusers” was substantive. See 
Graham, Confrontation Stories, supra note 86. However, it appears that the 
term “accusers” would have been redundant with “witnesses” in criminal 
proceedings in 1789, because an accuser would have been permitted and 
required to testify as a witness at the defendant’s trial. There does not seem 
to be any direct evidence as to why the First Congress deleted “accusers” 
from Madison’s draft language. 
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authorities had rarely used that confrontation terminology, they 
had discussed the salient features of what the Framers called the 
confrontation right. 
C.  The Framing-Era Ban Against Hearsay Evidence 
As noted above, the important sources for recovering the 
Framers’ understanding of the confrontation right are the 
framing-era editions of treatises on criminal law and evidence,96 
and the framing-era editions of derivative works such as justice 
of the peace manuals, abridgments, and legal dictionaries, 
especially the four major justice of the peace manuals that were 
printed and widely used in the American colonies and states 
between 1764 and 1789.97 Conveniently, virtually all of those 
sources (though not all editions of the sources) have recently 
become available on-line.98 
                                                          
96 It is important to consult the pre-framing editions of treatises. Relying 
upon post-framing editions of treatises that were initially published prior to 
the framing can result in serious errors because new material was sometimes 
added, or alterations were sometimes made, to the pre-framing text. Indeed, 
sometimes pre-framing authories were added to post-framing editions. See, 
e.g., Davies, supra note 2, at 310-14 (discussing Justice Souter’s erroneous 
reliance in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), on preframing 
statements that had been added to post-framing editions of treatises that had 
been initially published before the framing, as though the added statements 
were evidence of the Framers’ understanding of arrest law). 
97 The four manuals are identified infra note 160. For a discussion and 
listing of the English and American justice of the peace manuals, see Davies, 
supra note 2 at 278-281 nn. 121, 122. 
98 With a few exceptions, the various editions of the legal treatises and 
manuals are now available in word-searchable formats in on-line subscription 
services. English treatises and manuals published between 1700 and 1800 are 
available on-line in The Eighteenth Century Collections Online 
http:/www.gale.com/EighteenthCentury/ (this collection is also available in 
microfiche). American manuals from that period are available in Early 
American Imprints, Series 1, available at http://www.readex.com/readex/ 
product.cfm?product=247 (this series is also available in microfiche). 
English and American legal publications from the nineteenth century are 
available in The Makings of Modern Law http://www.gale.com/ModernLaw. 
It should be noted, however, that word-searching the historical sources 
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A brief preview of the framing-era criminal evidence regime 
may help to keep the trees from obscuring the forest. As I detail 
in the following pages, the framing-era legal authorities did 
draw a distinction regarding the admissibility of out-of-court 
statements as evidence of a defendant’s guilt, but it was almost 
the opposite of the testimonial/nontestimonial distinction drawn 
in Crawford and Davis. The framing-era sources indicated that 
two types of out-of-court statements that now would usually be 
“testimonial” under Crawford were admissible as evidence of a 
criminal defendant’s guilt. However, unsworn out-of-court 
statements, a category that would seem to include the 
“nontestimonial hearsay” category that is admissible under 
Crawford, were not admissible as evidence of a defendant’s guilt 
under framing-era evidence law. 
The two forms of admissible out-of-court statements both 
involved statements by persons who could not be produced as 
witnesses at trial. One was the written summary of a sworn 
Marian examination of a person who had been a witness against 
the defendant at the time of his arrest but who could not be 
produced at trial because of death, serious illness, or 
interference by the defendant.99 The other form of admissible 
out-of-court statement was a dying declaration of a murder 
victim. Although the latter was not technically a sworn 
statement, the declarant’s appreciation of impending death was 
viewed as being the functional equivalent of an oath.100 Thus, 
the admissible out-of-court statements that could be used to 
prove a defendant’s guilt were confined to sworn or functionally 
sworn statements by witnesses who were genuinely unavailable 
to testify at trial. (However, there was an unsettled issue 
regarding the admissibility of unsworn statements by young 
                                                          
available in these collections is not altogether reliable, probably because of 
deficiencies in the typesettings of the original documents that are reproduced 
in facsimilie in the collections 
99 Marian procedure was used when a person arrested for a felony was 
either bailed or committed to jail to await trial. For a brief description of 
Marian procedure, see infra note 116; Davies, supra note 10, at 126-29. 
100 See, e.g., infra notes 153, 210 and accompanying text. 
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children who were victims of crime.101) 
Conversely, “hearsay” was defined to include all unsworn 
out-of-court statements made by anyone other than the defendant 
(the defendant’s out-of-court statements were always admissible 
and were not labeled “hearsay”).102 Unlike modern doctrine, the 
framing-era definition of “hearsay” was not limited to out-of-
court statements that were offered to prove the truth of what was 
said; that refinement does not appear in the framing-era 
authorities.103 Rather, the framing-era authorities simply 
indicated that unsworn statements were banned as evidence of a 
criminal defendant’s guilt.104 
Put the other way, except for a dying declaration of a 
murder victim, there was no recognized exception to the ban 
against admitting unsworn hearsay as evidence of a defendant’s 
guilt in a felony trial. That point is sometimes obscured by a 
variety of recognized exceptions under which hearsay statements 
could be admitted to prove certain issues that could arise in 
trials of civil lawsuits. However, those exceptions were 
inapplicable to criminal trials.105 
Instead, the framing-era authorities recognized only two 
limited-purpose exceptions to the ban against unsworn hearsay 
that applied in criminal trials, neither of which permitted direct 
evidence of the defendant’s guilt. One limited-purpose exception 
was a corroboration/impeachment exception: prior out-of-court 
statements made by a witness who testified at trial could be 
admitted either to corroborate or impeach that witness’s trial 
testimony. The other limited-purpose exception allowed the use 
of hearsay statements to prove background facts that did not go 
directly to the defendant’s personal guilt; specifically, this 
                                                          
101 See infra notes 232-239 and accompanying text. 
102 See infra text accompanying notes 124, 129, 137,144. 
103 See supra note 9, infra note 279. 
104 However, there was a unique controversy during the eighteenth 
century as to whether a child victim of rape or molestation could testify 
without oath if the child were too young to take an oath. See infra notes 231-
239 and accompanying text. 
105 See infra note 162 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 145, 
185. 
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exception permitted hearsay evidence to be used to prove the 
general existence of a conspiracy, but not the defendant’s actual 
participation in it. (Thus, this exception was not equivalent to 
the modern co-conspirator statement hearsay exception.106) 
Framing-era sources articulated three somewhat overlapping 
rationales for the strict ban against admitting unsworn hearsay 
statements as evidence of a criminal defendant’s guilt. One was 
that such statements were presumptively untrustworthy because 
they were unsworn. A second rationale was that hearsay 
statements did not constitute the “best evidence” of the facts 
because the person who repeated a statement made by someone 
else did not have the direct personal knowledge that was 
required for legal evidence. The third rationale—which is most 
obviously identified with the confrontation right—was that 
admitting a hearsay statement would deny the defendant an 
opportunity to cross-examine, in the presence of the trial jury, 
the person who actually made the statement.107 Because of the 
requirement that all evidence in felony trials be presented in the 
                                                          
106 The modern co-conspirator hearsay exception, as formulated in FED. 
R. EVID. 801 (d)(2)(E), states that an out-of-court statement is not hearsay if 
it is offered “by the opponent of a party” (that is, the prosecutor in a 
criminal case) as “a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course 
and furtherance of the conspiracy.” State evidence codes generally track this 
federal definition, but with some variations. See. e.g. 4 JONES ON EVIDENCE: 
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 544-552, §§ 27:38-27:41 (Clifford S. Fishman, ed. 7th 
ed. 2000). 
 Cases recognizing this exception date back at least to the 1880s. See, 
e.g., 4 id. at 544 n. 82. However, it does not appear that this hearsay 
exception was recognized during the early nineteenth century. See, e.g., 1 
SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 295 (4th ed. 
1848) (stating that “the declarations of a conspirator or accomplice are 
receivable against his fellows, only when they are either in themselves acts, 
or accompany and explain acts, for which the others are responsible; but not 
when they are in the nature of narratives, descriptions, or subsequent 
confessions”). 
107 Professor Langbein has also noted that the eighteenth-century sources 
gave three main reasons for disapproving hearsay: (1) hearsay was not best 
evidence, (2) hearsay was not sworn, (3) hearsay meant “that the out-of-court 
declarant had not been subjected to cross-examination.” See LANGBEIN, 
ADVERSARY TRIAL, supra note 37, at 179-80. 
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presence of the defendant, the cross-examination rationale for 
the ban against hearsay appears to have applied more rigorously 
to criminal trials than to civil trials. 
These rationales for the ban against hearsay and the absence 
of any hearsay exceptions regarding evidence of the defendant’s 
guilt (except dying declarations) are evident in the discussions of 
the admissibility of out-of-court statements that appear in the 
principal framing-era sources. Let me begin with the leading 
treatises and then review the justice of the peace manuals. 
1.  Hawkins’s Pleas of the Crown 
The second volume of Serjeant William Hawkins’s Pleas of 
the Crown, which was first published in 1721 and reissued in 
subsequent editions through the eighteenth century,108 was 
widely regarded as the leading work on criminal procedure and 
criminal evidence at the time of the framing.109 In a chapter on 
                                                          
108 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1721). Volume 1 of 
this treatise, which dealt largely with substantive criminal law, was published 
in 1716. The title “Serjeant” indicated that Hawkins was a senior barrister. 
Several later editions were virtually identical to the first edition. I also cite 
the 1771 edition to show that continuity. For bibliographic information, see 1 
A LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS 362-
63 (W. Harold Maxwell & Leslie F. Maxwell eds., 2d ed. 1955) [hereinafter 
MAXWELL]. 
 In 1787, Thomas Leach published an edition of Hawkins’s treatise to 
which he added substantial notes and some new textual sections. However, 
Leach did not alter the passages from Hawkins’s original treatise that I quote 
and cite in this article. To distinguish between this and the original treatise, I 
cite this work separately: WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 
(Thomas Leach ed. 1787) [hereinafter “LEACH’S HAWKINS (1787 ed.)”]. In 
1795, Leach published an even more expanded four volume edition: WILLIAM 
HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (Thomas Leach ed. 1795) [hereinafter 
“LEACH’S HAWKINS (1795 ed.)”]. 
109 The influential nature of Hawkins’s treatise is evident in the attention 
given it in the preface to Richard Burn’s leading English justice of the peace 
manual, discussed infra note 144. See also the discussion of the influential 
nature of Hawkins’s treatise in 12 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW 361-62 (1938). 
 Hawkins’s treatise was widely consulted by framing-era Americans. For 
DAVIES 6/22/2007 1:01 AM 
 NOT THE FRAMERS’ DESIGN 395 
evidence in criminal trials, Hawkins explicitly set out two basic 
requirements for valid criminal evidence and implied a third. 
At the outset of his evidence chapter, Hawkins stated a 
requirement for valid criminal evidence as an overarching 
premise for his discussion of criminal trial evidence; that it was 
a “settled rule” that in felony trials “no evidence is to be given 
against a prisoner but in his presence.”110 This principle 
prohibited repetitions of the abuses associated with earlier 
treason trials, such as that of Sir Walter Raleigh, in which out-
of-court statements were admitted as evidence despite the 
availability of the declarants to testify in person at the trial.111 
                                                          
example, one study of the libraries of four Massachusetts lawyers who were 
in practice at the time of the American Revolution found that Hawkins’s 
treatise was one of ony a few works that all four owned. See RICHARD S. 
ECKERT, “THE GENTLEMEN OF THE PROFESSION”: THE EMERGENCE OF 
LAWYERS IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1630-1810, 256-57, 547 (1991). Likewise, 
Hawkins’s Treatise was still viewed as authoritative in the decades following 
the framing. For example, Chief Justice John Marshall also cited Hawkins’s 
treatise as authority in a prominent 1807 treason trial. See infra note 126. 
110 Hawkins opened his chapter on criminal trial evidence by stating: 
“[a]s to the Nature of Evidence, so far as it more particularly concerns 
Criminal Cases, having premised that it is a settled Rule, That in Cases of 
Life no Evidence is to be given against a Prisoner but in his Presence; . . .”2 
HAWKINS, supra note 108, at 428 (1721 ed.); 2 id. at 428 (1771 ed); 2 
LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra note 108, at 602 (1787 ed.); 4 id. at 418 (1795 
ed.). 
111 Hawkins commented that: 
There are many Instances in the Reigns of Queen Elizabeth and 
King James the first, wherein the Depositions of absent 
Witnesses were allowed as Evidence in Treason and Felony, 
even where it did not appear, but that the Witnesses might have 
been produced viva voce. And it was adjudged in the Earl of 
Strafford’s Trial, that where Witnesses could not be produced 
viva voce, by Reason of Sickness, &c. their Depositions might 
be read for or against the Prisoner on a Trial of High Treason, 
but not where they might have been produced in Person. 
2 HAWKINS, supra note 108, at 430 (1721 ed.); 2 id. at 430 (1771 ed.); 2 
LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra note 108, at 605 (1787 ed.). In the margin to this 
section, Hawkins cited, among others, Strafford’s Trial, “State Trials [1719 
ed.], Vol. 2. fol[io, 593,] 622 to 627, 644, 647, 651” (1680); and “Sir 
Walter Raleigh”s Trial [1 St. Tr. (1719 ed.)], fol[io] 181, 182” (1603). Note 
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Thus, out-of-court statements of available witnesses were never 
admissible as evidence of a defendant’s guilt. 
Hawkins also stated a second requirement; that “evidence for 
the king must in all cases be upon oath.”112 Thus, there was a 
complete ban against admitting unsworn testimony against a 
criminal defendant. This principle reflected the assumption that 
testimony was not trustworthy unless it was given under the 
threat of eternal damnation that attended a lie told under oath.113 
The requirement of an oath was also a source of the ban against 
admitting hearsay evidence; indeed, “hearsay” was defined to 
include any unsworn out-of-court statement. 
Additionally, Hawkins also implicitly drew upon a third 
principle that the terms “evidence” and “witnesss” implicitly 
carried during the eighteenth century: only a person who had 
direct personal knowledge of the facts or events could qualify to 
give evidence in a criminal trial. Although Hawkins did not 
explicitly discuss this point, other treatises referred to this as the 
“best evidence” principle or rule,114 and Thomas Leach later 
                                                          
that Hawkins indicated that the reading of depositions of available witnesses 
in treason trials was banned starting with Strafford’s trial in 1680. 
112 2 HAWKINS, supra note 108, at 434 (1721 ed.); 2 id. at 434 (1771 
ed.); 2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra note 108, at 612 (1787 ed.) (emphasis 
added). 
113 Under framing-era law, non-Christians could be admitted as witnesses 
provided they followed some religion, but atheists could not. Children could 
not be admitted unless they were mature enough to appreciate the prospect of 
eternal damnation for lying under oath, and adults who had not had religious 
instruction were sometimes also deemed inadmissible as witnesses. See, e.g., 
The King v. White, 1 Leach 430, 168 Eng. Rep. 317 (Old Bailey 1789) 
(ruling that although a potential witness said he had heard there was a god 
and believed that he could be hung for lying at a trial, he was inadmissible as 
a witness because “he had never learned the catechism” and thus “was 
altogether ignorant of the obligations of an oath, a future state of reward and 
punishment, the existence of another world, or what became of wicked 
people after death”). 
114 See infra note 144 and accompanying text. During the eighteenth 
century, “best evidence” referred to a broad principle of evidence. Thus, that 
term historically carried a much broader meaning than the term “best 
evidence” is accorded in contemporary evidence rules, such as the “original 
writing rule” codified in Rule 1002, FED. R. EVID. 
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added an explicit statement of this “best evidence” requirement 
to Hawkins’s treatise when he revised that work in 1787.115 
Thus, evidence in criminal trials had to take the form of 
sworn oral testimony, by a person with direct knowledge of the 
facts testified to, given in the presence of the defendant, and 
subject to cross-examination by the defendant in the presence of 
the jury. Conversely, unsworn hearsay statements could not be 
admitted as evidence of the defendant’s guilt, but only to 
corroborate or impeach testimony already given by another 
witness at the trial, or to prove the general existence of a 
conspiracy or similar background fact. 
With that overview, let me review the specific statements 
that Hawkins made about out-of-court statements in criminal 
evidence. 
a.  The Admissibility of a Marian Examination of an 
Unavailable Witness 
Hawkins identified only one kind of out-of-court statement 
that could be admitted as evidence of a defendant’s guilt: the 
written record of a sworn Marian witness examination given by 
a person who subsequently became genuinely unavailable to 
testify at trial. Under the Marian statutes, justices of the peace 
were not only authorized but required to take and record in 
writing the sworn “information” of the complainant and any 
supporting witnesses whenever a felony arrest was made, and 
coroners were required to do likewise regarding witnesses who 
testified at inquests of homicides.116 Hawkins stated that the 
                                                          
115 See infra note 154. 
116 Marian procedure, which was a standard feature of felony 
prosecutions in England and in the American colonies and most of the 
original states, was created by the Marian statutes, enacted in the mid-
sixteenth century during the reign of Mary Tudor (hence, the term 
“Marian”). See 1 & 2 Phil. & Mar. c. 13, § IV (1554); 2 & 3 Phil. & Mar., 
c. 10, § II (1555). The statutes provided the procedure to be followed when a 
person arrested for a felony or manslaughter was brought before a justice of 
the peace to be bailed or committed to gaol (that is, jail) to await trial. The 
statutes required the justice of the peace to whom the “prisoner” (that is, 
arrestee) was taken, to take the sworn “information” of the witnesses who 
DAVIES 6/22/2007 1:01 AM 
398 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
written record of a Marian witness examination117 was 
admissible as evidence in a felony trial if the witness was 
genuinely unavailable.118 Because the Marian statutes required 
witness examinations to be taken under oath, such examinations 
carried an indicia of trustworthiness. Probably for that reason, 
Hawkins did not refer to Marian examinations as “hearsay.” 
However, Marian examinations were admissible only if the 
declarant was genuinely unavailable—that is, dead, too seriously 
ill to travel, or kept away by the defendant.119 Because of the 
unavailability of the witness, the written record of a witness 
examination became the best evidence that could be had and thus 
was admissible of necessity. Although there is some controversy 
regarding the precise procedure required for Marian witness 
examinations as of 1789,120 there is no doubt that such 
                                                          
made the arrest, as well as the unsworn “examination” of the arrestee, to 
reduce those statements to writing, and to certify those records to the next 
session of the felony trial court (either the court of “gaol-delivery” or 
“sessions of the peace,” depending on the specific felony). The Marian 
statutes also required coroners to take, record, and certify to the trial court 
the sworn information of witnesses at inquests into homicides. For a more 
detailed description, see Davies, supra note 10, at 126-30. 
117 Modern commentaries typically refer to Marian witness examinations 
as “depositions,” and the historical sources sometimes did so. However, 
because use of the deposition label can lead to confusion, and because the 
historical sources usually used the term “examination,” I refer to these 
witness statements as Marian witness “examinations.” See Davies, supra note 
1, at 580 n. 80. 
118 2 HAWKINS, supra note 108, at 429 (1721 ed.); 2 id. at 429 (1771 
ed.); 2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra note 108, at 605 (1787 ed.). See also 
Davies, supra note 108, at 146-48. 
119 See 2 HAWKINS, supra note 98, at 429 (1721 ed.); 2 id. at 429 (1771 
ed.); 2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra note 98, at 605 (1787 ed.) 
120 Whether the admissibility of the written record of a Marian witness 
examination depended upon the defendant’s having had an opportunity to 
cross-examine the witness when the examination was taken, as Justice Scalia 
claimed in Crawford, is a contested point. Justice Scalia asserted in Crawford 
that the Marian “statutory derogation” of a broad common-law cross-
examination right had been “rejected” in English law by 1791. Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 54-55 n. 5. In my previous article, I argued that claim was 
prochronistic because, although a cross-examination rule did become a part of 
Marian procedure in English law sometime after the framing of the federal 
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examinations were admissible only if the witness was 
unavailable to testify at trial.121 Thus, although the admissibility 
                                                          
Bill of Rights, no cross-examination requirement for Marian witness 
examinations had appeared in any of the published treatises or case reports 
that were available in America by the time of the 1789 framing. See Davies, 
supra note 10, at 120-189. 
 Mr. Robert Kry, who clerked for Justice Scalia during the term when 
Crawford was decided, has responded to my criticism of Justice Scalia’s 
originalist claim regarding the “cross-examination rule” aspect of Crawford. 
See Robert Kry, Confrontation Under the Marian Statutes: A Response to 
Professor Davies, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 493 (2007). 
 I do not think the historical materials Mr. Kry has identified regarding 
the evolution of Marian practice in London alter my previous conclusions that 
no cross-examination rule for Marian procedure had been recognized in 
English law as of the 1789 framing of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation 
Clause and that no such rule had come to the Framers’ attention by that date. 
See Davies, supra note 1 (responding in detail to Kry’s arguments, and 
specifically noting that Kry’s evidence indicates only that a controversy 
regarding cross-examination in Marian witness examinations had arisen in 
London as of 1789, not the settled rule Justice Scalia asserted in Crawford, 
and that Kry has not identified significant evidence that Americans would 
have been aware even of that controversy as of 1789). 
 However, Mr. Kry has not addressed the criticism in my prior article 
regarding Crawford’s originalist testimonial formulation of the scope of the 
confrontation right, which I further elaborate in this article. 
121 It is unclear why Justice Thomas persists in asserting that Marian 
witness examinations were the target of the Confrontation Clause. Justice 
Thomas’s rhetoric conveys the impression that the Framers would have 
thought there was an unsettled issue as to whether Marian depositions might 
be admitted in lieu of live testimony by an available witness. That simply was 
not the case. As Hawkins indicated, the admissibility of a Marian witness 
examination had been limited to unavailable witnesses in a ruling in 1680, 
more than a century prior to the framing. See supra note 111. Thus, the 
framing-era rule permitted the admission of a Marian witness examination in 
a common-law criminal jury trial only in the unusual circumstance in which a 
witness had died, become seriously ill, or was kept away by the defendant. 
Otherwise, evidence at trial had to be given viva voce in the presence of the 
prisoner. Thus, the rule of admissibility of Marian witness examinations of 
genuinely unavailable witnesses did not threaten to turn criminal trials into 
trial by deposition. Notably, neither Justice Thomas nor Justice Scalia has 
identified any pre-framing complaints about the admissibility of Marian 
examinations of genuinely unavailable witnesses. I have not located any such 
complaint prior to 1794. See Davies, supra note 10, at 186. 
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of a Marian witness examination did contravene the usual 
principle that a defendant was entitled to cross-examine, face-to-
face, all adverse witnesses in the presence of the jury,122 that 
deviation seems to have been permitted because of the presumed 
trustworthiness of the statement in light of its having been taken 
under oath, and the potential importance of the evidence that 
would otherwise be lost. The admissibility of Marian 
examinations of unavailable witnesses also served an important 
practical purpose; the admissibility of a witness’s preserved 
written information removed a defendant’s incentive to kill or 
otherwise obstruct the appearance of an adverse witness.123 
b.  The Ban Against Hearsay 
Hawkins also discussed the general ban against hearsay 
evidence in criminal trials and identified the two limited-purpose 
exceptions to that ban. He stated the general ban against the 
admission of hearsay statements as evidence in a criminal trial as 
follows: 
As to . . . How far Hearsay is Evidence: It seems 
agreed That what a Stranger [that is, an out-of-court 
declarant] has been heard to say is in Strictness no 
Manner of Evidence either for or against a Prisoner, 
not only because it is not upon Oath, but also because 
the other side had no Opportunity of a cross 
Examination; and therefore it seems a settled Rule, 
That it shall never be made use of but only by way of 
Inducement or Illustration of what is properly 
Evidence . . . .124 
Thus, Hawkins defined all unsworn out-of-court statements 
as “hearsay” and also stated that such statements were 
                                                          
122 Hawkins did not explicitly refer to cross-examination in the presence 
of the jury, but other commentators did. See, e.g., HALE, quoted supra note 
89; BLACKSTONE, quoted supra note 90. 
123 See Davies, supra note 10, at 148. 
124 2 HAWKINS, supra note 108, at 431 (1721 ed.); 2 id. at 431 (1771 
ed.); 2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra note 108, at 606-07 (1787 ed.). 
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inadmissible not only because they were unsworn (and thus 
unreliable), but also “because the other side had no opportunity 
of a cross-examination.” The latter statement makes it clear that 
Hawkins did not treat the ban against hearsay as being distinct 
from the in-the-presence/confrontation principle; rather, he 
treated admitting hearsay—unsworn out-of-court statements—as a 
violation of the principle that all evidence in criminal trials had 
to be given in the presence of the defendant. Hawkins’s linkage 
of the ban against hearsay to the right to cross-examine is 
particularly significant because it was repeated in all of the 
prominent framing-era American justice of the peace manuals.125 
c.  The Two Limited-Purpose Hearsay Exceptions 
Hawkins identified only two exceptions to the ban against 
admitting hearsay evidence, and each was confined to a specific 
use. One allowed hearsay statements to be used “by way of 
inducement or illustration of what is properly evidence” and the 
other allowed hearsay statements to be used to corroborate (or 
impeach) the testimony a witness had already given at trial. 
Those are the only instances in which Hawkins indicated that 
hearsay statements could be admissible. 
Although Hawkins’s statement that hearsay can “be made 
use of . . . by way of inducement or illustration of what is 
properly evidence . . .” may seem mysterious, the marginal 
citations that accompany this point indicate that Hawkins was 
referring to the use of hearsay statements to prove the general 
existence of a conspiracy—but not to prove the defendant’s 
personal involvement in it.126 This seems to have been a 
                                                          
125 See infra notes 190-193. 
126 The meaning of Hawkins’s reference to the allowance of hearsay 
statements “by way of inducement or illustration of what is properly 
evidence” (see supra quotation in the text at note 124) is explained by 
Hawkins’s citations in the margin to five seventeenth-century treason trials. 
In each, the court allowed witnesses (usually persons who admitted some 
involvement in the plot) to repeat hearsay statements that showed the general 
existence of a conspiracy against the government, but indicated that such 
statements were not to be treated as evidence of the defendant’s own guilt. 
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 See 2 HAWKINS, supra note 108, at 431 (1721 ed.), citing: (1) Tryal of 
Richard Langhorn, 2 State Tryals (1st ed. 1719) 325, 328, 332, 333 (Old 
Bailey 1679) (reporting, in this Popish Plot trial, that witnesses who were 
involved were allowed to repeat hearsay statements regarding the general 
existence of a plot to kill the king; however, in one instance when a hearsay 
statement regarding the defendant was made, the court instructed the jury that 
that statement was “no evidence” against the defendant); (2) Trial of Thomas 
Knox and John Lane, 2 State Tryals (1st ed. 1719) 410, 414-15 (K.B. 1679) 
(reporting, in this Popish Plot trial, that the admission of hearsay evidence 
regarding statements made by a conspirator who had “run away” was 
contested, and the court ruled that the prosecution should first present some 
evidence of acts by the defendants and then could use the hearsay evidence to 
prove the circumstances in which the defendants had acted); (3) Tryal of 
Lord Russell, 3 State Tryals (1st ed. 1719) 133, 144, 145 (K. B. 1683) 
(reporting, in this Rye House Plot trial, that when a witness gave a long 
narrative about the existence of a conspiracy which included hearsay 
statements about the defendant, the defendant objected to “a great deal of 
Evidence by Hearsay” and the court responded that “[t]his is nothing against 
you, I declare it to the Jury”); (4) Tryal of Algernone Sidney, 3 State Tryals 
(1st ed. 1719) 207, 210 (K.B. 1683) (reporting, in this Rye House Plot trial, 
that when defendant objected to admission of evidence not about himself, the 
court cited the Popish Plot trials as precedent for admitting evidence of the 
general design of a conspiracy; when the witness then recounted some 
hearsay statements about the defendant himself, the defendant objected and 
the court ruled that “this Evidence does not affect you, and I tell the Jury 
so”); (5) Tryals of Charnock, King, and Keyes, 4 State Tryals (1719 ed.) 1, 
33 (Old Bailey 1695) (reporting, in a Jacobite plot trial, that the court 
instructed the jury that hearsay accounts of statements made by others 
involved in the plot were “not Evidence” against the individual defendants, 
but were “good Proof” of the existence of the plot itself). The same citations 
appear in later editions. See 2 id. at 431 (1771 ed.); 2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, 
supra note 108, at 606 (1787 ed.) All of these defendants were convicted of 
treason and executed. For historical background on the Popish Plot trials and 
the Rye House Plot trials, see LANGBEIN, ADVERSARY TRIAL, supra note 37, 
at 69-72, 75-76. 
 Unlike the modern co-conspirator statement exception, in each of these 
cases the court limited the use of hearsay to the general existence of a 
conspiracy, but instructed the juries that the hearsay evidence was not to be 
considered as evidence of the defendant’s personal involvement. 
 This limited understanding of the use to which hearsay evidence of a 
conspiracy could be admitted was still evident in Chief Justice Marshall’s 
rulings in the Burr Conspiracy trials of 1807. Marshall premised his ruling by 
stating that “courts will always apply the rules of evidence to criminal 
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pragmatic response to the difficulty that would otherwise have 
been encountered in proving the existence of a conspiracy 
involving more than a few persons.127 However, this framing-era 
exception was not equivalent to the modern co-conspirator 
hearsay exception because a co-conspirator’s hearsay statement 
could not be used to prove the defendant’s own involvement in 
the conspiracy.128 Although some later works suggest that this 
exception could allow the use of hearsay to prove other 
background facts, Hawkins mentioned only proof of a 
conspiracy. 
The only other hearsay exception Hawkins mentioned 
appeared at the end of his passage on hearsay, quoted above: 
Yet it seems that what the Prisoner had been heard to 
say at another Time may be given in Evidence for 
him as well as against him, and also what a Witness 
                                                          
prosecutions so as to treat the defence with as much liberality and tenderness 
as the case will admit.” United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 187, 191 (Cir. 
Ct. D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,696). He then noted that there was an exception to 
the rule against hearsay evidence “for the purpose of proving the conspiracy” 
but noted that the hearsay “is not to operate against the accused, unless 
brought home to him by [nonhearsay] testimony drawn from his own 
declarations or his own conduct.” Id. at 193. On that basis, he then ruled that 
the hearsay evidence proffered was inadmissible in the case at hand. Id. at 
195. Although Marshall did not cite authorities in this specific discussion, he 
discussed the proof of the existence of a conspiracy hearsay exception in the 
same way that Hawkins had, and also cited “2 Hawk. P.C.” as authority for 
several later points in the same proceeding. Id. at 196, 197. Hence, there is 
no doubt he was conversant with Hawkins’s treatment and regarded it as 
authoritative. 
 A comparable use of hearsay evidence to prove that a mutiny occurred 
was allowed in The Ulysses, 24 Fed. Cas. 515, 516-17 n.2 (1800). 
 However, Hawkins’s reference to the use of hearsay “by way of 
inducement or illustration of what is properly evidence” may have been 
applied more loosely during the early nineteenth century. See infra notes 171, 
200, 257. 
127 The treason trials that Hawkins cited, see supra note 126, had 
typically involved a significant number of alleged participants. The primary 
example was the “Popish Plot” trials of 1678-80. For a description, see 
LANGBEIN, ADVERSARY TRIAL, supra note 37, at 69-75. 
128 See supra note 126, infra notes 134, 163. 
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hath been heard to say at another Time, may be given 
in Evidence in order either to invalidate or confirm 
the Testimony which he gives in Court.129 
This impeachment/corroboration exception was quite limited. 
It did not permit a hearsay statement to be admitted 
independently as direct evidence of a defendant’s guilt. Rather, 
the only hearsay statements that were admissible were those that 
were previously made out-of-court by a person who had testified 
under oath as a witness at trial. Thus, the hearsay declarant was 
actually subject to cross-examination by the defendant during the 
trial. 
In sum, Hawkins identified only three instances in which 
out-of-court statements were admissible in criminal trials. The 
only form of out-of-court statement that was admissible as 
“proper[] evidence”—that is, as evidence of the defendant’s 
guilt—was a sworn Marian examination of a genuinely 
unavailable witnesses. In contrast, Hawkins did not identify any 
instances when unsworn hearsay statements were admissible to 
prove the guilt of the defendant. 
2.  Bacon’s Abridgment 
A summary of Hawkins’s statements regarding the rule 
against hearsay also appeared in an “abridgment” published by 
Matthew Bacon in 1736: 
It seems agreed, that what another has been heard to 
say is no Evidence, because the Party was not under 
Oath; also, because the Party who is affected thereby, 
had not an Opportunity of Cross-examining; but such 
Speeches or Discourses may be made use of by Way 
of Inducement or Illustration of what is is properly 
Evidence. 
                                                          
129 2 HAWKINS, supra note 108, at 431 (1721 ed.) (emphasis added); 2 
id. at 431 (1771 ed.); 2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra note 108, at 606-07 (1787 
ed.). Note that the use of a defendant’s own unsworn statements was not 
regarded as hearsay and posed no difficulty because the defendant’s 
statements were neither required nor permitted to be taken on oath. 
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Also, what a Witness hath been heard to say at 
another Time, may be given in Evidence, in order 
either to invalidate or confirm the Testimony he gives 
in Court.130 
The restrictive treatment of out-of-court statements that is 
evident in Hawkins’s treatise is also evident in the other treatises 
on evidence doctrine that were available in framing-era 
America. In particular, those sources also state a rigid ban 
against hearsay evidence in criminal trials. 
3.  Nelson’s Law of Evidence 
A 1717 treatise titled The Law of Evidence, which was 
published anonymously but is attributed to William Nelson, was 
written more or less contemporaneously with that by 
Hawkins.131 Like Hawkins, Nelson also recognized the 
admissibility of sworn Marian examinations of deceased 
witnesses.132 Also like Hawkins, Nelson stated a strong ban 
against unsworn hearsay. Specifically, Nelson wrote that “[a] 
Witness shall not give Evidence of what he has heard another 
say, (For Hearsay is not to be admitted),” but like Hawkins, he 
recognized the limited-purpose corroboration exception,133 and 
                                                          
130 2 MATTHEW BACON, THE NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 313 (1st 
ed. 1736) (citing “2 Hawk. P. C. 431 [1st ed.]”). This summary appears 
without change in 2 id. at *313 (6th ed., T. Cunningham ed. 1793). For 
bibliographic information, see 1 MAXWELL, supra note 108, at 16. 
131 WILLIAM NELSON, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1717). This work was 
initially published in 1717 and subsequent editions were published in 1735 
and 1744. See 1 MAXWELL supra note 108, at 379. I quote and cite the 1744 
edition. 
132 See NELSON, supra note 131, at 120, 277 (1744 ed.). 
133 Nelson’s treatise stated the hearsay rule as follows: 
12. A Witness shall not give Evidence of what he has heard 
another say, (For Hearsay is not to be admitted, except as No. 
7. supra.) Yet [in a treason trial] The Acts and Speeches of 
others admitted as Evidence against a Prisoner. (Sed quare 
Legem? [But query whether legal?]) 
Id. at 270 (citations omitted, emphasis in original). The exception in “No. 7” 
referred to in the above passage was the corroboration exception: 
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also mentioned the allowance of hearsay for the limited purpose 
of proving the general existence of a conspiracy.134 However, 
Nelson did not identify any other exceptions to the ban against 
unsworn hearsay evidence. 
4.  Gilbert’s Law of Evidence 
Chief Baron Geoffrey Gilbert’s treatise, The Law of 
Evidence, was written more or less contemporaneously with 
Hawkins’s and Nelson’s, but was published posthumously 
several decades later in 1754, and reissued in several later 
editions, including a 1788 New York printing.135 Unlike 
                                                          
7. Hearsay is admitted for Evidence where it is to establish 
another Witness’s Testimony; as where a second swears he 
heard the first Witness declare the same Thing formerly. 
Id. (citation omitted). See also id. at 181 (“Though a Hear-say was not to be 
allowed as direct Evidence, yet it might be made use of to this Purpose, viz. 
to prove that [a witness] was constant to himself; whereby his Testimony was 
corroborated”). 
134 Nelson’s treatise also noted that hearsay could be used to prove the 
existence of a conspiracy but not the defendant’s personal involvement in it: 
11. Hearsay from others is not to be applied immediately to the 
Prisoner; however those Matters that are remote at first, may 
serve to prove there was a general Conspiracy to destroy the 
King and Government; and so was the constant Rule and 
Method about the Popish Plot, first to produce Evidence of the 
Plot in General. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
135 GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1754). The title “Chief 
Baron” indicated that Gilbert was chief judge of the Court of Exchequer. 
Gilbert’s treatise was reprinted in several later editions with little alteration 
except for the pagination. I cite the 1777 London edition to show continuity. 
For bibliographic information, see 1 MAXWELL, supra note 108, at 379. 
Gilbert’s treatise was also printed in Philadelphia in 1788 [hereinafter 
“GILBERT (1788 Philadelphia ed.)”]. See JAMES, supra note 90, at 184. 
Examination of that edition indicates that it was a reprinting of the London 
1777 edition. 
 Capel Lofft edited a substantially expanded four volume edition of 
Gilbert’s Law of Evidence in 1791-1796. Because it is so altered, I cite this 
work separately: GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (Capel Lofft 
ed. 1791) [hereinafter LOFFT’S GILBERT.] For bibliographic information, see 
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Hawkins, Gilbert dealt with evidence in both civil and criminal 
matters, and gave predominance to the former. Nevertheless, 
Gilbert’s treatment of out-of-court statements was essentially the 
same as that set out by Hawkins and Nelson. 
Like Hawkins and Nelson, Gilbert recognized that Marian 
witness examinations of unavailable witnesses were admissible 
as evidence in felony trials.136 Also like Hawkins and Nelson, 
Gilbert offered a strong (if wordy) ban against hearsay evidence, 
which he defined to include any unsworn out-of-court statement: 
The Attestation of the Witness must be to what he 
knows, and not to that only which he hath heard, for 
a mere Hearsay is no Evidence, for ‘tis his 
Knowledge that must direct the Court and Jury in the 
Judgment of the Fact, and not his mere Credulity, 
which is very uncertain and various in several 
Persons; For Testimony being but an Appeal to the 
Knowledge of another, if indeed he doth not know he 
can be no Evidence: Besides tho’ a Person testify 
what he hath heard upon Oath, yet the Person who 
spake it was not upon Oath; and if a Man had been in 
Court and said the Thing and had not sworn it, he 
had not been believed in a Court of Justice; for all 
Credit being derived from Attestation and Evidence, 
it can rise no higher than the Fountain from whence it 
flows, and if the first Speech was without Oath, an 
Oath that there was such a speech makes it no more 
than a bare speaking, and so of no Value in a Court 
of Justice, where all Things were determined under 
the Solemnities of an Oath . . .137 
                                                          
1 MAXWELL, supra note 108, at 379. 
136 GILBERT, supra note 135, at 100 (1754 ed.), discussed in Davies, 
supra note 10, at 144-45. 
137 GILBERT, supra note 135, at 107-08 (1754 ed.); id. at 149-50 (1777 
ed.); id. at 149-50 (Philadelphia 1788 ed.). Capel Lofft located this passage 
under the heading “Of Secondary Evidence; or, Hearsay in Criminal Cases.” 
2 LOFFT’S GILBERT, supra note 135, at 889 (1791 ed.). This is the passage 
that Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted from Gilbert’s 1769 edition in Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 70 n. 2, discussed supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
DAVIES 6/22/2007 1:01 AM 
408 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
The first part of this passage reflects the “best evidence” 
principle—a person who can only repeat someone else’s account 
does not have the sort of direct knowledge that is required for 
valid evidence; hence, he cannot qualify as a witness. The 
second part condemns hearsay for the inherent untrustworthiness 
of an unsworn statement. However, perhaps because he was not 
primarily concerned with criminal evidence, Gilbert did not 
identify the absence of cross-examination or the lack of 
testimony in the presence of the defendant as deficiencies in 
hearsay. 
Gilbert identified only a single exception under which 
hearsay could be admitted as evidence—the limited-purpose 
corroboration exception also mentioned by Hawkins and Nelson. 
At the end of the passage quoted above, Gilbert wrote: 
But tho’ Hearsay be not allow’d as direct evidence, 
yet it may be in Corroboration of a Witness’s 
Testimony, to shew that he affirmed the same thing 
before on other occasions, and that he is still 
consistent with himself; for such Evidence is only in 
Support of the Witness that gives in his Testimony 
upon Oath.138 
Interestingly, however, Gilbert presented this corroboration 
exception under the heading of “One Witness, Hearsay 
Evidence,” suggesting that the exception applied only in an 
instance where only a single witness was available to give 
evidence on a matter.139 Perhaps because he was not primarily 
concerned with criminal evidence, Gilbert did not mention the 
limited-purpose exception for proving the general existence of a 
                                                          
138 GILBERT, supra note 135, at 108 (1754 ed.); id. at 150 (1777 ed); id. 
at 150 (1788 Philadelphia ed.); 2 LOFFT’S GILBERT, supra note 135, at 890 
(1791 ed.). 
139 GILBERT, supra note 135, at 106, 108 (1754 ed.); id. at 147, 150 
(1777 ed.); id. at 147, 150 (1788 Philadelphia ed.). Gilbert included a margin 
citation at this passage to “Skin 402,” the citation for Thompson v. 
Trevanion, which I discuss infra notes 244-247 and accompanying text. Thus, 
Gilbert treated Thompson as involving the corroboration hearsay exception, 
rather than as involving a spontaneous declaration or res gestae hearsay 
exception. 
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conspiracy. 
5.  The Bathurst and Buller Treatises 
Two additional English evidence treatises appeared in the 
mid eighteenth century, although they were so closely related 
that they constituted virtually the same work. Henry Bathurst’s 
The Theory of Evidence, which acknowledged heavy borrowing 
from Nelson and Gilbert, was published anonymously in 
1761.140 That work was then totally incorporated into a 
somewhat larger treatise, An Introduction to the Law Relative to 
Trials at Nisi Prius, which was published anonymously in 1767 
but, starting with the 1772 edition, was published under the 
name of Francis Buller, Bathurst’s nephew.141 A New York 
edition of this latter treatise was published in 1788.142 
Like Gilbert’s treatise, those by Bathurst and Buller were 
primarily concerned with evidence in civil litigation. 
                                                          
140 HENRY BATHURST, THEORY OF EVIDENCE (1761). There was no later 
edition of this work under this title. See 1 MAXWELL, supra note 108, at 378. 
141 FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO 
TRIALS AT NISI PRIUS (1772). (Nisi Prius referred to trial jurisdiction.) The 
incorporation of the contents of THE THEORY OF EVIDENCE into the later Nisi 
Prius treatise was well known. See RICHARD WALLEY BRIDGMAN, A SHORT 
VIEW OF LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 230-31 (1807) (noting that the contents of 
THE THEORY OF EVIDENCE were “generally understood to have been 
afterwards engrafted on” the Nisi Prius treatise). The initial editions of the 
Nisi Prius treatise are attributed to Bathurst, but his nephew, Francis Buller, 
is identified as the author starting with the 1772 edition, and this work is 
often cited as Buller’s. See 1 MAXWELL supra note 108, at 378 (entry 1; 
THEORY OF EVIDENCE incorporated into AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF 
NISI PRIUS); id. at 335 (entries 1 & 3; discussing 1767 & 1772 editions of 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT NISI PRIUS and 
attributing 1772 edition to Buller). There were also some later editions 
published by others, sometimes titled AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAW RELATIVE 
TO TRIALS AT NISI PRIUS. For simplicity, I cite the 1772 edition identifying 
Buller as the author. 
142 FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO 
TRIALS AT NISI PRIUS (reprinted by Hugh Gaine, New York, 1788) 
[hereinafter “BULLER (1788 New York ed.)”]. See JAMES, supra note 90, at 
184. 
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Nevertheless, they did recognize the admissibility of Marian 
examinations of genuinely unavailable witnesses in felony 
trials.143 The Bathurst and Buller treatises also stated a strong 
ban against hearsay evidence while recognizing the exception for 
the limited purpose of corroboration of a trial witness’s 
testimony: 
Hearsay is no Evidence, for no Evidence is to be 
admitted but what is upon Oath ; and if the first 
Speech was without Oath, another Oath that there was 
such Speech, makes it no more than a bare Speaking, 
and so of no Value in a Court of Justice. Beside, if 
the Witness is living, what he has been heard to say 
is not the best Evidence. But though Hearsay be not 
to be allowed as direct Evidence, yet it may in 
Corroboration of a Witness’s testimony, to shew that 
he affirmed the same Thing before on other 
Occasions, and that he is still constant to himself.144 
Following this passage, these works then listed several 
                                                          
143 THE THEORY OF EVIDENCE stated: 
if the Witnesses examined on a Coroner’s Inquest are dead, or 
beyond Sea, their Depositions may be read; for the Coroner is 
an Officer appointed on behalf of the Public, to make Inquiry 
about the Matters within his Jurisdiction; and therefore the Law 
will presume the Depositions before him to be fairly and 
impartially taken.—And by [the Marian statutes] Justices of the 
Peace shall examine of Persons brought before them for Felony, 
and of those who brought them, and certify such Examination to 
the next Goal-Delivery; but the examination of the Prisoner shall 
be without Oath, and the others upon Oath, and these 
Examinations shall be read against the Offender upon an 
Indictment, if the Witnesses be dead. 
BATHURST, supra note 140, at 33-34 (1761). See also BULLER, supra note 
141, at 238 (1772 ed); BULLER, supra note 142, at 242 (1788 New York 
ed.). 
144 BATHURST, supra note 140, at 111; BULLER, supra note 141, at 289-
90 (1772 ed.) (same passage with minor stylistic changes); BULLER, supra 
note 142, at 294 (1788 New York ed.) (same). Note that the language in the 
statement regarding the corroboration exception was taken almost verbatim 
from that by Gilbert, quoted supra text accompanying note138. 
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specific issues on which hearsay evidence was admissible in civil 
lawsuits, including legitimacy, ancestry, whether a person was 
dead, pedigree, “prescription” (that is, a claim to land based on 
long occupancy), customary right-of-ways, or reputation as to a 
title.145 However, none of these issues were pertinent to criminal 
                                                          
145 The paragraph that immediately follows that quoted in the text 
identifies civil litigation hearsay exceptions as follows: 
So where the Issue is on the Legitimacy of the Plaintiff or 
Defendant, it seems the Practice to admit Evidence of what the 
Parents have been heard to say, either as to their being or not 
being married, and with Reason, for the Presumption arising 
from the Cohabitation is either strengthened or destroyed by 
such Declarations, which are not to be given in Evidence 
directly, but may be assined the Witness as a Reason for his 
Belief one Way or the other. But in Pendrel and Pendrel, Hil. 5. 
G. 2. Lord Raymond would not suffer the Wife’s Declarations, 
that she should not know her Husband by Sight, &c. to be given 
in Evidence till after she had been produced on the other Side. 
So Hearsay is good Evidence to prove, who is my Grandfather, 
when he married, what Children he had, &c. of which it is not 
reasonable to presume I have better Evidence. So to prove my 
Father, Mother, Cousin, or other Relation beyond the Sea, is 
dead, and the common Reputation and Belief of it in the Family 
gives Credit to such Evidence; and for a Stranger it would be 
good Evidence if a Person swore that a Brother or other near 
relation had told him so, which Relation is dead. In Ejectment 
between the Duke of Athol and Lord Asburnham, E. 14. G. 2. 
Mr. Sharpe, who was Attorney in the Cause, was admitted to 
prove, what Mr. Worthington told him he knew and had heard 
in regard to the Pedigree of the Family, Mr. Worthington 
happening to die before the Trial. So in Questions of 
Prescription, it is allowable to give hearsay Evidence in order to 
prove general Reputation; and where the Issue was a Right to a 
Way over the Plaintiff’s Close, the Defendants were admitted to 
give Evidence of a Conversation between Persons not interested, 
then dead, wherein the Right to the Way was agreed. In 
Ejectment the Plaintiff derived his Title from Lord R. in whom 
he laid a Presentation of one Knight; the Bishop set up a Title in 
himself, and traversed the Seisin of Lord R. The Plaintiff gave 
in Evidence an Entry in the Register of the Diocese of the 
Institution of Knight, in which there was Blank in the Place, 
where the Patron’s Name is usually inserted, upon which he 
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prosecutions.146 Like Gilbert’s treatise, the Bathurst and Buller 
treatises did not mention the existence-of-a-conspiracy exception 
that Hawkins and Nelson had discussed. 
6.  Viner’s Abridgment and the Dying Declaration Exception 
None of the treatises mentioned so far had recognized any 
exception under which unsworn hearsay could be admitted as 
evidence of a criminal defendant’s guilt. The first such 
exception, for a dying declaration by a murder victim, was 
introduced into the treatise literature around 1750 when Charles 
Viner published volume 12 of his twenty-three volume General 
Abridgment of Law and Equity147 
Viner stated that “Hearsay from others is not to be applied 
immediately to the prisoner” and that “hearsay [is] not to be 
                                                          
offered parol Evidence of the general Reputation of the Country, 
that Knight was in by the Presentation of Lord R. Upon a Bill of 
Exceptions, this came on Error into K[ing’s] B[ench] where the 
better Opinion was, that the Evidence was allowable; the 
Register which was the proper Evidence being silent. A 
Presentation made by Parol, may be transmitted to Posterity by 
Parol, and that creates a General Reputation. 
BATHURST, supra note 140, at 111-113; BULLER, supra note 141, at 290-91 
(same passage with minor stylistic changes); BULLER, supra note 142, at 294-
95 (1788 New York ed.) (same). 
 No similar list of hearsay exceptions appeared in Gilbert’s Treatise, until 
Capel Lofft added a passage derived from the passage quoted above in his 
1791 revision of Gilbert’s treatise. See 1 LOFFT’S GILBERT, supra note 135, 
at 279 (1791 ed.). 
146 Capel Lofft explicitly noted that these hearsay exceptions were 
inapplicable in criminal trials when he published an enlarged edition of 
Gilbert’s treatise in 1791. See infra note 162 and accompanying text. 
147 CHARLES VINER, GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY. The 
twenty-three volumes were published between 1741 and 1753. See 1 
MAXWELL, supra note 108, at 20. I have been unable to establish the precise 
publication date of volume 12, which dealt with the topic of evidence, and 
which was sometimes published and sold separately. See 1 MAXWELL, supra, 
at 379. R. Kelham published an index to the twenty-three volumes as the 
twenty-fourth volume in 1758. See 1 id. at 19. 
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allowed as direct evidence.”148 He also recognized the limited-
purpose exceptions for proof of the existence of a conspiracy149 
and for corroboration.150 However, he added a new exception 
for a dying declaration that, for the first time, permitted 
unsworn hearsay to be admitted as evidence of a defendant’s 
guilt in a criminal trial: 
11. In the case of murder, what the deceased declared 
after the wound given, may be given in evidence. 
Coram King Ch. J. apud. Old Bailey, 1720. the King 
v. Ely. 
12. In Trowter’s Case, Pasch. 8 Geo. B.R. the Court 
would not admit the declaration of the deceased 
which had been reduced into writing to be given in 
evidence without producing the writing.151 
No similar dying declaration exception had been noted by 
Hawkins or the other evidence treatises. The explanation is 
suggested by the dates of the cases that Viner cited as authority 
for the exception: an unreported 1720 ruling in the Old Bailey 
and a 1722 (“Pasch. 8 Geo.”) ruling in King’s Bench (“B.R.”) 
                                                          
148 12 VINER, supra note 147, at 118 (page numbering according to first 
edition) (emphasis in original). 
149 Viner wrote: 
4. Hearsay from others is not to be applied immediately to the 
prisoner; however those matters that are remote at first may 
serve to prove there was a general conspiracy to destroy the 
King and Government; and so was the constant rule and method 
about the Popish plot, first to produce evidence of the plot in 
general; by Ch. J. cites Sidney’s Case, Try. per Pais, 56. 
12 id. (emphasis in original). 
150 Viner wrote: 
7. Though a hearsay was not to be allowed as a direct evidence, 
yet it might be made use of to this purpose (viz.) to prove that a 
man was consistent with himself, whereby his testimony was 
corroborated. 1 Mod. 283. pl. 29. Trin. 29 Car. 2 B.R. 
Lutterell v. Reynell. 
12 id. (emphasis in original). 
151 12 id. 118-19 (page numbers of first edition). 
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which was not published until 1730.152 Thus the case authority 
for a dying declaration exception appeared a bit too late to have 
been included in the treatises by Hawkins, Nelson, or Gilbert. 
Viner did not discuss the rationale for the hearsay exception 
for dying declarations, but a 1787 commentator suggested that a 
dying declaration was admissible because the declarant’s 
apprehension of imminent death would stimulate the same fear 
that a false accusation would result in eternal damnation as 
would an oath, and thus that the exception should apply only 
when the declarant actually apprehended his imminent 
“dissolution” (death).153 Thus, a dying declaration of a murder 
victim was viewed as carrying the same assurance of 
truthfulness and reliability as an oath. Moreover, because the 
information of the dying murder victim often constituted the 
“best evidence,” or even the only evidence, regarding the 
identity of the murderer and circumstances of the crime, such 
statements were admitted “of necessity,” not withstanding that 
they could not meet the usual in-the-presence/cross-examination 
requirement for evidence at criminal trials.154 
                                                          
152 Viner’s reference to “Trowter’s Case” was to the 1721 King’s Bench 
ruling in King v. Reason and Tranter. Two reports of that case were 
published. The earliest appeared in 6 State Trials 195 (2nd ed. Supplement 
1730) [reprinted 16 How St. Tr. 1, 24-38]. See 1 MAXWELL, supra note 108, 
at 369 (indicating that the sixth volume of State Trials was first published in 
1730). The second report appeared in Strange 499 (1st ed. 1755) [reprinted 1 
Str. 499 (3rd ed. 1795), 93 Eng. Rep. 659, 659-60]. See 1 MAXWELL, supra, 
at 309 (indicating that Strange’s Reports were first published in 1755). 
153 Thomas Leach added a section on the admissibility of dying 
declarations and a note setting out the rationale for that exception when he 
edited the 1787 revision of Hawkins’s treatise. See, 2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, 
supra note 108, at 619, n. “(10)” (1787 ed.) (commenting that a dying 
declaration can be admitted only if “the party is sensibly appreciative of 
approaching dissolution” when the declaration is made). In Crawford, Justice 
Scalia wrote that “The existence of [the dying declaration] exception as a 
general rule of criminal hearsay law cannot be disputed” and described dying 
declarations as a “sui generis” hearsay exception. Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 56 n. 6 (2004). 
154 Thomas Leach added the section on dying declarations in his 1787 
revision of Hawkins’s treatise immediately after a section he added setting out 
the “best evidence” principle. 2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra note 108, at 619 
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7.  Burn’s Justice of the Peace Manual 
The more salient passages in the treatises by Hawkins, 
Nelson, Gilbert, Viner, Bathurst, and Buller were also set out in 
justice of the peace manuals, a sort of legal encyclopedia 
covering topics relevant to that office. These works were often 
more substantial than the term “manual” may suggest. The 
leading English justice of the peace manual during the last half 
of the eighteenth century was Richard Burn’s The Justice of the 
Peace and Parish Officer, first published in 1755 and reissued in 
numerous later editions by Burn to 1785.155 Because Burn drew 
upon all of the treatises, abridgments, and earlier manuals, his 
four-volume manual provides a fairly comprehensive summary 
of late eighteenth-century criminal evidence law. 
Like the treatises, Burn noted the admissibility of Marian 
examinations of witnesses who were dead, too ill to travel, or 
kept away by the defendant,156 and the admissibility of a dying 
declaration of a victim “[i]n the case of murder.”157 Like the 
treatises, he also stated the general ban against hearsay evidence 
and the limited-purpose corroboration exception.158 However, 
like the treatises by Gilbert, Bathurst, and Buller, Burn omitted 
the limited-purpose exception that allowed hearsay to be 
                                                          
(1787 ed.) (see sections 45, 46). 
155 RICHARD BURN, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER (four 
volumes, 1755). Numerous further editions were published during the 
eighteenth century. For simplicity, I usually cite the 1764 edition, but call 
attention to any changes from that edition by citing later editions. For 
bibliographic information, see 1 MAXWELL, supra note 108, at 225-26 (entry 
15); BRIDGMAN, supra note 141, at 42-43. 
 Blackstone recommended that students interested in the role of the justice 
of the peace in criminal procedure consult “Dr Burn’s Justice of the Peace; 
wherein [the student] will find every thing relative to this subject, both in 
asncient and modern practice, collected with great care and accuracy, and 
disposed in a most clear and judicious method.” 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 
90, at 343 (1st ed. 1765). 
156 1 BURN, supra note 155, at 336 (1764 ed.). 
157 1 id. at 345. 
158 1 id. at 345. See also infra text accompanying notes 184-186. 
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admitted to prove the existence of a conspiracy.159 
8.  Framing-era American Justice of the Peace Manuals 
Burn’s manual is an especially important source regarding 
the framing-era American understanding of criminal evidence 
doctrine because the four principal justice of the peace manuals 
that were published in America between 1765 and 1789 each 
reprinted Burn’s treatment of admissible criminal evidence.160 
                                                          
159 Burn initially quoted Hawkins’s passage on hearsay in his 1755 first 
edition, which included Hawkins’s statement that hearsay could be admitted 
“by way of inducement or illustration of what is properly evidence.” See 1 
Burn, supra note 155, at 292 (1755 ed.) (quoting 2 HAWKINS, supra note 
108, at 431 (1721 ed.); passage quoted supra text accompanying note 124). 
However, Burn did not link that exception to proof of the existence of a 
conspiracy as Hawkins had. 
 After publication of THE THEORY OF EVIDENCE in 1761, however, Burn 
replaced Hawkins’s passage on hearsay with the passage on hearsay in that 
treatise, which did not mention the allowance of hearsay “by way of 
inducement or illustration of what is properly evidence.” See 1 Burn, supra 
note 155, at 345 (1764 ed.), quoting BATHURST, supra note 140, at 111-12. 
160 Framing-era Americans were likely to have consulted one of the four 
substantial justice of the peace manuals that were published in America 
between 1765 and 1789, each of which borrowed heavily from Burn’s 
English manual. The earliest of these was CONDUCTOR GENERALIS 
(Woodbridge N.J. 1765; printed by James Parker, “[o]ne of his Majesty’s 
Justices of the Peace for Middlesex County, in New-Jersey”) [hereinafter 
PARKER’S CONDUCTOR] (examination indicates the section on “Evidence” in 
this work selectively reprinted material from Burn’s 1762 edition). Parker’s 
treatment of “Evidence” was also reprinted in two later 1788 New York 
printings of this manual with different paginations but apparently without any 
updating of the material on “Evidence” to later editions of Burn’s manual: 
THE CONDUCTOR GENERALIS (New York, 1788; printed by Hugh Gaine) 
[hereinafter “GAINE’S CONDUCTOR”]; CONDUCTOR GENERALIS (New York, 
1788; printed by John Patterson for Robert Hodge) [hereinafter “HODGE’S 
CONDUCTOR”]. 
 There were also three other prominent manuals, each of which was based 
on later editions of Burn’s manual: JOSEPH GREENLEAF, AN ABRIDGMENT OF 
BURN’S JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER (Boston, 1773); 
RICHARD STARKE, OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 
(Williamsburg, 1774); and JOHN FAUCHAUD GRIMKE, SOUTH CAROLINA 
JUSTICE (Philadelphia, 1788)(published anonymously but attributed to Judge 
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Thus, directly or indirectly, Burn’s summary of criminal 
evidence was probably the most widely available source on the 
subject in framing-era America. 
9.  Summary of the pre-framing treatises and manuals 
In sum, the treatises and justice of the peace manuals that 
were available in framing-era America identified only two kinds 
of out-of-court statements that could be admitted as evidence of 
a defendant’s guilt in a criminal trial: a sworn Marian 
                                                          
Grimke; see Davies, supra note 10, at 185 n. 256). There were some earlier 
less substantial manuals, as well as a shorter and superficial 1774 justice of 
the peace manual for North Carolina: JAMES DAVIS, THE OFFICE AND 
AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE (New Bern, N.C., 1774). 
 Like Burn, the four substantial American manuals each noted the 
admissibility of Marian examinations of deceased or otherwise unavailable 
witnesses. See PARKER’S CONDUCTOR, supra, at 165; GREENLEAF, supra, at 
118; STARKE, supra, at 143; GRIMKE, supra, at 184; GAINE’S CONDUCTOR, 
supra, at 137-38; HODGE’S CONDUCTOR, supra, at 168. 
 Like Burn, the substantial American manuals each stated the general ban 
against hearsay, the corroboration exception, and the dying declaration of a 
murder victim exception; however they did not all identify the limited 
purpose exception for proof of a conspiracy. The three printings of 
CONDUCTOR GENERALIS quoted Burn’s passage on dying declarations and the 
passage on hearsay and the corroboration exception that Burn initially quoted 
from Hawkins’s treatise: see PARKER’S CONDUCTOR, supra, at 170; GAINE’S 
CONDUCTOR, supra, at 142; HODGE’S CONDUCTOR, supra, at 173. The 
Hawkins passage quoted in these printings of Conductor Generalis also 
mentioned the allowance of hearsay “by way of inducement or illustration of 
what is properly evidence,” but did not contain any explanation of that 
exception, and did not link it to proof of the existence of a conspiracy as 
Hawkins had (see supra note126). 
 The other three manuals by Greenleaf, Starke, and Grimke quoted 
passages on dying declarations, hearsay and the corroboration exception from 
recent editions of Burn’s manual. Thus, they quoted the passage on hearsay 
from THE THEORY OF EVIDENCE that Burn substituted for the Hawkins 
passage in Burn’s 1764 edition (see infra notes 185-186 and accompanying 
text). As a result, they made no mention of the limited hearsay exception for 
statements “by way of inducement or illustration of what is properly 
evidence.” See GREENLEAF, supra, at 127; STARKE, supra, at 144, 150; 
GRIMKE, supra, at 194-95. 
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examination of an unavailable witness or a dying declaration of 
a murder victim. Both involved (1) either an oath or the 
functional equivalent of an oath, and (2) the genuine 
unavailability of the witness. However, none of the framing-era 
authorities recognized any other exception to the ban against 
hearsay evidence under which unsworn hearsay statements could 
be admitted as evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Rather, most of 
these works recognized only a limited-purpose corroboration 
exception, and some also recognized that hearsay could be used 
to prove background facts such as the general existence of a 
conspiracy, though not the defendant’s part in it. 
However, except for dying declarations, all of the modern 
criminal hearsay exceptions are missing from these works (and 
even the dying declaration exception was limited to statements 
made by murder victims). For example, none of the preframing 
sources mentioned the modern “res gestae,” “spontaneous 
declaration,” “declaration against interest,” or statement of a co-
conspirator exceptions that could now fall within Crawford’s 
“nontestimonial hearsay” category. Rather, the modern 
exceptions under which “nontestimonial” hearsay can now be 
admitted against a criminal defendant did not exist when the 
Confrontation Clause was framed in 1789.161 In fact, hearsay 
exceptions for criminal trials are still absent even from the 
leading treatises that were published in the decades following the 
American framing. 
10.  Post-Framing English Treatises 
When Capel Lofft published an enlarged edition of Gilbert’s 
Law of Evidence in London in 1791, he repeated the strong ban 
against use of hearsay evidence, noted the cross-examination 
rationale for that ban (though he did not use the term “cross-
examination”), and explicitly commented that the hearsay 
exceptions “which have their place in civil, do not apply in 
                                                          
161 My conclusion is essentially consistent with that which Professor 
Heller announced in 1951. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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criminal cases.”162 Lofft also noted that hearsay could be 
                                                          
162 Capel Lofft’s revisions of Gilbert’s treatise, published in London in 
1791, clearly indicated that no exceptions beyond the limited-purpose 
exceptions for corroboration and for proof of the existence of a conspiracy 
had been recognized by that date. Although Lofft inserted a passage 
identifying the various hearsay exceptions for civil litigation noted by 
Bathurst and Buller, he stated that those exceptions were not pertinent to 
criminal cases when he restated Gilbert’s definition of “hearsay.” He began 
the discussion under the heading of “Of Secondary Testimony; or, Hearsay in 
Criminal Cases” as follows: 
We have seen in general that Hearsay is not Evidence: but we 
have had occasion at the same time to observe some Exceptions 
to this Rule, such as the Proof of ancient Custom or Pedigree, 
where the Nature of the Thing to be proved supposes a failure 
of direct living Testimony. But these and other Exceptions, 
which have their place in civil, do not apply to criminal Cases: 
and therefore in these the Attestation of the Witness must be to 
what he knows, and not to that only which he has heard; for a 
mere hearsay is no Evidence . . . . 
2 LOFFT’S GILBERT, supra note 135, at 889 (1791 ed.) (emphasis added). At 
the end of this passage Lofft repeated Gilbert’s original statement of the ban 
against hearsay, quoted supra text accompanying note 137. (A peculiarity of 
Lofft’s edition is that the material he added is indicated by quotation marks 
along the left margin but the original material by Gilbert is presented without 
those marks.) Shortly thereafter, he indicated the linkage between the ban 
against hearsay and the defendant’s right to cross examine by noting that a 
person who testified to his own knowledge, unlike a person who testified only 
to hearsay information, “incur[red] the Risque of Con[f]utation.” 2 id. at 890 
(there is an apparent typographical error; a high “s” appears instead of an 
“f,” but “Consutation” was not and is not a recognized word). 
 Lofft also restated Gilbert’s statement of the corroboration exception 
(though he emphasized the potential for impeachment by noting that the 
absence of a complaint by the alleged victim immediately after a personal 
injury would carry a strong implication that the crime had not occurred). 2 
id. at 890. 
 In addition, Lofft also added a passage incorporating Hawkins’s 
existence-of-a-conspiracy exception (discussed supra note 126), but noted that 
the hearsay evidence of a conspiracy could not be admitted “to charge the 
Prisoner [that is, defendant] in particular.” 2 id. at 891. However, the limited 
purpose exceptions for corroboration and proof of a conspiracy are the only 
two exceptions to the ban on hearsay that Lofft discussed in his section on 
hearsay in criminal cases. 
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admitted for the limited purposes of proving a conspiracy,163 or 
by way of corroborating the testimony of a witness,164 but only 
hinted that a dying declaration exception applied in criminal 
trials.165 
The three principles of evidence that Hawkins had described 
as requiring the strong ban against unsworn hearsay were also 
evident in Thomas Peake’s A Compendium of the Law of 
Evidence, published in London in 1801. Peake made the 
following general statement about hearsay: 
The Law . . . always requires the sanction of an oath: 
It further requires [the witness’s] personal attendance 
in Court, that he may be examined and cross 
examined by the different parties, and, therefore, in 
cases depending on parol [i.e., oral] evidence, the 
testimony of persons who are themselves conusant of 
the facts they relate, must in general be produced; for 
the relation of one who has no other knowledge of 
the subject than the information he has received from 
others, is not a relation upon oath; and moreover the 
party against whom such evidence should be 
permitted, would be precluded from his benefit of 
cross examination.166 
As in the previous evidence treatises, the specific hearsay 
exceptions that Peake identified were not pertinent to criminal 
                                                          
163 2 id. at 891 (“But Hearsay maybe Evidence of Inducement in matters 
that do not constitute the Crime, and are of a general Nature. As that there 
was a Plot, a Conspiracy, a Disaffection; but not to charge the Prisoner in 
particular”). 
164 2 id. at 890. 
165 In his discussion of hearsay in civil lawsuits, Lofft commented that 
“what a deceased person said on his death-bed touching the Cause of his 
Death” was admissible evidence. See 1 id. at 280. However, he did not 
repeat that point when discussing hearsay in criminal cases. See 2 id. at 889-
91. 
166 THOMAS PEAKE, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 7-8 
(1801) (“relation” in this passage means “account” or “speaking”). Note that 
the reference to a person “conusant of the facts they relate,” that is, a person 
with direct personal knowledge, amounts to a version of the framing-era 
“best evidence” principle. 
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trials.167 
Joseph Chitty’s Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law, 
which was published in London in 1816,168 and reprinted in 
America in 1819,169 also still described the treatment of out-of-
court statements in criminal trials in essentially the same terms 
that Hawkins had used in 1721. Chitty noted the admissibility of 
Marian witness examinations of unavailable witnesses,170 stated 
the strong rule against hearsay evidence and the cross-
examination rationale for that prohibition, and recognized the 
two limited-purpose exceptions for corroboration and 
“inducement or illustration of more substantial testimony” 
(although, unlike Hawkins, he did not link the latter specifically 
                                                          
167 Peake listed the recognized hearsay exceptions as follows: 
The few instances in which this general rule [against hearsay] 
has been departed from, and in which hearsay evidence has been 
admitted, will be found, on examination, to be such as were, in 
their very nature, incapable of positive and direct proof. Of this 
kind are all those which can only depend on reputation. The 
excluding of hearsay evidence in questions of pedigree, 
prescription, or custom, would prevent all testimony 
whatsoever; for the evidence of any living witness of what 
passed within the short time of his own memory, would often be 
insufficient in the former instance, always in the latter; and there 
is no other way of knowing the evidence of deceased persons, 
than by the relation of others, of what they have been heard to 
say. In these cases, therefore, the law departs from its general 
rule, and receives evidence of the declarations of deceased 
persons, who, from their situation, were like to know the facts; 
and also the general reputation of the place or family most 
interested to preserve in memory the circumstances attending it. 
Any thing which shews such reputation is, on a question of this 
sort, received in evidence, though oftentimes wholly 
inadmissible in other cases. 
Id. at 8-9. (“[P]rescription” refers to a claim to land based on constant 
occupation.) 
168 JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 
(London 1816). 
169 JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 
(Philadelphia 1819). 
170 1 CHITTY, supra note 168, at 72-79; 1 CHITTY, supra note 169, at 
*72-79. 
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to proof of the general existence of a conspiracy).171 Chitty also 
noted the exception for the “dying declaration of a party 
murdered” as “one great and important exception” to the rule 
against admitting hearsay evidence relating to a criminal 
defendant’s guilt.172 As noted above, Thomas Leach had 
previously added the dying declaration exception to his 1787 
revision of Hawkins’s treatise.173 
11.  Post-framing American Cases 
Reported American cases from the decades following the 
framing also seem to confirm that the modern hearsay 
exceptions had not yet appeared on the scene. Professor 
Randolph N. Jonakait surveys those cases in another article in 
this symposium issue.174 Although Jonakait finds that relevant, 
available American case law from the decades immediately 
                                                          
171 Chitty wrote the following regarding hearsay: 
There is no general rule better established in the law of 
evidence, then that mere statements of what was uttered by a 
stranger, cannot be admitted to prove any circumstance on the 
trial. For the law admits of no evidence but such as is delivered 
upon oath, and the original expressions were not only uttered 
when the speaker was not under that obligation, but are liable to 
be forgotten, misunderstood, and unconsciously altered, by the 
party who repeats them. Besides, if the original speaker be 
living, this statement of his words is not the best evidence, 
which, we have seen, the courts will require; and the prisoner 
loses the benefit of cross-examination, which is of such eminent 
service in discovering the true color of the circumstances 
related. . . . But hearsay may be used as inducement and 
illustration of more substantial testimony. And the declarations 
of a witness, at another time, may be adduced to invalidate or to 
confirm his evidence; by showing that he varies in his statement; 
or has maintained a uniform consistency in his narration. 
1 CHITTY, supra note 168, at 568-69. 
172 1 id. at 569-70. 
173 See supra text accompanying note 153. 
174 Randolph N. Jonakait, The (Futile) Search for a Common Law Right 
of Confrontation: Beyond Brasier’s Irrelevance to (Perhaps) Relevant 
American Cases, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 471 (2007). 
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following the framing about evidentiary practices in criminal 
cases “is slight,”175 he reports that there is evidence of the 
general rule against unsworn hearsay evidence in the cases we 
do have.176 Although participants in those cases sometimes made 
loose but unspecific assertions that there were “many 
exceptions” to the general rule against hearsay177 (perhaps 
referring to the civil hearsay exceptions), the hearsay evidence 
that actually was contested in the criminal trials that Jonakait 
identifies involved either background or general information that 
did not go directly to the defendant’s guilt of a crime178 (that is, 
Hawkins’s hearsay as “inducement or illustration of what is 
properly evidence”), corroboration of a witness’s in-court 
testimony,179 or dying declarations of murder victims.180 Thus, 
the exceptions that Jonakait finds in the post-framing cases seem 
to be limited to the exceptions identified in the treatises.181 Like 
the treatises and manuals, the post-framing American cases 
                                                          
175 Id. at 483. 
176 See, e.g., id. at 479 (noting an exchange in a 1794 case that indicated 
that the proposition that hearsay is generally inadmissible “went unchallenged 
by the prosecutor and was readily accepted by the court”). See also id. at 485 
(noting that statements by the judge in an 1800 federal criminal trial indicated 
that hearsay “was usually banned”). 
177 Id. at 479 (discussing judge’s statement in State v. Baynard, 1794 
W.L. 184 (Del. O.& T. 1794). 
178 See, e.g., id. at 478-80 (noting that in State v. Bayard, 1794 W.L. 
184 (Del. O.&T. 1794). the prosecutor sought to admit hearsay on the 
ground that it was not “substantive evidence” itself but rather was offered 
“introductory to that which was good legal evidence” to explain the 
narrative). 
179 See, e.g. id..at 486, n.43 (discussing hearsay rulings in State v. 
Norris, 1796 W.L. 327 (N.C. Super. L. & Eq. 1796) and The Ulysses, 24 
F. Cas. 515 (D. Mass. 1800). 
180 See, e.g., id.at 481 n.30 (discussing a ruling regarding the dying 
declaration hearsay exception in Respublica v. Langcake & Hook, 1795 W.L. 
708 (Pa. 1795). 
181 Jonakait also found that depositions were deemed inadmissible in 
criminal cases unless the parties consented, which tends to confirm that the 
admissibility of Marian witness examinations was understood to be sui 
generis. See id. at 487 (discussing ruling in The Ulysses, 24 F. Cas. 515, 
516 n.2 (D. Mass. 1800). 
DAVIES 6/22/2007 1:01 AM 
424 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Jonakait identified do not reveal anything like the modern 
variety of criminal hearsay exceptions. 
12.  Summary 
Taken together, the framing-era treatises and manuals, the 
treatises from the decades immediately after the framing, and the 
post-framing American cases all present a strikingly consistent 
treatment of a strong prohibition against use of unsworn out-of-
court statements as evidence of a defendant’s guilt. Except for 
dying declarations of murder victims, they did not permit 
unsworn hearsay statements to be admitted as evidence of a 
defendant’s guilt. Rather, the only other exceptions they allowed 
were the limited-purpose exceptions for corroboration (or 
impeachment) of the testimony of a witness who had already 
testified at trial, or for background information such as the 
general existence of a conspiracy, that did not bear directly on 
the defendant’s guilt of a crime. The bottom line is that none of 
these historical authorities identified any hearsay exceptions that 
would have permitted any unsworn, “nontestimonial” hearsay 
statement to be admitted as evidence of a criminal defendant’s 
guilt. 
The absence of framing-era hearsay exceptions that relate to 
proof of the defendant’s guilt demonstrates that the “reasonable 
inferences” that Justice Scalia announced in Crawford and Davis 
regarding “the Framers’ design” for cross-examination cannot 
be valid. Indeed, the historical sources provide even stronger 
evidence of that invalidity. The originalist testimonial 
formulation announced in Crawford and repeated in Davis was 
rooted in the foundational premise that the law of hearsay 
statements was analytically distinct from the confrontation right. 
However, that is not how the framing-era authorities treated 
those subjects. Rather, the framing-era authorities indicated that 
the confrontation right itself required that unsworn hearsay 
statements be inadmissible. 
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D. How the Confrontation Right Required the Ban Against 
Hearsay 
As noted above, Serjeant Hawkins observed in 1721 that an 
unsworn hearsay statement was inadmissible in a criminal trial 
“not only because it is not upon oath, but also because the other 
side had no opportunity of a cross examination.”182 In other 
words, if the statement of an out-of-court declarant—a 
“stranger” in Hawkins’s terminology—were to be admitted, a 
criminal defendant would be deprived of the right to cross-
examine the maker of the statement in the view of the jury, one 
of the key features of the confrontation right.183 
When Burn published the first edition of his manual in 
London in 1755, he included Hawkins’s passage on the ban 
against hearsay, including the statement that hearsay was banned 
“because the other side hath no opportunity of a cross 
examination.”184 When Bathurst’s The Theory of Evidence 
became available a few years later, however, Burn’s 1764 
edition replaced Hawkins’s passage on hearsay with the more 
extensive discussion of hearsay, and the listing of the civil 
litigation hearsay exceptions, that appeared in The Theory of 
Evidence.185 However, Burn made a significant alteration in the 
                                                          
182 See supra text accompanying note124. 
183 See supra note122. 
184 1 BURN, supra note 155, at 292 (1755 ed.) (entry for Evidence). 
185 After quoting the passage of hearsay that had appeared in the Bathurst 
and Buller treatises, as set out supra text accompanying note 144, Burn also 
provided the following less cumbersome summary of the hearsay exceptions 
that applied to various issues pertinent to civil lawsuits that had appeared in 
the Bathhurst and Buller treatises: 
So where the issue is on the legitimacy of a person, it seems the 
practice to admit evidence of what the parents have been heard 
to say, either as to their being or not being married, for the 
presumption arising from the cohabitation is either strengthened 
or destroyed by such declarations, which altho’ not to be given 
in evidence directly, they may be assigned by the witness as a 
reason for his belief one way or the other. So hearsay is good 
evidence to prove who was a man’s grandfather, when he 
married, what children he had, and the like, of which it is not 
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latter. Because Bathurst had not mentioned the cross-examination 
rationale for the rule against hearsay, Burn retained a paraphrase 
of Hawkins’s statement of the cross-examination rationale and 
inserted it into the discussion of hearsay that he otherwise 
borrowed from The Theory of Evidence. The phrase Burn added 
is set out in italics: 
It is a general rule, that hearsay is no evidence; for 
no evidence is to be admitted but what is upon oath; 
and if the first speech was without oath, another oath 
that there was such a speech, makes it no more than a 
bare speaking, and so of no value in a court of 
justice; and besides, the adverse party had no 
opportunity of a cross examination; and if the witness 
is living, what he had been heard to say is not the 
best evidence that the nature of the thing will 
admit.186 
Thus, all of the editions of Burn’s leading manual treated the 
right to cross-examine adverse witnesses as requiring the ban 
against hearsay evidence. 
It is highly likely that the American Framers also understood 
that the confrontation right itself required the ban against 
                                                          
reasonable to presume that there is better evidence. So to prove 
that a man’s father or other kinsman beyond the sea is dead, the 
common reputation and belief of it in the family gives credit to 
such evidence; and for a stranger it would be good evidence, if 
a person swore that a brother or other near relation had told him 
so, which relation is dead. So in questions of prescription, it is 
allowable to give hearsay evidence, in order to prove general 
reputation; and where the issue was of a right to a way over the 
plaintiff’s close, the defendants were admitted to give evidence 
of a conversation between persons not interested, then dead, 
wherein the right to the way was agreed. 
1 id. at 345 (1764 ed.) (citing “Theory of Evid. 111, 112” and paraphrasing 
Bathurt’s discussion of civil hearsay exceptions quoted supra note 145). This 
passage on exceptions to the ban against hearsay is unchanged in later 
editions. See, e.g., 1 id. at 529 (1785 ed.). 
186 1 BURN, supra note 155, at 345 (1764 ed.) (emphasis added); 1 id. at 
529 (1785 ed.). Compare the italicized clause to the Hawkins passage quoted 
supra text accompanying note 124. 
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hearsay evidence regarding a criminal defendant’s guilt. For one 
thing, the Framers would have consulted Hawkins’s treatise 
because it was the leading work on criminal law and procedure 
during the entire eighteenth century and the pertinent passage on 
hearsay appeared in all of the eighteenth century editions of that 
work,187 as well as in the summary of Hawkins’s views in 
Bacon’s Abridgment.188 
Moreover, Hawkins’s treatment of the hearsay ban as a 
consequence of the right of cross-examination also appeared, 
directly or indirectly, in each of the significant justice of the 
peace manuals published in America during the framing 
period.189 The 1765 printing of Conductor Generalis in New 
Jersey and the 1788 printings of that work in New York each 
quoted Hawkins’s passage on hearsay itself.190 The other three 
manuals quoted Burn’s altered quotation of the ban against 
hearsay from The Theory of Evidence, including his reference to 
the loss of cross-examination. Joseph Greenleaf included that 
passage when he published his Abridgment of Burn’s Justice in 
Boston in 1773;191 Richard Starke included that passage when he 
published his Office and Authority of a Justice of the Peace in 
Williamsburg in 1774;192 and Judge John Faucheaud Grimke 
also included that passage in his South Carolina Justice, which 
was printed in Philadelphia in 1788.193 Thus, the linkage 
between the confrontation right and the ban against unsworn 
hearsay appeared in the justice of the peace manuals published 
for New England, New York and the mid-Atlantic states, 
Virginia, and South Carolina, as well in the works by Hawkins 
and Burn themselves (both of which appear to have been 
imported by Americans in significant numbers194). 
                                                          
187 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
188 See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
189 One shorter and less substantial manual published in North Carolina 
in 1774 did not discuss hearsay at all. See supra note 160. 
190 See supra note 160. 
191 GREENLEAF, supra note 160, at 127. 
192 STARKE, supra note 160, at 250. 
193 GRIMKE, supra note 160, at 194. 
194 One can make an admittedly crude estimate as to whether an English 
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Additionally, the linkage between a criminal defendant’s 
right to cross-examine adverse witnesses and the ban against 
hearsay evidence was also stated in several other widely used 
legal works. For example, Matthew Bacon’s summary of 
Hawkins’ passage on hearsay—that hearsay “is no evidence . . . 
because the party who is affected thereby had not an opportunity 
of cross-examining”195—was repeated in the framing-era editions 
of the leading legal dictionaries (really more like encyclopedias) 
published by Giles Jacob196 and Timothy Cunningham.197 Given 
                                                          
publication was imported in significant numbers by counting the number of 
surviving copies of the work that are currently found in American public 
libraries. That number can be derived from the Worldcat listing of the Online 
Computer Libraries Center. See Online Computer Libraries Center, 
http://www.oclc.org (last visited Mar. 18, 2007). 
 A search of that source revealed 163 copies of preframing editions of 
Hawkins’s PLEAS OF THE CROWN (99 from the first through the 1771 editions 
and 64 of the 1787 edition edited by Thomas Leach (including a 1788 Dublin 
reprinting of that edition). A similar search located 150 copies of the 16 
preframing-editions of Burn’s manual (133 from the first through the 1785 
edition and 17 of the 1788 edition). 
 By comparison, a similar search revealed 33 copies of Nelson’s treatise, 
61 of Gilbert’s plus 30 of the 1788 New York edition, 15 of Bathurst’s, and 
81 of Buller’s plus 39 of the 1788 New York edition. I am indebted to my 
colleague Professor Sibyl Marshall for this information. 
195 See supra text accompanying note 130. 
196 1 GILES JACOB, A LAW DICTIONARY (Owen Ruffhead & J. Morgan, 
eds., 10th ed. 1773) (pages unnumbered; entry on “Evidence II,” subsection 
“3. Of parol, preumptive, and hearsay evidence”); 1 id. (T.E. Tomplins, ed., 
1797 ed.) (same). There were a number of earlier editions, see 1 MAXWELL, 
supra note 108, at 9; however, I cannot locate this passage in earlier editions 
of this dictionary; rather, it appears to have been added when Ruffhead and 
Morgan revised it in the early 1770s. 
 The passage quoted also appears in the first American edition of this 
dictionary: 2 GILES, JACOB, THE LAW DICTIONARY 462-63 (Philadelphia, 
1811). 
197 1 TIMOTHY CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY 
OR GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW (2d ed. 1777) (entry for “Evidence,” 
subsection “5. Of parol, presumptive, and hearsay evidence”); 1 id. (3rd ed. 
1783) (same). The first edition of Cunningham’s dictionary was published in 
1764-1765; see 1 MAXWELL supra note 108, at 8. However, I have been 
unable to locate that edition. 
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all of these sources, it seems highly likely that framing-era 
American lawyers and judges understood the bar against 
unsworn hearsay evidence to be a component of a criminal 
defendant’s right to confront adverse witnesses.198 
                                                          
198 My conclusion that the connection between the right to confrontation 
(in the form of a criminal defendant’s right to cross-examine at trial) and the 
ban against unsworn hearsay evidence was well established during the 
eighteenth century and certainly during the framing era (1775-1789) may 
appear to contrast with descriptions of the development of hearsay doctrine 
that Professors Gallanis and Langbein have given in other recent historical 
commentaries. However, the differences seem to reflect only the different 
historical sources that were consulted. 
 On the basis of a review of historical English evidence treatises, 
Professor Gallanis concluded that the cross-examination rationale for the 
hearsay rule “appeared first in Lofft’s 1791 revision of Gilbert, although only 
in connection with criminal cases.” Gallanis, supra note 37, at 533, citing 2 
GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 890 (Capel Lofft ed., London, 
1791) (cited as LOFFT’S GILBERT in this article) (stating that a witness at trial 
“incur[s] the Risque of Co[f]utation”) (there is an apparent typographical 
error in the original; see supra note 162). That statement by Professor 
Gallanis has also been quoted in LANGBEIN, ADVERSARY TRIAL, supra note 
37, at 245 (2003). The explanation for the seeming difference between 
Gallanis’s discussion of the cross-examination rationale and mine is simply 
that Gallanis only undertook to summarize the statements that appeared in 
evidence treatises themselves, but did not review the discussions of hearsay 
and the references to the cross-examination rationale for the hearsay rule that 
appeared in criminal procedure treatises such as Hawkins’s treatise, or in 
other kinds of legal publications such as Bacon’s Abridgment, Burn’s manual, 
or the law dictionaries by Jacob and Cunningham. Moreover, because 
Gallanis was interested only in the contents of the English evidence treatises 
per se, he also did not consult the framing-era American justice of the peace 
manuals which also articulated the cross-examination rationale for the ban 
against hearsay evidence. Hence, as Professor Gallinis has confirmed to me 
by e-mail, his statement should be understood only as specific description of 
the hearsay rationales that appear in English evidence treatises, but not as a 
statement dating the first appearance of the cross-examination rationale for 
the ban against hearsay. Gallanis’s study simply did not address the 
eighteenth-century criminal procedure publications in which the cross-
examination rationale appeared. 
 Likewise, the seeming differences between my statements about the 
appearance of the cross-examinaiton rationale for the hearsay rule and some 
of those made by Professor Langbein also appear to arise from the different 
DAVIES 6/22/2007 1:01 AM 
430 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
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sources that we each examined. Thus, although Professor Langbein did note 
that Hawkins had noted the cross-examination rationale for the hearsay rule 
as early as 1721, see LANGBEIN, ADVERSARY TRIAL, supra note 37, at 238, 
and that cross-examination was one of the three rationales for the 
confrontation right during the eighteenth century, see id. at 180, he 
commented, based on his examination of the surviving records of trials in 
London’s Old Bailey, that recorded objections to hearsay were still 
uncommon in eighteenth-century criminal trials in that court, that “concern 
about the want of cross-examination remained a muted theme in criminal 
practice throughout the eighteenth century,” and that “[t]he first judicial 
mention of [the cross-examination] rationale for excluding what we could call 
hearsay . . . in the [surviving records of criminal trials in the Old Bailey] 
turns up in 1789.” Id. at 233-238 (citing the passage from Woodcock quoted 
infra text accompanying note 215). Likewise, he suggested that “[o]nly in the 
middle of the nineteenth century did the consensus form that the doctrinal 
basis of the hearsay rule was to promote cross-examination.” Id. at 180. 
 My assessment is that Langbein’s observations simply show that one 
cannot accurately recover historical doctrinal understandings from the records 
of statements made during criminal trial proceedings themselves. It is not 
surprising that discussions of the rationale for the hearsay rule are not 
particularly apparent in the surviving trial records. For one thing, the 
surviving accounts of Old Bailey trials are far from complete prior to the 
1780s and hardly amount to a transcript. See id. at 182-89. Moreover, 
precisely because the hearsay rule was settled as a doctrinal matter and rested 
on three rationales, there would have been little reason for counsel or the 
judge to discuss those rationales in the course of trials. Indeed, some of the 
trial records that did show the exclusion of hearsay evidence did not indicate 
that either the judge or counsel actually even bothered to use the term 
“hearsay,” let alone discuss the rationale for that rule. See, e.g., infra text 
accompanying notes 253-256. Those cursory applications of the hearsay rule 
during trials suggest that the rule was so well understood that neither counsel 
nor the judge thought any discussion of the basis for the rule was necessary. 
 Additionally, it would seem that the heightened prominence accorded the 
cross-examination rationale for the hearsay rule that Langbein reports during 
the nineteenth century might be explained as readily in terms of the 
diminishing importance accorded to the other rationales for the hearsay rule – 
that is, the diminishing significance of the oath and the relaxation of the “best 
evidence” principle—as in terms of any increased assignment of importance 
to the cross-examination rationale per se. Thus, the fact that cross-
examination emerged as “the” rationale for hearsay in the nineteenth century 
does not mean that cross-examination did not earlier constitute one of several 
salient doctrinal grounds for the hearsay rule at the time of the framing. 
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against hearsay also was still prominent in the criminal evidence 
treatises published in the decades that immediately followed the 
framing. In addition to the recognition of the cross-examination 
rationale for the hearsay ban in the treatises by Lofft, Peake, 
and Chitty mentioned above,199 Leonard MacNally’s 1802 
treatise also treated the ban against hearsay evidence as flowing 
from the requirement that all criminal evidence had to be given 
in the defendant’s presence.200 
A statement by Chief Justice John Marshall also 
demonstrates that Americans still understood that the ban against 
hearsay was a component of the confrontation right in the 
decades following the framing of the Confrontation Clause. In 
an 1807 evidentiary ruling in one of the trials that arose from 
the Burr conspiracy, Marshall said the following in a discussion 
in which he also cited Hawkins’s treatise as authority: 
The rule of evidence which rejects mere hearsay 
testimony, which excludes from trials of a criminal or 
civil nature the declarations of any other individual 
than him against whom the proceedings are instituted 
has generally been deemed all essential to the correct 
                                                          
199 See, e.g., the 1791 statement by Lofft, quoted supra note 162; the 
1801 statement by Peake, quoted supra text accompanying note 166; the 1816 
statement by Chitty, quoted supra note 171. 
200 LEONARD MACNALLY [sometimes cited as M’NALLY], THE RULES OF 
EVIDENCE ON PLEAS OF THE CROWN 360 (Dublin 1802). In the first “rule” in 
his chapter on “parol” (oral) evidence, MacNally combined Hawkins’s 
statements regarding the requirement that criminal evidence be presented in 
the defendant’s presence and Hawkins’s statement of the ban against hearsay: 
“No evidence can be received against a prisoner but in his presence: and 
therefore it is agreed that what a stranger has been heard to say, is in 
strictness no manner of evidence, either for or against the prisoner.” Id., 
citing “2 HAWK. P.C. ca. 46” (see passages quoted supra, text accompanying 
notes 110, 124). MacNally then continued: “The reasons assigned as the 
grounds of this [hearsay] rule are, because such evidence is not upon oath: 
and also because the party, who would be affected by such evidence, had no 
opportunity of cross examination.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 However, MacNally then recognized (as the second rule of oral 
evidence) “[b]ut hearsay evidence may be made use of by way of inducement 
or illustration of what is properly evidence.” Id. (citations omitted). 
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administration of justice. I know not . . . why a man 
should have a constitutional claim to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him, if mere verbal 
declarations, made in his absence, may be evidence 
against him. I know of no principle in the 
preservation of which all are more concerned. I know 
of none, by undermining which, life, liberty and 
property, might be more endangered. It is therefore 
incumbent on courts to be watchful of every inroad 
on a principle so truly important.201 
Marshall made that statement in the context of deciding 
whether an unsworn hearsay statement proferred by the 
prosecution fell within the limited-purpose exception that 
allowed hearsay to be used to prove the general existence of a 
conspiracy. He went on to rule that the proffered hearsay 
statement went beyond those bounds because it implicated the 
defendant personally, and thus was inadmissible.202 
Although Justice Scalia did his best in Crawford to evade the 
plain import of Marshall’s statement, what Marshall said leaves 
no doubt that he understood that the ban against admitting 
hearsay evidence of a defendant’s guilt was required by the 
defendant’s constitutional confrontation right.203 Indeed, 
                                                          
201 United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 187, 191 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) 
(No. 14,696). Marshall cited Hawkins’s treatise in discussing the hearsay 
issue. See supra note 126. 
202 Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. at 195. 
203 Justice Scalia wrote: 
Although Chief Justice Marshall made one passing reference to 
the Confrontation Clause, the case was fundamentally about the 
hearsay rules governing statements in furtherance of a 
conspiracy. The “principle so truly important” on which 
“inroad[s]” had been introduced was the “rule of evidence 
which rejects mere hearsay testimony.” Nothing in [Marshall’s] 
opinion concedes exceptions to the Confrontation Clause’s 
exclusion of testimonial statements as we use the term. 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n. 9 (2004) (citation to Burr 
omitted). 
 Justice Scalia’s characterization that Marshall made only a “passing 
reference” to confrontation but that the principle at issue was only the rule 
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Marshall was simply stating the same understanding that the 
legal authorities of the period also stated. Marshall’s 
understanding of the confrontation-hearsay linkage was 
essentially the same as that set out by Hawkins, Burn, the 
American justice of the peace manuals, the legal dictionaries, 
and the post-framing treatises. Given the consistency among 
those authorities, it seems highly likely that Marshall’s statement 
reflected a continuation of the pre-framing understanding of that 
linkage. 
Thus, contrary to statements in Crawford and Davis that 
seem to deny a connection between the confrontation right and 
                                                          
against hearsay rather than the confrontation right was merely a false 
dichotomy. Marshall plainly linked the prohibition against hearsay to the 
constitutional confrontation right. Additionally, Marshall’s statement did not 
indicate that there were “inroad[s]” which “had been introduced” regarding 
the ban against use of hearsay to prove a defendant’s own guilt. The only use 
of hearsay at issue in Burr was the limited-purpose exception that allowed 
hearsay to prove the general existence of a conspiracy, but not to prove the 
defendant’s involvement, and Marshall excluded the hearsay statement in 
question because it reflected directly on the defendant. Thus, Marshall 
applied the rule against hearsay, not the limited-purpose exception. See supra 
note 126. As of 1807, there were still no recognized hearsay exceptions 
(other than a dying declaration of a murder victim) that would have permitted 
hearsay to be admitted as evidence of a defendant’s guilt, so it is apparent 
that Marshall did not refer to any “inroad[s]” of that sort. Thus, the limited-
purpose proof-of-the-existence-of-a-conspiracy exception that Marshall 
actually discussed was not the equivalent of the modern statements in 
furtherance of conspiracy exception. 
 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurring opinion in Crawford also 
mischaracterized Marshall’s statement in Burr. The Chief Justice quoted 
Marshall’s statement in the context of asserting that “there were always 
exceptions to the general rule of exclusion [of hearsay]” and suggested that 
Marshall’s statement “recognized that [the confrontation] right was not 
absolute, acknowledging that exceptions to the exclusionary component of the 
hearsay rule, which [Marshall] considered an ‘inroad’ on the right to 
confrontation, had been introduced.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 74 (Rehnquist, 
C.J., concurring). Again, however, that rendition overstated the situation 
regarding historical hearsay exceptions. Marshall had not referred to any 
exception that would permit use of hearsay to prove a defendant’s guilt, as 
the Chief Justice’s statements implied. 
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the hearsay ban,204 the framing-era authorities did not divorce 
the ban against unsworn hearsay from the cross-examination 
right that is central to confrontation. The direct historical 
evidence that Justice Scalia did not consult in either Crawford or 
Davis reveals that the hearsay ban was understood to be a 
requirement of the confrontation right. 
Hence, however “reasonable” the originalist inferences that 
Justice Scalia drew in Crawford might have appeared when 
viewed in isolation,205 they collide head-on with the evidentiary 
doctrine that actually shaped the Framers’ understanding of the 
confrontation right. Admitting unsworn, “nontestimonial” 
hearsay was not part of “the Framers’ design.” 
III.  THE CASES CITED IN CRAWFORD AND DAVIS 
What of the historical English cases that were discussed in 
Crawford and Davis? Do they alter the picture of the Framers’ 
understanding of the confrontation right that emerges from the 
framing-era treatises and manuals? Do they cast doubt on the 
description of framing-era law presented above? If one actually 
pays attention to what the cases say, rather than to the modern 
glosses imposed on them during the arguments in Davis, one 
finds that the statements that appear in the case reports are 
consistent with the treatment of out-of-court statements in 
framing-era treatises and manuals. 
A.  The Historical Treatment of the Purportedly 
“Testimonial” Cases 
Let me begin with the two cases that were discussed in Davis 
as though they might be examples of the exclusion of testimonial 
hearsay statements, King v. Dingler,206 and King v. Brasier.207 
                                                          
204 See supra note 54. 
205 See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. 
206 2 Leach 561, 168 Eng. Rep. 383 (Old Bailey 1791), discussed in 
Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2277. 
207 1 Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (Twelve Judges 1779), discussed in 
Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2277. 
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As explained above, neither of these cases were published early 
enough to constitute valid evidence of the Framers’ 
understanding. In fact, the actual publication stories of these two 
cases amply illustrate the pitfalls of attempting to base claims 
about original meaning upon late eighteenth-century English 
cases. The cases are relevant here only insofar as they provide a 
check on the evidentiary regime spelled out in the framing-era 
treatises and manuals. 
1.  Dingler 
Although no one seems to have been aware of it when Davis 
was argued, the 1791 ruling in the Old Bailey in Dingler was 
never published, and thus never available to Americans, until 
1800208—eleven years after the Sixth Amendment was framed. 
Hence, it plainly did not inform the original meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause in 1789. Nevertheless, Justice Scalia 
discussed Dingler in Davis as though the exclusion of the out-of-
court statement of the deceased victim was an example of the 
exclusion of a “testimonial” hearsay statement.209 However, that 
is not the reason the English judge gave when he ruled the 
statement inadmissible. 
In Dingler a justice of the peace had taken and recorded the 
statement of a victim of an assault after the assailant had been 
arrested and committed to jail to await trial. The victim 
subsequently died prior to the trial, and the issue was the 
admissibility of the victim’s statement. The victim’s statement 
did not constitute a dying declaration because she had not been 
aware of impending death when it was made.210 Thus, the issue 
was whether it was admissible as a sworn Marian witness 
examination. As noted above, the framing-era evidence 
authorities recognized that sworn Marian examinations of 
                                                          
208 See supra note 69. 
209 Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2277. 
210 Dingler, 2 Leach (4th ed. 1815) at 563, 168 Eng. Rep. at 384 (noting 
that prosecuting counsel conceded that the victim’s statement was not a dying 
declaration). 
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deceased witnesses could be admitted in felony trials.211 
However, because that rule of admissibility was grounded in the 
statutory authority for justices of the peace to take such 
examinations, issues could arise as to whether a statement by a 
deceased person had actually been taken within the statutory 
window for exercising Marian authority. This was the issue that 
was actually argued in Dingler. 
The Marian statutes provided for the taking of sworn 
statements of witnesses at the time of a felony arrest, when the 
justice of the peace was required to decide whether the arrestee 
should be released, bailed, or committed to jail to await trial. 
However, the victim’s statement in Dingler was taken a day 
after the defendant was arrested and committed to jail. Thus, at 
Dingler’s trial, his counsel objected that the victim’s statement 
was inadmissible because, not having been taken in connection 
with the arrest, it was outside the scope of Marian authority and 
not properly sworn. Dingler’s counsel offered the 1789 Old 
Bailey ruling in King v. Woodcock as authority for his 
position.212 
In Woodcock, in turn, the trial judge had ruled that a 
deceased victim’s out-of-court statement could not be admitted at 
trial as a Marian examination because, having been taken 
separately from, rather than in connection with, the defendant’s 
arrest, the procedure was “extrajudicial” and, thus, the victim’s 
statement was not “upon oath, judicially taken.”213 The 
presiding trial judge at Dingler’s trial accepted that ruling as 
authority and excluded the victim’s statement on the basis of 
                                                          
211 See supra text accompanying notes 116-123, 132, 136, 143, 156; see 
also note 160. 
212 Dingler, 2 Leach (4th ed. 1815) at 562-63, 168 Eng. Rep. at 383-84, 
noting that defense counsel cited the case of King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach (4th 
ed. 1815) 500, 168 Eng. Rep. 352 (Old Bailey 1789). Woodcock was initially 
published in the first edition of Leach’s reports. See Leach (1st ed. 1789) 
437. That volume was probably published in late 1789, after the framing of 
the Sixth Amendment. See supra note 68. Unlike some of the other cases 
reported in Leach’s first edition, there were no significant alterations of the 
Woodcock report in the later editions. 
213 Woodcock, Leach (1st ed. 1789) at 440; 1 Leach (4th ed. 1815) at 
502, 168 Eng. Rep. at 353. 
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Woodcock.214 
The significant point for present purposes is that neither the 
ruling in Dingler nor that in Woodcock made any reference to 
the “testimonial” character of the excluded statement or to any 
other aspect of the character of what was said. Likewise, neither 
of the cases said anything that might suggest that an unsworn, 
nontestimonial hearsay statement could ever be admitted as 
evidence. To the contrary, the presiding judge in Woodcock 
made a statement that identified only two forms of out-of-court 
statements that could be admitted as to a defendant’s guilt: 
The most common and ordinary species of legal 
evidence consists in the depositions of witnesses taken 
on oath before the Jury, in the face of the Court, in 
the presence of the prisoner, and received under all 
the advantages which examination and cross-
examination can give. But beyond this kind of 
evidence there are also two species which are 
admitted by law: The one is the dying declaration of 
a person who has received a fatal blow: the other is 
the examination of a prisoner, and the depositions of 
the witnesses who may be produced against him, 
taken officially before a Justice of the Peace, by 
virtue of [the Marian statute], which authorizes 
Magistrates to take such examinations and directs that 
they shall be returned to the Court of Gaol Delivery. 
This last species of deposition, if the deponent should 
die between the time of examination and the trial of 
the prisoner, may be substituted in the room of that 
viva voce testimony which the deponent, if living, 
could alone have given, and is admitted of necessity 
as evidence of the fact.215 
Significantly, the only two kinds of out-of-court statements 
that the judge in Woodcock identified as admissible evidence of a 
                                                          
214 Woodcock, Leach (1st ed. 1789) at 440; 1 Leach (4th ed. 1815) at 
502, 168 Eng. Rep. at 353. 
215 Woodcock, Leach (1st ed. 1789) at 439; 1 Leach (4th ed. 1815) at 
501-02, 168 Eng. Rep. at 352-53. 
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defendant’s guilt—a dying declaration of a murder victim and a 
sworn Marian witness examination of an unavailable witness—
are precisely the same as the only two kinds identified in the 
treatises and manuals.216 
Dingler and Woodcock do not reveal the “testimonial” end of 
a distinction between “testimonial” and “nontestimonial” 
hearsay. Rather, they simply reflect an across-the-board rule that 
no statement could be offered as evidence in a criminal case, 
even from an unavailable declarant, unless it was made under a 
valid oath, or the equivalent of an oath in the case of a dying 
declaration. Thus, these cases underscore that unsworn out-of-
court statements were never admissible as evidence of a 
defendant’s guilt, and that out-of-court statements of available 
witnesses were never admissible, either. 
2.  Brasier 
The reporting of the 1779 rulings in Brasier also illustrates 
the hazards of working with reports of English criminal trials 
from the late eighteenth century. The version of Brasier that was 
relied upon in the briefs and opinion in Davis was substantially 
different from the report that Thomas Leach initially published 
in 1789. It appears that Leach got the facts of the trial wrong in 
the first version; the version of Brasier that now appears in the 
English Reports and that everyone used in Davis is a corrected 
account that was not published until 1815.217 Hence, it is patent 
                                                          
216 See supra text accompanying notes 116-123, 151-154. 
217 The initial one-page report of Brasier appeared in Leach (1st ed. 
1789) 346. That report was published in late 1789 after the framing. See 
supra note 68 The initial report stated that Brasier had been convicted of rape 
on the basis of the unsworn trial testimony of the child-victim, “an infant 
under seven years of age” who was too immature to be sworn. The trial 
judge allowed the admission of the child’s testimony but then “respited” (that 
is, delayed) entering judgment on Brasier’s conviction and took the issue to 
the Twelve Judges. The Twelve Judges then unanimously overturned the 
conviction and ruled “[t]hat no testimony whatever can be legally received 
except upon oath,” but also stated, as a rule for future trials, that an infant 
victim of a crime even younger than seven might be sworn if the child could 
appreciate the consequences of the oath. The ruling of the Twelve Judges 
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that the account discussed in Davis could not have informed 
American framing-era thinking. Nevertheless, the corrected 
account does shed some light on late eighteenth-century English 
hearsay doctrine. 
The report of Brasier stated rulings in two courts: first, a 
ruling admitting evidence in a felony trial at the Assizes in 
Reading (that is in a felony trial comparable to that held at the 
                                                          
was: 
That no testimony whatever can be legally received except upon 
oath; and that an infant, though under the age of seven years, 
may be sworn in a criminal prosecution, provided such infant 
appears, on strict examination by the Court, to possess a 
sufficient knowledge of the nature and consequences of an oath: 
for there is no precise or fixed rule as to the time within which 
infants are excluded from giving evidence; but their admissibility 
depends upon the sense and reason they entertain of the danger 
and impiety of falsehood, which is to be collected from their 
answers to questions propounded to them by the Court; but if 
they are found incompetent, their testimony cannot be received. 
Id. 
 However, in the 1800 third edition, Leach inserted a footnote into the 
earlier report of Brasier to the effect that further information indicated that 
the child had not testified at all, but that the mother and another witness had 
testified as to what the child had told them. 1 Leach (3rd ed. 1800) at 237 n. 
(a). The note indicates that the revised information came from “a manuscript 
of this case, in the possession of a gentleman at the bar” (possibly Edward 
Hyde East who had access to the judges’ unpublished manuscripts. See infra 
notes 223-224 and accompanying text). 
 Then in the 1815 fourth edition, which is reprinted in the English 
Reports—that is, the version that was actually cited and discussed in Davis, 
126 S.Ct. at 2277—Leach gave a fuller corrected account of the trial 
proceedings. 1 Leach (4th ed. 1815) 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202. The corrected 
report even identified a different trial judge and location: the initial 1789 
report identified Justice Gould at the York Assizes, but the revised 1815 
account identified Justice Buller at the Reading Assizes. 
 I am indebted to Professor Robert Mosteller for calling the inconsistency 
of the reports of Brasier in the various editions of Leach’s reports to my 
attention, as well as for calling my attention to the discussion by East, 
discussed in the text below. For a more detailed discussion of the changes in 
Leach’s reports of Brasier, see Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial 
Concept and Exceptions to Confrontation: “A Little Child Shall Lead Them,” 
82 IND. L.J. 919, 925-35 (2007). 
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Old Bailey in London218), and then the more authoritative, quasi-
appellate ruling by the Twelve Judges in London.219 In the 
corrected account of Brasier that was cited and discussed in 
Davis, the evidence at Brasier’s trial was described as follows: 
The case against the prisoner was proved by the 
mother of the [child victim], and by another woman 
who lodged with her, to whom the child, immediately 
on her coming home, told all the circumstances of the 
injury which had been done to her: and there was no 
fact or circumstance to confirm the information which 
the child had given, except that the prisoner lodged at 
the very place which she had described, and that she 
had received some hurt, and that she, on seeing him 
the next day, had declared that he was the man; but 
she was not sworn or produced as a witness on the 
trial.220 
However, Leach reported that when Brasier’s conviction was 
reviewed and reversed by the Twelve Judges, they stated “[t]hat 
no testimony whatever can be legally received except upon 
oath,” but went on to say (presumably as advice for future 
trials) that a child victim of a crime even younger than seven 
might be sworn if the child could appreciate the consequences of 
                                                          
218 The Old Bailey was the London-area equivalent of the provincial 
assize courts, that is a felony trial court. See LANGBEIN, ADVERSARY TRIAL, 
supra note 37, at 16-17. 
219 The Twelve Judges were composed of the combined benches of the 
three common-law superior courts at Westminster: King’s Bench, Common 
Pleas, and Exchequer. These were also the judges who presided at felony 
trials in the Old Bailey and on Assizes. See LANGBEIN, ADVERSARY TRIAL, 
supra note 37, at 212-13. 
 When novel or unsettled issues arose in trials, the presiding judge could 
“respite” (delay) the judgment in the case and refer the question to the 
collective judgment of the combined judges. Because there was no writ of 
error in criminal cases, this was the primary mode of review in criminal 
cases. See id. The Twelve Judges were also sometimes referred to as the 
Court of Exchequer Chamber. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 90, at 55-56 
(1st ed. 1768). 
220 Brasier, 1 Leach (4th ed. 1815) at 199; 168 Eng Rep. at 202. 
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the oath.221 Leach also added in his corrected report that “[t]he 
Judges determined, therefore, that the evidence of the 
information which the infant had given to her mother and the 
other witness, ought not to have been received”;222 that is, that 
the unsworn “information” of the child could not not be repeated 
by anyone else at trial. 
There is also another even fuller account of Brasier, not 
mentioned in Davis, that was published in 1803 by Edward 
Hyde East.223 East’s account indicated that the Twelve Judges 
were not initially unanimous as to the final rulings. Specifically, 
it indicated that two of the judges initially thought that the 
mother might testify to what the child said immediately after the 
rape “because it was part of the fact or transaction itself.” (This 
is the earliest indication of the res gestae concept I have come 
across in a criminal case.) However, most of the judges rejected 
that view in their initial discussion, and ultimately the judges 
unanimously rejected it.224 
                                                          
221 The account of the ruling of the Twelve Judges is essentially the same 
in Leach’s various reports of Brasier. Because the child-victim had not 
actually testified at the trial, and because Brasier could not be retried, the 
statements of the Twelve Judges regarding the minimum age at which a child 
had sufficient “discretion” to take an oath can only have been forward-
looking dicta to provide direction for future trials. The only statement the 
judges made regarding Brasier’s own trial was that the mother could not 
testify to the child’s statements as a substitute for the child testifying herself. 
Thus, the ruling overturning Brasier’s conviction carried a clear message that 
a valid conviction could be obtained in future child rape cases only if the 
living child victim testified in person at the trial. 
222 Brasier, 1 Leach (4th ed. 1815) at 200, 168 Eng. Rep. at 202-03. 
223 See 1 EDWARD HYDE EAST, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE 
CROWN 443-44 (London, 1803) (discussing Brasier in the context of a larger 
discussion of evidence in child rape cases). East’s account of Brasier was 
apparently based on manuscript accounts of the case by judges Gould and 
Buller. See East’s marginal note, 1 id. at 443 (“MS Gould and Buller Js”) 
and the Preface and listing of the manuscripts on which the work was based, 
1 id. at v-xv. 
224 According to East’s account of Brasier, there was initially a 
difference of opinion among the judges. Most of the judges were of the view 
that the mother’s hearsay evidence was inadmissible, but that even a child 
under seven might be sworn if it appeared she was “capable of distinguishing 
DAVIES 6/22/2007 1:01 AM 
442 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Does the ruling in Brasier tell us anything about Crawford’s 
originalist testimonial/nontestimonial hearsay distinction? In 
Davis, counsel for Davis argued that the hearsay account of the 
child’s statements that had been excluded in Brasier were 
comparable in character to the statements contained in the 911 
call in Davis itself, and thus that the statements to the 911 
operator should be deemed to fall within Crawford’s 
“testimonial” category and be inadmissible.225 However, Justice 
Scalia rejected the comparison between the statements made by 
the child in Brasier and the statements made during the 911 call 
in Davis. Specifically, Justice Scalia noted that the child’s 
statements in Brasier were not made “during an ongoing 
emergency” but were only an “account of past events,” and thus 
were dissimilar from those made during the ongoing emergency 
situation in Davis itself. Thus, Justice Scalia commented that the 
                                                          
between good and evil.” However, two judges, Gould and Willes, were of 
the view that a child under seven could never be sworn but that the mother’s 
account of the child’s statements should have been admitted because, the 
statement “being recently after the fact [that is, the rape], so that it excluded 
a possibility of practicing on her, it was a part of the fact or transaction itself 
and therefore admissible” (that is, what would now be termed res gestae). 
One other judge, Buller, took the view that the mother’s evidence should 
have been admissible “if by law the child could not be examined under oath.” 
1 id. at 443-44. (This is the earliest mention of a res gestae exception in a 
criminal case that I have located, though that term was not used—but note 
that most of the judges still rejected it.) 
 East indicated that the judges later met and “unanimously agreed that a 
child of any age, if she were capable of distinguishing between good and 
evil, might be examined on oath; and consequently that evidence of what she 
had said ought not to have been received. And that a child of whatever age 
cannot be examined unless sworn.” 1 id. at 444. Thus, the res gestae 
treatment was ultimately rejected by all of the justices. 
 East also added that “[i]t does not however appear to have been denied 
by any in the above case that the fact of the child’s having complained of the 
injury recently after it was received is confirmatory evidence.” 1 id. 
(emphasis added). This would appear to be a reference to the limited-purpose 
corroboration hearsay exception; that is, if the child testified under oath, 
statements she made after the rape could be testified to by another witness to 
confirm that the child’s account at trial was consistent with her earlier 
statements. 
225 Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2277. 
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exclusion of the hearsay evidence in Brasier would have been 
“helpful” in Davis’s attempt to exclude the 911 statements only 
“if the relevant statement had been the girl’s screams for aid as 
she was being chased by her assailant.”226 
The important point for assessing the originalist claims in 
Crawford and Davis, however, is simply that the historical 
ruling in Brasier was not based on the context in which the 
child’s statements had been made; rather, the Twelve Judges 
ruled that the mother’s account of the child’s unsworn statements 
was inadmissible as hearsay regardless of the context. Thus, the 
ruling actually reported in Brasier neither said nor implied that 
any distinction could be drawn between testimonial or 
nontestimonial hearsay in 1779.227 Indeed, the mere fact that the 
judges used the term “testimony” when they ruled that “no 
testimony whatever” could be admitted without oath did not 
refer to Crawford’s “testimonial” category—any statement made 
by a witness during a trial constituted “testimony” in 1789, 
regardless of whether its content might now be characterized as 
being “testimonial” or “nontestimonial” under Crawford’s 
scheme.228 Indeed, the ultimate ruling of the Twelve Judges— 
                                                          
226 Id. It may be noteworthy that Justice Scalia did not say whether the 
girl’s “account of past events” to her mother in Brasier amounted to a 
testimonial statement under Crawford. That silence would seem to reflect the 
Court’s disinclination to decide in Davis whether a statement to a private 
person can constitute a testimonial statement under Crawford. See id. at 2274 
n. 2. 
227 As Chief Justice Rehnquist previously noted, the ruling in Brasier 
drew no distinction between kinds of hearsay statements. Crawford, 541 U.S. 
at 69-70 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
228 I mention this rather obvious point only because I have heard 
discussions in which the judges’ use of the rather general term “testimony” in 
the ruling of the Twelve Judges in Brasier was arbitrarily equated with the 
narrower meaning assigned to “testimonial” in Crawford. However, it is 
patent in the context that the judges used “testimony” simply as a generic 
term for any statement made by a witness during a trial. Any statement made 
by a witness in court would constitute “testimony” (what else would one call 
it?), regardless of the content or character of the statement. As noted above, 
it does not appear that “testimonial” was ever used to designate a category of 
evidence at the time of the framing; in fact, it does not appear that 
“testimonial” was even used as an adjective. See supra notes 50, 51. 
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that the mother could not recite the unsworn statement of the 
child because “no testimony whatever can be legally received 
except upon oath”—did not leave room to admit any unsworn 
hearsay statement.229 The Twelve Judges simply restated the 
same blanket exclusion of unsworn hearsay that also was set out 
by the treatises and manuals of the time.230 
However, a question remains: if there was a blanket 
prohibition against hearsay evidence, why did the trial judge 
permit the mother to testify at all in Brasier? The answer 
appears to be that the issue of what could constitute admissible 
evidence in the case of a child rape victim who was too young 
to be sworn was understood to be a uniquely difficult and 
unsettled question.231 On the one side, the likelihood that the 
child would be the only source of information about the crime 
presented a case for allowing that evidence somehow to come in 
as a matter of necessity. For example, writing in the mid 1600s 
Sir Matthew Hale had opined that a child’s unsworn information 
might be admitted, or that a parent might be allowed to recount 
the child’s account (though Hale thought the latter was the less 
preferable option).232 Moreover, Blackstone had initially 
                                                          
229 Recall the statements in the evidence treatises to the effect that a 
sworn recitation of an unsworn statement could not cure the unsworn 
character of the original “bare speaking.” See supra text accompanying notes 
137 (GILBERT), 144 (BATHURST and BULLER). 
230 As discussed above, dying declarations of murder victims, which 
were viewed as having been made under circumstances equivalent to an oath 
(see supra note 153 and accompanying text), were the only category of 
hearsay that could be admitted to prove the guilt of the defendant. See, e.g., 
supra notes 172, 215 and accompanying text. 
231 See LANGBEIN, ADVERSARY TRIAL, supra note 37, at 239-41 (noting 
that no formal exception to the hearsay rule was developed for child rape 
cases because allowing hearsay was too hard to reconcile with the core 
policies underlying the hearsay rule, the oath and cross-examination). 
232 1 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 634-35 
(published 1736; written sometime prior to Hale’s death in 1676). In addition 
to suggesting that a child rape victim under the age of twelve might be 
permitted to testify under oath (as had been allowed in trials of witches), 
Hale suggested that a young child might be permitted to testify without oath. 
However, Hale suggested that a rape conviction should not be based on such 
unsworn testimony unless there was some additional corroborating evidence. 
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endorsed Hale’s views in 1769233 (though he later reversed and 
took the opposite position after he participated as one of the 
Twelve Judges in the Brasier decision).234 Hawkins offered only 
an ambiguous statement on the subject.235 
On the other side, several reported cases had taken the view 
that the admission of a child’s unsworn testimony plainly 
violated the basic requisites of criminal evidence, and that this 
was also the case if a parent was admitted as a sworn witness to 
recite a child’s unsworn information. By the late eighteenth 
                                                          
1 id. Hale also left open the possibility that a parent might testify to what a 
young child had reported, though he suggested that was second best to 
hearing from the child directly. 1 id. The fact that Hale probably wrote his 
treatise sometime around 1665 is significant, however, because the law of 
hearsay may not have been much developed at that time. Rather, Hawkins 
traced the requirement that all evidence be presented under oath in the 
presence of the prisoner to 1680. See supra note 111. 
 In the second volume of this treatise, Hale also suggested that “an infant 
of tender years may be examined without oath, where the exigence of the 
case requires it, as in case of rape, buggery, witchcraft.” 2 HALE, supra, at 
279. 
233 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 90, at 214-15 (1st ed. 1769). Blackstone 
probably repeated this position through his eighth London edition in 1778, 
which was published prior to the 1779 decision in Brasier. I have not located 
that edition, but I have confirmed that Blackstone made no change as of the 
1775 seventh London edition. See 4 id. at 214-15 (7th ed. 1775). 
 Blackstone’s initial statement is important for assessing the American 
understanding of this issue because of the large number of Americans who 
purchased copies that were printed in Philadelphia in 1771-1772. See supra 
note 90. There was no subsequent American printing of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries until 1790 (that is, until after the framing of the Bill of 
Rights). See JAMES, supra note 90, at 185 (entry 69). 
234 Blackstone was one of the Twelve Judges who decided Brasier in 
1779, so he amended the statement in his ninth London edition in 1783 to 
reflect that decision. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 90, at 214-15 (9th ed. 
1783). The 1783 9th edition was the last in which Blackstone personally 
made alterations. See 1 MAXWELL, supra note 108, at 28. 
235 2 HAWKINS, supra note 108, at 434 (1771 ed.) (stating “[t]hat want 
of discretion [that is, maturity] is a good exception against a witness; on 
which account alone it seems, That an infant may be excepted against; for in 
some cases an infant of nine years of age has been allowed to give 
evidence”). 
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century, most of the authorities seem to have opined that a 
prosecution could be based on a child-victim’s information only 
if the child was old enough to be sworn and personally testified 
under oath.236 However, there are indications that trial rulings 
on the issue during the eighteenth century went both ways.237 
The Twelve Judges had taken up the issue of whether a 
young child-victim could testify a few years before Brasier in a 
1775 case, but had not resolved it at that time.238 Hence, it 
                                                          
236 King v. Travers, 2 Str. 700, 700-01; 93 Eng. Rep. 793, 793-94 
(K.B. 1726); Omychund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 21, 29; 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 20 
(Chancery 1744). Burn appears to have altered his discussion of the 
admissibility of statements by child rape victims on the basis of these cases. 
As late as the 1764 edition, Burn’s manual simply noted Hale’s statements 
allowing the admission of the child’s information. See 1 BURN, supra note 
155, at 342 (1764 ed.). However, in 1766 he altered his rendition of Hale’s 
position by removing the words “without oath” from the end of a statement 
that “in many cases an infant of tender years may be examined,” and by 
adding a new statement that “[b]ut in no case shall an infant be admitted as 
evidence without oath. Str. 700. Tracy Atk. 29.” See 1 id. at 475 (1766 ed). 
237 The amicus brief of the National Association of Counsel for Children 
supporting respondents Washington and Indiana in Davis and Hammon 
reported that cases described in the Old Bailey Sessions Papers show that 
young child victims sometimes were permitted to testify without oath and that 
other witnesses sometimes were permitted to testify about out-court 
statements by child victims. See Brief for the National Association of Counsel 
for Children as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 19-22, n. 13, 
Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006). See also Anthony J. Franze, 
The Confrontation Clause and Originalism: Lessons from King v. Brasier, 15 
J.L. & POL’Y 495, passim (2007) (reporting that in some of the Old Bailey 
trials involving young child victims, the child was permitted to testify without 
oath, but that in some the child was prevented from testifying, while in others 
family members, doctors, neighbors, or others were sometimes allowed to 
repeat what the child victim had said out-of-court). See also LANGBEIN, 
ADVERSARY TRIAL, supra note 37, at 239-40. 
238 See Powell’s Case, Leach (1st ed. 1789)114 (1775). Leach’s initial 
report indicated that the defendant was convicted of rape on the basis of the 
unsworn testimony of an infant between six and seven years of age, but that 
Justice Gould reserved the case for the Twelve Judges because, especially in 
criminal cases, “no evidence can be legal unless it is given upon oath.” This 
initial report stated that “[t]he question was under consideration [by the 
Twelve Judges], and the prisoner was pardoned,” but no express opinion was 
given on the point. 
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appears that the issue of a parent’s hearsay testimony arose in 
Brasier because the law remained uniquely unsettled as to what 
evidence could be admitted in a child rape prosecution. 
However, it was not unsettled after Brasier: the Twelve Judges 
came down on the side of enforcing the principles of evidence 
even in the hard case of the child-victim, albeit while signaling 
that in future trials some flexibility could be shown in 
determining whether a child victim was mature enough to be 
sworn.239 
                                                          
 However, the report of Powell in Leach’s 1800 third edition is quite 
different. In that report, the child testified without being sworn, but “the 
prisoner was acquitted upon her testimony.” 1 Leach (3rd ed. 1800) at 128 
(emphasis added). Nevertheless, the trial judge “mentioned the case to the 
Judges; and the majority of them were of opinion that in criminal cases no 
testimony can be received except upon oath.” Id. at 128-29. Thus, assuming 
the latter report is correct, there was a split of opinion among the judges on 
this issue as late as 1775, only four years prior to Brasier. 
239 The conflict among the authorities regarding the admissibility of a 
young child victim’s information regarding a rape makes it problematic how 
framing-era Americans would have evaluated legal authority on that issue. 
The opinion in Brasier was not published until late 1789. See supra note 68. 
The only information available about Brasier by the date of the framing in 
1789 was the alteration that Blackstone had made in the 1783 edition of his 
Commentaries. See supra note 234. However, it seems unlikely that 
Americans would have imported many copies of Blackstone’s editions 
between 1782 and 1789; instead, most of the copies of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries then in circulation in America would have been of the 1771-
1772 Philadelphia reprint of Blackstone’s earlier 1769 edition. 
 Moreover, even if Americans learned of Brasier from the later editions 
of Blackstone’s Commentaries, that ruling was made by an English court 
after American independence, so it would not have been part of the common 
law absorbed by the American states in 1775 or 1776. Thus Americans may 
have given more weight to Blackstone’s earlier statement. 
 On the other hand, as noted above, Burn had revised his statement on the 
issue in the 1766 edition of his justice of the peace manual to the effect that a 
child’s information could not be admitted except under oath, and had cited 
early eighteenth-century cases to that effect. See supra note 236. A number 
of the framing-era justice of the peace manuals printed in America repeated 
Burn’s revised statement and his citations to the earlier cases. See 
GREENLEAF, supra note 160 at 124; STARKE, supra note 160, at 144-45; 
GRIMKE, supra note 160, at 191. However, the 1765 through 1788 printings 
of Conductor Generalis continued to quote Burn’s earlier statement endorsing 
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The significant point for present purposes is that the ruling in 
Brasier, like the rulings in Dingler and Woodcock, did not draw 
on any historical distinction between testimonial and 
nontestimonial hearsay. Rather, the actual rulings in all three 
cases consistently confirmed the basic doctrinal rule that 
unsworn hearsay statements were inadmissible as evidence of a 
criminal defendant’s guilt. 
B.  The Absence of Cases that admitted “Nontestimonial” 
Hearsay 
The other and more telling aspect of the search for historical 
cases in Davis and Hammon is the absence of any example of a 
historical case that admitted any unsworn out-of-court statement 
that could now be labeled a “nontestimonial” hearsay statement. 
As noted above, no such case was identified in the briefing in 
Davis. Moreover, it appears that the only case of that sort 
identified in Crawford probably involved a different 
consideration. 
In Crawford, Justice Scalia suggested that the 1694 trial 
ruling in Thompson et Ux v. Trevanion240 might be an example 
of what is now termed the “excited utterance” or “spontaneous 
declaration” hearsay exception. Specifically, Justice Scalia 
quoted from the ruling of the trial judge in Thompson when 
Justice Scalia commented that “to the extent the hearsay 
exception for spontaneous declarations existed at all, it required 
that the statements be made ‘immediat[ely] upon the hurt 
received, and before [the declarant] had time to devise or 
contrive any thing for her own advantage.’”241 
Thompson may now appear to have involved a spontaneous 
declaration hearsay exception. The entire report was as follows: 
                                                          
the admission of a child-victim’s unsworn information. See PARKER’S 
CONDUCTOR, supra note 160, at 167; GAINE’S CONDUCTOR, supra note 160, 
at 140; HODGE’S CONDUCTOR, supra note 160, at 170. 
240 Thompson v. Trevanion, Skin. 402, 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (Nisi Prius 
1694), discussed in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n. 8. 
241 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n. 8, quoting Thompson, Skin. 402, 90 
Eng. Rep. 179 (Nisi Prius 1694). 
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Ruled upon evidence, that a mayhem may be given in 
evidence, in an action of trespass of assault, battery, 
and wounding, as an evidence of wounding per Holt 
Chief Justice; and in this case he also allowed, that 
what the wife said immediately upon the hurt 
received, and before that she had time to devise or 
contrive any thing for her own advantage, might be 
given in evidence; quod nota; this was at Nisi Prius 
in Middlesex for wounding of the wife of the 
plaintiff.242 
A similarly cryptic report also appears in Holt’s King’s 
Bench Reports.243 
On its face, this report indicates that someone other than 
“the wife of the plaintiff” testified as to “what the wife said 
immediately upon the hurt received.” Thus, it may appear that 
this is a case in which a hearsay account of the wife’s statement 
was testified to by another witness under a spontaneous 
declaration exception, albeit in a civil rather than criminal trial. 
However, that is not how Gilbert characterized the issue in 
Thompson. 
As Petitioner’s brief in Davis noted, Gilbert’s evidence 
treatise cited Thompson as an example of the allowance of 
hearsay for corroboration that applied when there was a single 
witness;244 that is, the limited-purpose corroboration exception 
                                                          
242 Skin. 402, 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (Nisi Prius 1694). 
243 The other report of Thompson states: 
Holt C. J. Ruled upon Evidence, that a Mayhem may be given 
in Evidence in an Action of Trespass of Assault, Battery and 
Wounding, as an Evidence of Wounding. And in this Case he 
also allowed, that what the Wife said immediate upon the hurt 
received, and before she had Time to devise or contrive any 
thing for her own Advantage, might be given in Evidence. 
Thompson v. Trevanian, Holt K.B. 286, 90 Eng. Rep. 1057 (Nisi Prius 
1694). (Chief Justice Holt was not the author of these reports; rather, they 
were called “Holt’s King’s Bench Reports” because they report cases from 
the period when Holt was chief justice.) 
244 Brief of Petitioner at 30, Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266 
(2006), citing GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 108 (1st ed. 
1754). The marginal note to Gilbert’s discussion of the allowance of hearsay 
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discussed above.245 Gilbert’s classification of the case suggests 
that the wife (possibly as the only witness to her wounding) had 
testified under oath during the trial, and that the out-of-court 
statements she had made “immediately upon the hurt received” 
were then recited by another witness simply to corroborate the 
wife’s trial testimony. Although the Thompson report has more 
than its share of mysteries246—or perhaps because it has more 
than its share—Gilbert’s nearly contemporaneous interpretation 
should be accorded considerable weight.247 Hence, it does not 
                                                          
to corroborate a single witness contains the citation “Skin. 402,” the citation 
to Thompson. 
245 See supra text accompanying note 138. 
246 There is another cite to Thompson that is quite mysterious. Matthew 
Bacon’s 1736 Abridgment cited “Skin. 402” in the margin next to his 
paraphrase of Hawkins’s statement that hearsay was no evidence, but that 
hearsay might “be made use of by Way of Inducement or Illustration of what 
is properly Evidence.” See 2 BACON, supra note 120, at 313 (compare 
passage quoted supra text accompanying note 120). However, it is hard to 
see any way to read the wife’s statement in Thompson as illustrating what is 
otherwise proper evidence. Bacon apparently had access to Gilbert’s still 
unpublished manuscripts, so it is likely that the “Skin 402” cite came from 
Gilbert’s evidence manuscript. It may be a simple case of Bacon’s printer 
having placed the “Skin 402” citation in the margin next to the wrong 
paragraph in the text, because the paragraph that follows in Bacon’s 
Abridgment sets out the corroboration hearsay exception to which Gilbert had 
cited “Skin. 402.” See 2 id. (passage quoted supra text accompanying note 
130). 
247 Of course, one might wonder why, if Thompson involved only the 
corroboration exception, the judge bothered to note that the wife’s prior 
statement was “immediately upon the hurt received”? My hunch is that this 
was prompted because allowing the wife to testify at all involved an 
exception to the usual rule that, in civil cases, an interested party—which the 
wife was as a co-plaintiff with her husband—usually could not be admitted as 
a witness. Exceptions to that rule were permitted, however, in criminal 
prosecutions for assault where the interested party was the only possible 
source of information as to what happened. My hunch is that something like 
that criminal exception was involved here. (Indeed, it is possible that the 
opening statement in the report “that a mayhem may be given in evidence” 
may be a cryptic reference to the crime of mayhem or even to a conviction 
for that crime. “Mayhem” referred to a disabling wound.) Hence, my hunch 
is that the trial judge thought that, because the wife was an interested party 
and her testimony already involved an exception, it was appropriate to put 
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appear that Thompson was actually an example of a spontaneous 
declaration hearsay exception. 
Additionally, whatever Thompson actually involved, the case 
report seems to have lurked in obscurity prior to the framing of 
the Confrontation Clause in 1789. Petitioner’s reply brief in 
Hammon noted that Thompson was never cited by any reported 
English decision prior to 1805.248 As a result, it appears that the 
only way a framing-era American lawyer would have been likely 
to have discovered the case was through Gilbert’s citation.249 
                                                          
some additional limit on the corroboration of a party’s testimony by hearsay 
evidence about the party’s prior out-of-court statements. 
 It should be noted that although Petitioner’s Brief in Hammon dismissed 
Thompson as being too obscure to matter, it rejected Gilbert’s 
characterization of Thompson as a corroboration case as “inapposite.” That 
dismissal seems to have been based partly on the assumption that the citation 
was posthumously added by the editor rather than by Gilbert himself, and 
partly on the assumption that exceptions were never made to the rule that an 
interested party could not be a witness in a civil lawsuit for damages. See 
Brief of Petitioner at 25 n. 26, Hammon v. Indiana, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006). I 
am doubtful that either objection has much weight. I know of no reason why 
the margin cite was not one that Gilbert made himself—it appeared in the 
first edition of Gilbert’s treatise, and the editor who published the treatise 
described the contents as Gilbert’s own work without alterations (of course, 
even Gilbert’s editor was in a better position to know what the cryptic report 
referred to than we now are). Second, I think it is quite plausible that the 
admissibility of an assault victim as a witness in a criminal proceeding could 
have leaked over into a related civil suit for assault, as well. 
248 Brief of Petitioner at 30-31, Hammon v. Indiana, 126 S.Ct. 2266 
(2006) (citing Aveson v. Kinnaird, 6 East 197, 102 Eng. Rep. 1258 (K.B. 
1805), discussed infra text accompanying notes 266-269). 
249 Legal research was far more difficult during the framing-era than it is 
today. In particular, there were no general digests to locate pertinent cases. 
Rather, each volume or set of case reports typically had its own table of 
subjects. Thus, research was time-consuming. Additionally, few Americans 
would have had access to anything like a comprehensive collection of the 
English case reporters. Instead, a framing-era American lawyer or judge 
probably started research with a treatise or justice of the peace manual and 
then looked to the cases cited in the margins of those authorities, if they had 
access to those reporters. Hence, it seems likely that a framing-era American 
lawyer would have located Thompson only through the marginal citation in 
Gilbert’s treatise—assuming the lawyer had access to a set of Skinner’s 
reports. Notably, no copies of Skinner’s reports are identified in one study of 
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The fair conclusion seems to be that framing-era Americans 
were probably unaware of Thompson, but were unlikely to have 
thought it was authority for a spontaneous declaration or res 
gestae hearsay exception even if they somehow did become 
aware of it. 
Once the confusion over Thompson is dealt with, the net 
result is that no brief or opinion in Davis or Crawford identified 
even a single published framing-era case report that actually 
admitted an unsworn out-of-court statement that might now be 
described as “nontestimonial hearsay.”250 The obvious 
explanation for that absence, given the absence of pertinent 
criminal hearsay exceptions in the discussions in the treatises,251 
is that the criminal hearsay “exceptions” that are now prominent 
features of evidence law simply had not yet been invented when 
the Bill of Rights was framed. Available evidence regarding the 
post-framing appearance of criminal hearsay exceptions also 
points to that conclusion. 
IV.  WHEN WERE THE HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS INVENTED? 
When did judges actually invent the hearsay exceptions that 
are now part of criminal evidence law? And did those judges 
take the confrontation right into account when they invented 
those exceptions? Based on available clues, it does not appear 
that the judges who fashioned the modern exceptions gave much 
thought to the conflict between the new exceptions and the 
earlier understanding of the confrontation right. 
                                                          
the libraries of eighteenth-century Massachusetts lawyers. See ECKERT, supra 
note 109, at 551-55. 
250 Justice Scalia did recognize that a “dying declaration” was admissible 
evidence at the time of the framing, and that such declarations might be 
either testimonial or nontestimonial under Crawford’s scheme, See Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 56 n. 6. 
251 The recognized exceptions pertained only to certain specific issues in 
civil lawsuits. See supra text accompanying note 162. 
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A.  The Hearsay that English Juries “Heard” 
As discussed above, framing-era evidence authorities state a 
virtually total ban (that is, except for dying declarations of a 
murder victim) against admitting unsworn hearsay statements as 
evidence of a defendant’s guilt. Because it seems safe to assume 
that the American Framers were concerned with legal doctrine 
when they framed the Confrontation Clause, it also seems safe 
to assume that the legal doctrine of the time informed their 
actual design for the Confrontation Clause. Hence, the 
reasonable conclusion is that the original Confrontation Clause 
incorporated the doctrinal ban against unsworn hearsay 
evidence. 
Of course, there has always been some slippage between 
legal doctrine and legal practice, and there are reasons to think 
that the “gap” between doctrine and practice was at least as 
large in 1789 as it is today. For one thing, not all defendants 
were represented by counsel, so hearsay often may have gone 
unchallenged during criminal trials. For another, the absence of 
systematic forms of appellate review in criminal cases meant that 
trial judges retained considerable discretion as to whether to 
adhere to doctrine in admitting evidence at trial. 
We know very little about the way framing-era criminal 
trials were actually conducted in the American states. However, 
recent historical research has shed considerable light on how 
criminal trials were conducted in London in the 1780s. Although 
one cannot assume that English trials, and particularly London 
trials, shed direct light on framing-era American trial practices, 
the English practices are indirectly relevant insofar as they shed 
light on doctrinal developments. That is so because English 
evidence doctrine almost certainly did influence American 
doctrinal developments during the nineteenth century. 
What does the recent research on English trials show about 
when and how hearsay exceptions emerged? Unsurprisingly, it 
shows that the doctrinal rule against hearsay was inconsistently 
enforced during the eighteenth century. The surviving criminal 
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trial records, primarily the Old Bailey Sessions Papers,252 are 
inadequate to support a quantitative assessment of how 
frequently the hearsay rule was enforced. However, the accounts 
of Old Bailey trials do provide clear examples of judges or 
defense counsel cutting off a witness who was about to repeat a 
potentially material out-of-court statement made by someone 
other than the defendant. 
For example, Professor Langbein has related a 1783 trial for 
theft of iron goods in which a constable who discovered the 
stolen goods stated that he “asked Mrs. Dunn whose they 
were,” at which point defense counsel interjected that “You 
must not tell us what she said” and the judge said “No, certainly 
not.”253 Professor Gallanis has identified similar rulings. For 
example, in a 1780 trial involving theft of wood, a witness for 
the prosecution stated that the defendant had told him he had 
bought the wood in question from John Gibbons (recall that 
testimony about a defendant’s own statement did not constitute 
hearsay), but when the witness started to repeat what Gibbons 
had told him (which would constitute hearsay), the judge 
inquired if Gibbons was going to testify and, being told he was 
not, told the witness “You must not tell us what he said.”254 In 
other instances, however, the judge did not succeed in 
preventing the reciting of a hearsay statement but either told the 
jury the out-of-court statement was “no evidence”255 or simply 
commented that the witness should not have repeated the 
statement.256 
                                                          
252 See supra note 63 (the Old Bailey Sessions Papers are abbreviated as 
“OBSP” in the notes following). 
253 Trial of William Jones, OBSP December 1783, no. 102, at 130, 131, 
described in LANGBEIN, ADVERSARY TRIAL, supra note 37, at 243. 
254 Trial of Francis Hall, OBSP January 1780, no. 83, at 110, 113, 
identified by Gallanis, supra note 37, at 535 n. 263. 
255 See, e.g., Trial of John Mills, OBSP January 1785, no. 253, at 291 
(reporting, in a case involving theft of a lottery ticket, that a servant testified 
that he knew relevant directions “[b]ecause I heard my master say so” and 
either defense counsel or the judge stated “[t]hat is no evidence at all”), 
identified in Gallanis, supra note 37, at 535 n. 263. 
256 See, e.g., Trial of John Gould, OBSP January 1780, no. 46, at 61, 
identified in Gallanis, supra note 37 at 535 n. 263. 
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In still other instances, however, witnesses repeated hearsay 
statements without prompting objection or comment,257 so Old 
Bailey juries sometimes heard hearsay testimony despite the 
doctrinal prohibition against it.258 For example, Professor 
Langbein has reported that records of Old Bailey trials indicate 
that juries often heard hearsay regarding what Langbein calls 
“pursuit hearsay”—that is testimony regarding statements that 
were made regarding the discovery and arrest of the accused.259 
Thus, there is little doubt that a witness sometimes repeated a 
hearsay statement during his or her narrative account. 
In addition, the enforcement of the prohibition against 
hearsay was limited by the absence of appellate review, and by 
the still fairly informal structure of the trial process itself. 
Although defense counsel were appearing more frequently in 
criminal trials in London by the 1780s, the question-and-answer 
format of the modern trial was still not fully developed. As a 
result, there was less opportunity for judges to filter the 
admissibility of statements in advance than in the modern trial. 
Because witnesses often simply narrated what they had to tell, it 
seems likely that witnesses who had been admitted to testify as 
to their own direct knowledge of events might also have 
mentioned another person’s unsworn statement in the course of 
their narrative testimony. 
Indeed, the regulation of hearsay was especially limited by 
the fact that evidentiary points were still argued in the presence 
of the jury as the trial progressed.260 Thus, although counsel or 
a judge could sometimes prevent a witness from reciting patent 
hearsay, in other instances the only remedy for improper 
hearsay testimony was for the judge to admonish the jury to 
disregard or discredit such statements.261 
                                                          
257 Langbein also cites a 1744 Irish case in which Hawkins’s statement 
that hearsay could be used “by way of inducement or illustration of what is 
properly evidence” was applied rather loosely. See LANGBEIN, ADVERSARY 
TRIAL, supra note 37, at 239, n. 272. 
258 Id. at 234-35. 
259 Id. at 239, n. 275. 
260 Id. at 249. 
261 See Davies, supra note 10, at 198-99. 
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It would hardly be surprising, in that setting, if judges 
sometimes gave a pass to hearsay evidence that did not seem 
terribly material—a precursor of sorts to a harmless error 
approach. Likewise, it also would not be surprising if the sort of 
incidental hearsay evidence that slipped into jury trials as 
“pursuit hearsay” and such was of the sort that would later fall 
within “res gestae” or “spontaneous declaration” hearsay 
exceptions when those exceptions were invented. On the other 
hand, because judges had more control over admitting witnesses 
than over statements, it seems unlikely a person would have 
been admitted as a witness in a late eighteenth century trial if 
the person had nothing to offer but hearsay statements.262 (Thus, 
it does not appear that a person in the position of the 911 
operator in Davis, who had only second-hand information, 
would have been permitted to testify at all in 1789.) 
Moreover, although hearsay testimony happened, those 
instances still constituted departures from evidence doctrine 
during the late eighteenth century. The accounts of the Old 
Bailey trials appear to be consistent with the statements in the 
treatises and manuals insofar as they do not reveal any legally 
authorized hearsay “exceptions” (beyond dying declarations). 
That is significant because the important inquiry for assessing 
the original understanding of the Confrontation Clause is not so 
much the degree to which the rule against unsworn hearsay was 
adhered to in practice, but how legal doctrine defined the legal 
standard for admissible evidence at the time of the framing. 
B.  When Did Hearsay Exceptions Begin to Apply to 
Criminal Trials? 
Obviously, evidence law now recognizes a variety of hearsay 
exceptions that are pertinent to criminal trials. When were they 
first formally recognized? And why? 
An 1869 Supreme Court opinion indicates that judges began 
                                                          
262 However, pursuant to the corroboration exception, a witness could 
have been admitted who could only provide hearsay that corroborated or 
impeached statements previously made by other witnesses who had testified at 
a trial. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 129, 138, 144. 
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to recognize new doctrinal hearsay exceptions sometime during 
the first half of the nineteenth century—but well after the 1789 
framing of the Confrontation Clause. The evidentiary issue in 
Insurance Company v. Mosley263 arose from a claim brought 
under an accidental death insurance policy. Four days before his 
death, the insured person had told his wife and son that he had 
suffered an accidental fall. Those statements were the only 
evidence that he died because of an accident, and thus were the 
only basis for a claim under the policy. At trial, the court 
permitted the decedent’s wife and son to repeat the deceased’s 
statements, and they won a judgment. On appeal, the defendant 
insurance company objected to the admission of those hearsay 
statements into evidence. The Supreme Court upheld the 
admission of the statements as “res gestae.” What is interesting 
for present purposes is how little authority the justices could 
muster to justify that conclusion in 1869. 
Justice Swayne’s Mosley opinion identified an 1849 
Massachusetts criminal manslaughter case, Commonwealth v. 
M’Pike, in which a stabbing victim’s out-of-court statement had 
been admitted under a “res gestae” formulation. However, the 
Massachusetts court itself had cited no precedents for that 
ruling.264 
In addition, Justice Swayne cited an 1834 English criminal 
case, King v. Foster,265 in which the defendant was charged with 
manslaughter for running over one Ferrall in a “cabriolet.” In 
                                                          
263 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 397 (1869). 
264 57 Mass. (3 Cush.) 181 (1849). The defendant had been convicted of 
manslaughter for the stabbing of the defendant’s wife. The court ruled that 
““[t]he admission in evidence of [a hearsay account of] the statement of the 
party injured, as to the cause and manner of the injury which terminated in 
her death, may be sustained upon the ground that the testimony was of the 
nature of the res gestae”; that “[t]he period of time, at which these acts and 
statements took place, was so recent after the receiving of the injury, as to 
justify the admission of the evidence as a part of the res gestae”; and that 
“[“i]n the admission of testimony of this character, much must be left to the 
exercise of the sound discretion of the presiding judge.” Id. at 184 (emphasis 
in original). 
265 King v. Foster, 6 Car. & P. 325, 172 Eng. Rep. 1261 (K.B. 1834) 
(cited in Mosley, 75 U.S. at 406). 
DAVIES 6/22/2007 1:01 AM 
458 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Foster, a waggoner testified for the prosecution that he did not 
see the accident, but he heard the victim groan and went to him 
and asked what was the matter, and the victim made a statement 
to him. Presumably the statement of the victim incriminated 
Foster—the case report does not actually recite what the victim 
said. The English appellate judges ruled that the statement was 
properly admitted, but they cited only one precedent, an 1805 
English trial ruling in an insurance case, Aveson v. Kinnaird.266 
Moreover, the judges’ familiarity with that precedent appears to 
have been serendipitous; Justice Park, who delivered the ruling 
in Foster, had earlier been one of the counsel in Aveson. 
Significantly, this trail of authority seems to extend back no 
farther than Aveson in 1805. The issue in Aveson had involved 
the health and insurability of the decedent at the time a life 
insurance policy was taken out. The evidence at trial seems to 
have amounted to dueling hearsay: because the medical doctor 
whom the insured’s beneficiary called as a witness had based his 
professional opinion that the insured was in good health largely 
on the unsworn statements that the insured had made to him, the 
trial court judge permitted the defendant insurance company to 
call as a witness an acquaintance of the insured to whom the 
insured had confided that she was not at all in good health. 
Aveson appears to have been the first formally reported 
recognition of the “res gestae” hearsay exception.267 The only 
authority that the trial judges in Aveson could muster was the 
1694 Thompson case, which they interpreted—probably 
incorrectly—as having authorized the admission of an excited 
utterance.268 Nobably, Aveson appears to have been the first 
                                                          
266 Aveson v. Kinnaird, 6 East 188, 102 Eng. Rep. 1258 (K.B. 1805). 
267 See Brief of Petitioner at 30-32, Hammon v. Indiana, 126 S.Ct. 2266 
(2006). There is no mention of “res gestae” in the treatises by Hawkins, 
Gilbert, Bathurst, or Buller, or in Blackstone’s Commentaries. However, 
references to “res gestae” became fairly common in evidence treatises 
published in the 1820s. See Brief of Petitioner, supra, at 30-31. 
268 As discussed supra notes 241-247 and accompanying text, it appears 
that Thompson actually allowed the hearsay account of the victim’s statement 
to be admitted under the corroboration exception. 
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court decision to cite Thompson as authority.269 Whatever else 
one might say of the Aveson ruling, the rationale had little to do 
with the admission of hearsay evidence in criminal cases. 
A variety of other indications also suggest that the 
recognition of the “res gestae” and “spontaneous declaration” 
exceptions in criminal cases occurred sometime after the 1805 
ruling in Aveson. For example, although Professor Gallanis 
concluded that a variety of hearsay exceptions were evident in 
English rulings between 1780 and 1799,270 the list he recites did 
not include examples of hearsay exceptions that applied in 
criminal trials other than Marian witness examinations, dying 
declarations, and the limited-purpose corroboration exception 
(each of which was recognized in the treatises271). In particular, 
Gallanis did not report indications of exceptions for statements 
against penal interest or by co-conspirators,272 nor for excited 
                                                          
269 See supra note 248 and accompanying text. 
270 Gallanis noted hearsay exceptions pertaining to various issues that 
could arise in civil lawsuits including the settlement (that is, residence) of a 
pauper, general reputation and character, prescriptions (that is, claims to land 
based on long occupation), other property rights, marriages, and customs. 
Gallanis, supra note 37, at 536-37. Gallanis’s list of civil hearsay exceptions 
is comparable to that which appeared in the treatises and the justice of the 
peace manuals. See, e.g., supra notes145, 162, 185. 
271 See supra text accompanying notes 118, 129, 151. 
272 Out of court statements by accomplices or co-conspirators, including 
the Marian examinations taken of an accomplice when he was arrested, were 
inadmissible against any other defendant because they were unsworn. Thus, 
the rule was that a confession could be admitted only against the person who 
confessed, but not against anyone else. See e.g., 2 HAWKINS, supra note 108, 
at 429 (1771 ed.); LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra note 108, at 603-04 (1787 ed.). 
 However, an accomplice could be admitted as a prosecution witness and 
testify under oath at trial. See Davies, supra note 10, at 196-97 n. 298 
(discussing Tong’s Case, Kelyng J. 17, 84 Eng. Rep. 1061 (K.B. 1662)). 
It may appear that a deceased accomplice’s confession was admitted contrary 
to this rule in King v. Westbeer, 1 Leach 12, 168 Eng. Rep. 108 (Old Bailey 
1739); however, in that case the accomplice had not only “made a full 
confession in writing,” which was presumably unsworn and inadmissible, but 
had also “given information upon oath against the prisoner [pursuant to the 
Marian statutes].” Id. In other words, the accomplice had given a sworn 
Marian examination against Westbeer as a witness in that case; because the 
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utterances or spontaneous declarations,273 though he did describe 
a bankruptcy case as an example of “res gestae” (although the 
case report never used that term).274 
There are other indications that hearsay exceptions in 
criminal cases still were not recognized during the early 
nineteenth century. As noted above, the English criminal 
evidence treatises that were published in the early decades of the 
nineteenth century still did not recognize any hearsay exceptions 
                                                          
accomplice was deceased, that sworn examination would have been 
admissible, even though the unsworn confession would not have been. See 
supra notes 116-123 and accompanying text. 
273 Gallanis concluded that “[b]y the close of the eighteenth century . . . 
the contours of the modern rule against hearsay were largely in place.” 
Gallanis, supra note 37, at 535. However, that conclusion would not appear 
to be applicable to the hearsay exceptions that were pertinent to criminal 
trials. 
274 Gallanis identified a 1794 bankruptcy case, Bateman v. Bailey, 5 
T.R. 512, 513, 101 Eng. Rep. 288 (K.B. 1794), as an example of a “res 
gestae” hearsay exception. Gallanis, supra note 37 at 535 n. 266. The 
evidentiary ruling in that case was “that a bankrupt cannot be called as a 
witness to prove his bankruptcy, but that ‘what was said by him at the time in 
explanation of his own act may be received into evidence.’” Id. Some early 
nineteenth century treatises did identify Bateman as an example of a “res 
gestae” ruling. See, e.g., S.M. PHILLIPPS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE 102 (London, 1814). 
 However, the term “res gestae” did not appear in Bateman itself. 
Likewise, there was no mention of “hearsay” in that report. Rather, on the 
face of the report it appears that the issue may have been peculiar to 
bankruptcy law. Because of concerns about fraudulent manipulations, 
bankruptcy could not be initiated by the bankrupt at that time. See Thomas E. 
Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. REV. 487, 510-
13 (1996). Thus, it is possible that the concern that gave rise to the issue in 
Bateman was that allowing a third person to testify to what a bankrupt said 
about a condition of bankruptcy (for example, the person’s avoidance of 
creditors) might allow the bankrupt to end-run the prohibition against the 
bankrupt personally initiating bankruptcy. That may be the concern in the 
case because the opposition to the allowing the third person’s recitation of the 
bankrupt’s statement was that it could open a door to “fraud.” Bateman, 5 
T.R. at 513, 101 Eng. Rep. at 288. Hence, it is not clear whether Bateman 
involved a res gestae analysis, or whether that characterization was simply a 
gloss applied to it prochronistically in later commentaries. 
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beyond dying declarations 275 and the limited-purpose 
corroboration and existence-of-a-conspiracy exceptions that had 
been recognized in the earlier treatises.276 However, some other 
English commentaries began to mention “res gestae” in civil 
cases.277 Even so, briefs in Davis and Hammon identified several 
English criminal cases from the 1830s that still prohibited 
admission of the content of a crime victim’s apparently 
spontaneous out-of-court statements (although it appears that 
judges sometimes side-stepped the rule).278 
                                                          
275 See supra text accompanying note 172 (discussing Chitty’s 1816 
treatise). 
276 See supra text accompanying notes 163, 164, 171. 
277 See PHILLIPPS, supra note 274, at 102 (1814 ed.) (stating that 
“[h]earsay is often admitted by way of inducement of illustration of what is 
properly evidence, or, as part of the res gestae” but citing only rulings in 
civil lawsuits). In his 1817 third edition (I have not located the second 
edition), Phillipps also treated Brasier as though it were an example of res 
gestae in a criminal case. Id. at 219 (1817 ed.). However, Phillipps misstated 
the ruling in Brasier as though the mother’s testimony had been ruled proper, 
when it was actually ruled to have been illegal and inadmissible. See supra 
text accompanying note 222. The fact that Phillipps could identify a criminal 
example of res gestae only by misstating the ruling in Brasier suggests that 
res gestae had not yet become an accepted doctrine in criminal evidence. 
278 For example, the petitioner’s brief in Davis cited Rex v. Wink, 172 
Eng. Rep. 1293 (1834) (trial judge ruled that a constable could not be asked 
the name of the robber that a robbery victim had told him several hours after 
the robbery, but that the constable could testify as to whether he went in 
search of any person “in consequence of the [victim] mentioning a name to 
him”). The petitioner’s brief attempted to treat that ruling as an aspect of 
“hue and cry” or a hue and cry “report.” See Brief for Petitioner at 20, 
Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006). However, there is no mention 
of hue and cry in the case report and that characterization appears to reflect a 
misunderstanding of the hue and cry procedure for arrests, which was likely 
obsolete by that date. 
 Similarly, the Petitioner’s brief in Hammon noted that an 1830 English 
treatise and English cases decided in the 1830s and 1840s indicated that 
witnesses could testify to the fact that an alleged rape victim had made 
complaints shortly after the alleged incident but that such witnesses still could 
not testify to the contents of her statements, including the name of the person 
she identified as the perpetrator. See Brief for Petitioner at 29-30 nn. 36, 37, 
Hammon v. Indiana, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006). 
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Thus, the available evidence allows considerable confidence 
that there were no pre-framing hearsay exceptions relevant to 
criminal cases other than dying declarations and the limited-
purpose exceptions for corroboration or for proving the general 
existence of a conspiracy or similar background facts. 
C.  Why Were Hearsay Exceptions Invented? 
Why did nineteenth-century judges move away from the 
strict doctrinal ban against hearsay and invent the variety of 
hearsay exceptions that now often permit unsworn out-of-court 
statements to be admitted in criminal trials? The change 
probably reflects the combined effects of a number of factors 
and developments, and I can only speculate. 
Part of the explanation may lie in increasing judicial 
acceptance of relativistic and probabilistic notions of truth and 
proof. That shift probably made some hearsay evidence seem 
more acceptable than it had in the past. Additionally, it seems 
fairly obvious that the significance accorded to the oath as an 
indicia of reliability declined during the nineteenth century, and 
that would have removed one of the earlier supports for the 
strict ban against the admission of unsworn statements. 
Changes in trial procedures may also have contributed to the 
acceptance of hearsay exceptions. The rigid doctrinal ban against 
hearsay may not have had that great an effect on the outcomes 
of criminal trials when defendants were often unrepresented by 
counsel, evidentiary practices were less formal, and trial judges 
exercised considerable discretion. It is possible that the ban 
against hearsay evidence became more costly—either in the 
sense of making the prosecution’s case more cumbersome or in 
the sense of preventing convictions of accused persons—when 
the criminal trial became increasingly adversarial and formalized 
as the nineteenth century progressed. Hence, those changes may 
have created pressures for creating hearsay exceptions, as well 
as for restricting the concept of hearsay to out-of-court 
statements offered for the truth of what was said.279 
                                                          
279 The modern definition of hearsay reaches only those out-of-court 
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Changes in other aspects of criminal procedure may also 
have fed into the recognition of hearsay exceptions. For 
example, the institutionalization of a police prosecutor or public 
prosecutor may have created a “repeat player” who could press 
for relaxation of the hearsay ban.280 Additionally, the shift from 
the accusatorial criminal procedure of the framing-era to modern 
investigatory procedure and the accompanying invention and 
institutionalization of police departments and public prosecutor 
offices may have given a new gloss of reliability to hearsay 
information obtained by official sources and may also have 
increased pressures to admit hearsay evidence.281 
Unlike the constables of the eighteenth century, the new 
police officers of the nineteenth century were expected to be 
more proactive in ferreting out crime. In particular, unlike the 
eighteenth-century constable who usually made an arrest only 
after another person had charged that a crime had been 
committed “in fact,” the new police officers of the nineteenth 
century were authorized to arrest on their own assessment of 
“probable cause”282—a relaxed standard that implied room to 
use second-hand hearsay information.283 As a result, it seems 
likely that police testimony would have generated even more 
                                                          
statements that are offered into evidence “for the truth of the matter 
asserted.” See supra note 9. That qualification is not stated in any of the 
definitions of hearsay that appeared in any of the eighteenth-century 
authorities discussed in this article. It would appear that the qualification was 
developed in connection with the articulation of the res gestae concept during 
the early nineteenth century. The distinction between a hearsay statement, and 
an out-of-court statement constituting “original” evidence or res gestae is 
evident in mid- and late-nineteenth century discussions of hearsay. See, e.g.,1 
SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 98-102, 108 
(Boston, 4th ed., 1848); 1 id. at 185 (16th ed. 1899). 
280 See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead; Speculations 
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC. REV. 95 (1974). 
281 For an overview of the post-framing shift from accusatory to 
investigatory criminal procedure, see Davies, supra note 2, at 419-35. 
282 See Davies, Fourth Amendment, supra note 11, at 627-39. 
283 Indeed, the change in the law that permited police officers to use 
hearsay information to justify warrantless arrests eventually undermined the 
framing-era ban against using hearsay information to justify the issuance of 
arrest or search warrants. See id. at 650-51 n. 287. 
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“pursuit hearsay” during nineteenth-century trials than Professor 
Langbein observed in accounts of eighteenth-century trials.284 
Whatever the explanation, it seems fairly evident that 
nineteenth-century judges gave more priority to facilitating the 
introduction of evidence of a defendant’s guilt than to enforcing 
the previously rigorous conception of the confrontation right. In 
a very real sense, American judges rejected the original 
understanding of the Confrontation Clause during the nineteenth 
century—though they obviously did not admit as much.285 That 
rejection, in turn, is the source of the hearsay-confrontation 
conundrum that has been a constant in the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause since the Supreme 
                                                          
284 See supra text accompanying note259; see also the indirect allowance 
of pursuit hearsay in the 1834 Wink case discussed supra note 278. 
285 The fact that trial testimony came to be recorded in written transcripts 
may have also played a role. During the eighteenth century, although the 
written record of a sworn Marian witness examination of a deceased witness 
was admissible as evidence, see supra notes 116-123 and accompanying text, 
oral testimony purporting to recite the sworn testimony a deceased witness 
had given in a prior trial was inadmissible as hearsay. The reason was that 
the oral nature of an account of prior trial testimony made it inferior in 
reliability to the written record of an examination or deposition. See Davies, 
supra note 10, at 180 n. 235. 
 However, the objection regarding the unreliability of oral accounts of 
prior trial testimony was undercut when trial testimony began to be recorded 
in writing. Thus, a number of the nineteenth century American cases that 
discussed the confrontation right did so in the context of justifying a rule 
change to allow admission of sworn testimony that a deceased witness had 
given in a prior trial. However, because that form of evidence still did not 
conform to the earlier emphasis on the importance of cross-examination in the 
presence of the trial jury, the opinions that were written to justify that change 
tended to downplay the significance of the earlier emphasis on cross-
examination in the presence of the trial jury and instead treated the 
opportunity for cross-examination at a previous trial as though that satisfied 
the confrontation right. As a result, those cases tended to give a truncated 
account of the connection between the rule against hearsay and the 
confrontation right. For example, Mattox seems to have introduced the 
inaccurate historical notion that the confrontation right was aimed merely at 
preventing trial by ex parte depositions as a means of downplaying the 
concept of cross-examination in the presence of the trial jury. See supra note 
23. 
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Court first began to hear criminal appeals in the late nineteenth 
century.286 
The bottom line is that Crawford and Davis cannot have 
invoked an authentic understanding of the original Confrontation 
Clause because the original understanding is no longer 
compatible with modern criminal evidence or procedure. The 
distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay may 
appear to be a convenient way to adjust the confrontation right 
to the post-framing invention of the hearsay exceptions that now 
permit far greater admission of hearsay evidence than the 
Framers ever imagined. However, that convenience hardly 
makes the distinction part of the original Confrontation Clause. 
Crawford and Davis depart from the Framers’ design when 
they allow the admission of unsworn hearsay in criminal trials. 
Even if one sets aside the historical requirement of an oath, they 
depart from the Framers’ design insofar as they allow second-
hand, hearsay evidence to be admitted that tends to prove the 
guilt of the defendant. Crawford and Davis limit the scope of the 
confrontation right in ways the Framers would neither have 
imagined nor endorsed. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the holdings in Crawford and Davis, it is plain that the 
testimonial/nontestimonial hearsay distinction is now a central 
feature of the law of the Confrontation Clause. It is highly 
improbable that the Court will revisit that treatment. However, 
accurate investigations of authentic framing-era law will not 
provide any guidance as to how that distinction should now be 
applied. Contrary to Crawford’s claims, the confrontation right 
was not limited to “testimonial hearsay” at the time of the 
framing, and framing-era sources did not draw any distinction 
between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay. Hence, 
authentic history cannot shed any light on how the distinction 
                                                          
286 There generally was no appellate review of felony convictions prior 
to the late nineteenth century, and the Supreme Court itself did not review 
criminal convictions until the 1880s. See, e.g., ERWIN C. SURRENCY, 
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 312-14 (2d ed. 2002). 
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should now be applied—unless it is to suggest that the disparity 
between the testimonial scheme and the original understanding 
of the right could be reduced by redefining the “testimonial” 
category to include any statement that constituted material 
evidence of a defendant’s guilt, regardless of whether it was 
made to a government officer or private person. 
Rather, the hypothetical originalist claims in Crawford and 
Davis are significant primarily for what they demonstrate about 
originalism itself. In particular, the hypothetical character of 
those claims reveals a defect that commonly infects originalist 
claims—the denial of the degree to which legal doctrine and 
institutions (and almost everything else) has changed since the 
framing. Originalism is dependent upon the historical fiction that 
the content of constitutional rights can somehow have remained 
constant when the law that shaped and informed the content of 
those rights plainly has not. 
As noted above, Justice Scalia asserted in Crawford that 
“[a]ny attempt to determine the application of a constitutional 
provision to a phenomenon that did not exist at the time of 
adoption (here, allegedly, admissible unsworn testimony) 
involves some degree of estimation . . . but that is hardly a 
reason not to make the estimation as accurate as possible.”287 In 
a similar vein, Justice Scalia has more recently asserted that 
“[t]here is nothing new or surprising in the proposition that our 
unchanging Constitution refers to other bodies of law that might 
themselves change. . . .This reference to changeable law 
presents no problem for the originalist.”288 
The “problem” of changeable law would matter for 
originalists, however, if originalist claims were actually confined 
to authentic history. The difficulty with recovering or applying 
the original confrontation right is not, as Justice Scalia’s 
comments suggest, a matter of making an “estimation” of how 
the Framers would have applied a constitutional provision “to a 
phenomenon that did not exist at the time of the adoption.” 
Rather, the difficulty lies in attempting to apply a constitutional 
                                                          
287 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n. 3 (emphasis added). 
288 Georgia v. Rudolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1540 (2006). 
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provision to a post-framing phenomenon such as the invention of 
criminal hearsay exceptions that actually contravenes the 
framing-era law that shaped the Framers’ understanding of the 
constitutional provision. The difficulty lies in applying the 
Confrontation Clause to hearsay exceptions that violate the 
Framers’ expectations and design. 
No amount of clever speculation can uncover “our 
unchanging Constitution” because the Constitution does not 
hover out there someplace—rather, constitutional rights have 
always drawn their content from the relevant bodies of 
“changeable law” (though it is doubtful that the Framers’ 
anticipated how changeable evidence law would turn out to 
be289). Additionally, Supreme Court justices have been revising 
both the law and the Constitution for more than two centuries.290 
The result is that we could not to “return” to even an 
approximation of the original Confrontation Clause unless we 
were willing to repeal the hearsay exceptions that judges have 
invented since the framing. Obviously, we are not going to do 
that. Undoubtedly there are good reasons not to abandon those 
exceptions wholesale. That being the case, however, originalism 
cannot be more than a distraction from the policy concerns that 
                                                          
289 It is doubtful, however, that the Framers anticipated that the law of 
evidence or jury trial would change significantly in the future. See supra note 
54. 
290 The notion of an “unchanging Constitution” can only constitute a 
rhetorical device today because it cannot be seriously entertained as a 
description of our constitutional history. The Supreme Court has been 
revising the Constitution in myriad ways for more than two centuries. For 
example, I hope to soon publish an article explaining how the Marshall Court 
itself effectively rewrote Article III to fabricate an opportunity to rule that a 
statute was unconstitutional in Marbury v. Madison in 1803. Likewise, as I 
have previously documented, the modern Supreme Court has moved the 
standards for lawful criminal arrests from “due process of law” in the Fifth 
Amendment, which the Framers understood to preserve common-law arrest 
requirements, to the Fourth Amendment, which was understood to be only a 
specific ban against general warrants themselves in 1789. That transposition 
then allowed the justices to relax the constitutional arrest standard to probable 
cause, and to press “due process” into service as a surrogate for “privileges 
and immunities.” See Davies, supra note 10, at 216 n. 344. It is several 
centuries too late to speak of an “unchanging Constitution.” 
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we—and the justices—have more reason to be concerned about. 
Hence, it is time for everyone to stop pretending that 
Crawford’s restriction of the scope of the confrontation right is 
other than the policy and political choice that it is.291 Crawford’s 
                                                          
291 The ideological content of Crawford’s purportedly originalist scheme 
looks quite different depending on which aspect of the decision one thinks 
will have the most practical importance. The “cross-examination rule” that 
regulates the admission of testimonial hearsay is a pro-defendant feature that 
imbues the confrontation right with more substance than it had under the 
previous Roberts regime. For example, that standard is the basis for the 
exclusion of the statements made during police interrogations in both 
Crawford and Hammon. Thus, some early commentaries on Crawford have 
tended to describe it as thought it were a pro-defendant ruling. 
 However, the complete withdrawal of the confrontation right from 
nontestimonial hearsay is plainly a pro-prosecution feature in so far as it 
allows state courts or legislatures to take a very permissive approach to 
admitting nontestimonial hearsay in criminal trials. For example, the 
restrictive interpretation of the scope of the Confrontation Clause in Crawford 
permitted the admission of the hearsay statements made in the 911 call in 
Davis, even though those statements constituted crucial evidence against the 
defendant. 
 As a student of criminal procedure, I suspect that the restricted scope 
assigned to the confrontation right in Crawford and Davis will turn out to be 
the most important aspect of those rulings. Viewed against the overall pro-
prosecution trajectory of criminal procedure developments over the last two 
centuries, and especially during the last several decades, I think it is likely 
that further rulings in the Supreme Court (or the justices’ acquiescence in 
lower court rulings) will define the large mass of hearsay evidence to be only 
nontestimonial hearsay that is entirely exempt from the confrontation right. 
 For example, although Davis left the issue open, it seems likely that 
future developments will clarify that only statements that are made to 
government agents can be deemed to be testimonial and subject to the cross-
examination rule. See Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2274 n. 2. Indeed, in Crawford, 
Justice Scalia described the Marian examinations taken by the justice of the 
peace as the primary target of the Confrontation Clause (see supra note 17 
and accompanying text), and then announced that the Confrontation Clause 
applied to police “interrogations” because such interrogations bore “a striking 
resemblance” to justice of the peace examinations. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 
(discussed in Davies, supra note 10, at 202-04). That formulation leaves the 
door open for the justices to decide in future cases that the Confrontation 
Clause applies only to interrogations by government agents. For example, it 
will not be surprising if the justices conclude that even accusatory statements 
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testimonial scheme for limiting the confrontation right is 
decidedly not “the Framers’ design.” 
 
                                                          
made to private persons do not sufficiently “resemble” framing-era 
examinations conducted by justices of the peace to fall within the scope of the 
confrontation right. 
 Additionally, the ruling in Davis itself shows that not all statements made 
to government agents will be deemed to be testimonial. Rather Davis 
indicates that statements made to police officers will be testimonial only when 
the “primary purpose” of the police interview was to obtain information for a 
prosecution and concludes that statements made in police interviews will 
“often” be nontestimonial. 126 S.Ct. at 2279 (emphasis in original). 
 Similarly, it seems likely that the justices will create (or allow lower 
courts to create) a variety of exceptions that will permit the admission of 
testimonial hearsay even when the unavailability and cross-examination 
requirements are not met. For example, although Davis left the parameters of 
the “forfeiture” exception to the confrontation right for another time, it did 
announce in dicta that hearsay (presumably including testimonial hearsay) 
could be admitted in a forfeiture hearing itself. Id. at 2279-80. 
 Thus, it seems likely that the Court may define the scope of the 
Confrontation Clause so narrowly in future cases that the cross-examination 
rule applicable to only “testimonial” hearsay will have very limited practical 
significance—especially as law enforcement professionals learn how to avoid 
that characterization. 
